3: Savonnet-1 E-5 (no date) 1955 MS37 Senegal MS37

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121 369 To complement an urban geographical study of Thiès (1), a city located about 60 kilometers as the crow flies from Dakar, we have made an investigation in the villages of its suburbs.

[175 496] The sole object of this investigation was to learn to what extent the presence of a city founded entirely by Europeans as early as 1885 (date of the running of the Dakar--Saint-Louis railroad) may have effects on the neighboring rural groupings.

Consequently, this study will deal only with the relations that may exist between the city and the neighboring villages; agricultural problems will be dealt with only to the extent that they help to clarify certain aspects of the question.

[563] Seven villages were chosen. These agglomerations contain populations that belong to the principal ethnic groups of the region: Sérère-none /Serer/ at Tiali, Thiès-none, and Sapko; Wolof at Diakhaté and Keur-Mamour; Bambara and Wassoulonké at Karamoko and at Keur-Issa-Bambara (see the sketch below). All of these localities are located within a radius of less than ten kilometers around the city.

The presence of a city in a given region may have disturbed rural life in very different ways, depending on the distance from the village to the city and depending on its ethnic composition.

It may have acted on the choice of the site for the village, on its arrangement, on the creation of new rural groupings.

It may have caused modifications in the type of the traditional settlement, in its interior comforts, in its modes and methods of cultivation.

/372/ Finally, and above all, it may have led to more or less profound perturbations in the social and economic organization of the village.

Before developing these three points it seems necessary to

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1. "La ville de Thiès /The City of Thiès/," to appear soon in Études Sénégalaises.

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SR /381 cont./
369 inhabitants. These three villages are located less than two
[162] kilometers from the first urban quarters, consequently a favorable location for the daily departure of workers for the escale.

S The ethnic composition of these agglomerations, despite
SR the urban proximity (favorable for the mixing of peoples), has
369 remained homogeneous. At Sapko there is no foreign element;
162 at Tiali two Wolof and one Sérère-Sine were working there
[563] temporarily at the time of the time of the inquiry; by contrast, nearly a tenth of the population of Thiès-None is made up of individuals belonging to non-Sérère ethnic groups (Wolof, Toucouleur, Peul). A parallel must be drawn between this
S quite relative heterogeneity and the almost total Islamiza-
SR tion of the locality. Nearly four-fifths of the population of
[771] Thiès-None has embraced this religion; Sapko and Tiali, by contrast, remain essentially Catholic or fetishistic, the Moslems living there generally being transient elements.

S A kind of self-defense by the Catholic group that lives
SR in a region largely Islamized seems to be one of the primary
582 reasons for this ethnic integrity. Under the influence of the
794 fathers, who possess, it seems, a profound authority over every
[563] Christian agglomeration, marriages occur from None village to None village and between Catholics (1).

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[177] 1. The woman seems to be the element through which the transition from the Catholic religion to the Moslem religion occurs. The young Christian who marries a Moslem no longer practices and quickly abjures her first religion; her children and the whole line will become Islamized under the paternal influence.

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SR /382/ An examination of the male and economically
162 active population of these three agglomerations gives the
369 result that 38% of its elements have remained essentially

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S 162 An examination of the suburban villages farthest from Thiès will give even lower figures.

S 162 563 Karamoko, located seven kilometers from the city, musters 106 inhabitants. Its ethnic composition is clearly different from that of the above None villages. Very great heterogeneity prevails there; it is made up of 30% Bambara, 30% Wassoulonké, and 25% Peul-Toucouleur. The Bambara and Wassoulonké form the ethnic base of the village, of which they were the creators. The other elements through the play of marriages have superimposed themselves on these groups.

W [563] /383/ Keur-Mamour, by contrast, has remained Wolof; only a few Peul shepherds have infiltrated into the village.

S 162 369 463 The distance from the urban center has considerably reduced the relations with Thiès. They have both remained rural: less than 10% of the economically active male population have non-agricultural work; more than 60% have remained wholly faithful to the land.

S W 369 463 317 At Keur-Mamour, although some elements were formerly employed in the escale itself, at the time of the inquiry only one-tenth were employed as laborers at the Péchiney phosphate quarries located in the vicinity of their village. (We have here an indirect effect of the urban presence: the opening of extra-urban yards offering extra-rural work to the neighboring villages.) As a consequence no worker was employed in the city itself.

S 369 Karamoko and Keur-Mamour thus present limited characteristics of the urban suburbs.

Keur-Issa-Bambara and Diakhaté, located in the vicinity of the escale (about one kilometer from the first outskirts), would have to form the type proper of the suburb.

S 369 563 162 W [563] The ethnic composition is essentially Wolof at Diakhaté, composite at Keur-Issa-Bambara. In this latter agglomeration the Bambara, the Peul, and the Toucouleur respectively account for 30% in the composition of the group. The remainder is made up of Wassoulonké, Wolof, Malinké, and Sarakolé. Consequently the heterogeneity seems to be greater there than

/383 cont./
369 at Karamoko. This leads to the supposition that there is great
563 instability on the part of the families who, coming from the
162 Sudan, for example, momentarily settle in the village before being integrated into the urban population of Thiès.

An examination of the table below[1] will permit a comparison of the structure of the four non-None villages (the None villages are homogeneous, as we have seen above).

/384/ In the predominately rural villages, the number
369 of individuals born in the village almost balances the number
563 of those born outside: Karamoko, 34 as against 35; Keur-Mamour,
162 28 as against 22. It should be emphasized that at Keur-Mamour
166 most of the men were born in the village itself, 21 as against 3, but by contrast most of the women are of outside origin, 19 as against 7. At Karamoko, on the other hand, an equal number of men and women leave their village of birth to settle elsewhere.

In the predominately urban agglomerations, the individuals who come from the outside are clearly in the majority. At Diakhaté, 31 are natives of the village as against 48 from the outside. At Keur-Issa-Bambara, only 23 are natives of the village as against 51 from the outside. Let us note that the number of men and the number of women born outside of the village are nearly identical: 22 men as against 29 women at Keur-Issa-Bambara, 23 as against 25 at Diakhaté.

These comparative figures emphasize a greater ethnic mixture in the villages whose economy is marked by the presence of the city.

The villages of Sudanese origin in particular require complementary data concerning the place of origin of the emigration.
563 To what extent do these villages maintain relations with their
162 country of origin? Does the emigration movement toward Senegal,
166 primed at the end of the last century, continue with as much strength in our day?

An examination of the place of birth of individuals belonging to the over-40 age group (early emigration) and the individuals not having reached this age (recent emigration) will illuminate

[1] [see cat 116, p 18 - ANALYST]

3: Savonnet--19 E-5 (no date) 1955 MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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this problem.

At Keur-Issa-Bambara, out of 37 individuals born in the Sudan, 20 are over 40 years of age. At Karamoko, 28 are natives of the Sudan, but 18 have reached 40 years of age. Out of 65 individuals of Sudanese origin, only 27 are young elements. Over half of those classed under the rubric "emigrant" were aged persons, some of whom perhaps assisted in the creation of the village in Senegal.

These few figures are an index of the mediocrity of the present immigration of the Sudanese to the region of Thiès. The unions and the displacements of families or of familial elements seem to occur now between relatively close villages.

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An examination of the division of activities at Diakhaté and at Keur-Issa-Bambara will permit to some extent "gauging" their index of urbanization.

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At Diakhaté, 20% of the economically active male population work /385/ at Thiès, 60% have remained agriculturalists, and the remainder, 20%, is composed of workers of mixed activities, half-rural, half-urban. Keur-Issa-Bambara shows only a very low percentage of workers in mixed activities: 60% are rural; more than 30% work in the city (one sees that this latter figure is slightly higher than that for the None villages, 27%).

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The workshops of the Dakar-Niger employ a considerable number of permanent or temporary workers from these two villages. These two localities in fact furnish 19 permanent city workers, 15 of whom are employed on the Dakar-Niger; among the four temporary workers from Keur-Issa-Bambara, three have worked in this enterprise. In addition, Diakhaté furnishes temporarily for the city: four tailors, one mason, and one carpenter.

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Let us add that a minority of natives, despite the contacts that they can have with Europeans, understand our language, a little less than 5%. The number of children who go to the European school is almost null, scarcely 1%.

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After this quick study of some types of villages in the vicinity established. Until recent years Senegal was the only territory with an educational system in any way compatible with a policy of assimilation. 648

Thus, with the exception of Senegal, there evolved a mixed policy containing elements of assimilation and separation which came to be known as the policy of association. Even so, as Lord Hailey wrote in his recent *African Survey*, 'the underlying assumption remained that, on a long view, the future of the overseas territories must be one of eventual integration with France in a larger political unit'. And though assimilationist policy was never really successful on the political level, on the personal level, particularly in education where equality of black and white was so frequently demonstrated, it left deep marks. To quote Lord Hailey once again, this time from his 1939 *African Survey*, 'it is not easy to exaggerate the effect on native outlook of a system which permits Africans to sit side by side with French children and to compete with them on equal terms in examinations'.

Since assimilation was only practised in any real measure in Senegal, it is the most interesting of all the French African colonies as the one most marked by contact with the metropolitan power. This book is therefore a study of Senegal with particular reference to a special kind of race relations whereby one people, whilst accepting the fundamental equality of the other, attempts to assimilate it to its own standards in every sphere of life. An attempt will be made to assess to what extent French assimilation was successful in Senegal and why the Senegalese eventually reacted against it; the subsequent marks it was to leave on this newly independent state; the extent to which indigenous culture withstood assimilationist policy; and finally what sort of society the Senegalese, now independent of France, are trying to create for themselves. 121

Senegal becomes even more interesting as a present day case study. For in applying their policy of assimilation, the French Government had to remember that Senegal was the [563]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961)·1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

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563 only black African territory where there was a sizeable French community. In Dakar alone the French numbered [160] 6,600 in 1931, 17,300 in 1948 and increased to nearly 30,000 in recent years. It is interesting to examine how the *colons* on the spot reacted to the acceptance of Africans as [369] equals in law and political rights and finally how far assimilation, by providing a new common culture, was able to break down traditional indigenous inter-ethnic hostilities.

175 small island of Gorée further down the coast. However this did not mean that the French lacked interest in the interior. From 1749-53 Michel Adanson explored the Senegalese coast and undertook the first really scientific description of West Africa. His writings were largely responsible for the later hope that European colonisation of this part of Africa would be possible. But for the rest of the eighteenth century France's hold on St. Louis was too tenuous for anything of this nature to be undertaken. Indeed during the Seven Years' War the town fell to the British and was only returned
175 in 1779. By the end of the eighteenth century St. Louis
563 with a population of 7,000, had a European colony numbering 600, the largest on the whole of the West Coast. It also
369 had an important assimilated mulatto community, whose
[162] descendants are known today as St. Louisiens. Indeed there had been a very high degree of *métissage* by the end of the eighteenth century, since most Frenchmen there took permanent African mistresses known as *signares*, and ensured the education of any children they had by them. Indeed in all but legal status these *signares* were wives and their 'marriages' were celebrated by their families with all the pomp of a normal wedding. However, with the improvement of communications between Senegal and France and the arrival of larger numbers of soldiers in the middle of the nineteenth century, mistresses were much more temporary in nature and the number of Frenchmen prepared to educate resulting offspring was considerably reduced.

175 In 1789 St. Louis sent its *cahier* of grievances to the States-
567 General on the eve of the French Revolution, demanding the end of the monopoly of the great companies, freedom of trade and the abolition of slavery, which had hitherto formed
[439] the main item of export from St. Louis. These grievances were heeded. Slavery was abolished and the companies had their charters withdrawn. But the position of slaves and slave-trading in the colonies was not in fact settled until the end of the wars that followed the French Revolution.

175 During these wars St. Louis once again fell to the British
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5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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and only under the terms of the Treaty of Paris which ended the Napoleonic Wars was it finally returned to the French in 1817. Under King Louis XVIII, France embarked on a policy of European colonisation of Senegal. Colonel Schmaltz negotiated with Moctar Diop, the Lebou chief of the small village of Dakar, for land to settle 200 emigrants to be despatched from France under the auspices of the *Société Coloniale Philanthropique.* But climate and disease soon put an end to this venture. Nevertheless Schmaltz persisted with his schemes in St. Louis so that Senegal could by its products enrich the mother country. He made agreements with local chiefs for the agricultural settlement of part of the Oualo or hinterland of St. Louis and in 1819 a model farm was established to experiment in the growing of cotton, olives, dates, coconuts and coffee. This policy was pursued enthusiastically by his successor, Baron Roger, and a number of experiments, mainly concerned with cotton, were undertaken in the next few years. By 1822 nearly fifty concessions had been granted to the French by local chiefs and for the next five years further experiments were carried out by Monsieur Richard who started a full scale research station at what is now called Richard-Toll or Richard's field. But his efforts were not crowned with success, and later governors influenced by the reaction against colonialism in France lost interest in agricultural settlement. This was perhaps fortunate for modern Senegal, since had these first experiments been fruitful she might have been saddled with a settler problem today.

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France was already working towards an assimilationist policy. A governmental despatch to Schmaltz informed him that his political aim should be 'to introduce gradually among the blacks of Senegal a civilisation based on free labour . . . education, and public peace . . .' It continued: 'A mulatto is now mayor of the capital of our possessions, and a black could become so too.' Two years later Baron Roger was informed that since most of the free population of St. Louis was mulatto or African it was 'very important

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648 [563] [369] not to let the same discriminations and prejudices such as exist in other colonies be introduced among them.' At the same time the metropolitan Government was asking whether Africans would make suitable corporals and under-officers. Furthermore Schmaltz, whilst advocating a system of economic exploitation that seemed to be entirely to the advantage of France, maintained that the Senegalese were not merely to be auxiliaries and that they would be encouraged by fixed prices for their crops to produce more and become 'civilised' by their contact with Europe.

648 567 641 So far France had made no definition of the position of non-French inhabitants of her colonies. Even though France by the decree of 16 Pluviose Year II (1792) had abolished slavery and declared that 'all men, without distinction of colour, domiciled in French colonies, are French citizens, and enjoy all the rights assured by the Constitution', and even though the slave trade had been outlawed in 1818, until 1833 freed slaves had uncertain status in law, and domestic slaves still existed in large numbers. A royal ordinance of that year proclaimed that 'Any person born free or having legally acquired his liberty enjoys in the French colonies: (1) civil rights; (2) political rights under conditions prescribed by law'. But only in 1848 was the status of *captif* or domestic slave abolished, though the majority of *captifs* continued to serve with their former masters. Naturally this law only affected inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée and the other French posts like Dagana and Richard-Toll.

648 [641] [818] [799] The most important result of these two laws was to give about 12,000 Africans, mostly illiterate, the full rights of French citizens. Of these less than a thousand had been converted to Christianity by their French, mulatto or Christian African masters. Educational facilities, which would have to accompany any effective conversion of illiterates into full scale French citizens were still rudimentary. But it must be remembered that in France, at the time, the electorate was suddenly increased from 200,000 to

9,000,000 most of whom were illiterate. Balzac, in 1845, wrote in his book *Les paysans*: 648

> For twenty million beings in France the law is merely a piece of white paper stuck on the door of the Church or the Town Hall . . . Many mayors of cantons turn their copies of the *Bulletin des Lois* into bags for holding raisins and seeds. As for the mere mayors of communes you would be shocked by the number who cannot read or write and by the way in which the civil registers are kept.

Most remarkable of the innovations of the short lived French Second Republic of 1848-52, in which the Revolution once more came into its own, was the granting of the right to Senegal of sending a deputy to the National Assembly in France. Grandly it was announced, 'The Colonies purified of slavery . . . will be represented in the National Assembly'. Effectively, such a deputy would be representing an overwhelming majority of African 'citizens' for metropolitan Frenchmen numbered then only some 500. However it was to take some time before the African citizens were to use this newly acquired right to elect one of their own number to the Assembly. 162 563 666

The 1848 Revolution thus embroidered on the 1833 ordinance of the French monarchy by introducing a full scale assimilationist policy for the colonies of France. In Senegal it affected only a small number of people. And never again would France in her expansion through Africa apply this trend in her colonial policy so liberally to her newly acquired territories. Thereafter there was to be a tussle with those administrators who either felt that the inhabitants of the colonial territories were different and should be treated as such, or were overwhelmed by the practical problems involved in applying an assimilationist policy to a largely illiterate population spread over an area eight times the size of France.

The reaction to the liberal thinking of the second republic soon came with Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* by which an authoritarian Second Empire was established. In 1854 the right of electing a deputy was withdrawn from all

648 colonies other than Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion and at the same time they were subjected to rule by direct decree of the Emperor.

[167] It was under the Second Empire that the first great period of French colonial expansion in black Africa took place. It was during that regime that Faidherbe, who was to Senegal what Lugard was to Nigeria, first embarked on his African conquests. Faidherbe himself embodied this dichotomy in French colonial policy: an authoritarian agent of an authoritarian regime, he was often found introducing reforms and innovations that conformed with the most liberal application of an assimilationist policy.

[643] Faidherbe was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854.
369 At the time St. Louis, according to Abbé Boilaut in his
[162] *Esquisses sénégalaises* was a city of 12,336 inhabitants with
[563] only 177 Europeans. There were two primary schools run
by Catholic missionaries. A full scale administration had
[877] succeeded in imposing on a town otherwise consisting mainly
[797] of single storey houses, a governor's palace, a 'very elegant
[361] Palace of Justice', a large naval hospital, a fine church and
an army barracks.

648 From his base at St. Louis, Faidherbe, in a series of
643 brilliant campaigns, notably against the powerful emir of
Trarza and the Muslim reformist and Toucouleur leader, El Hadj Omar, was to lay the foundations of France's West African empire. To do this he organised the now famous *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, since Europeans did not stand up well to the climate and the prevalent diseases. By conquest or by treaty he brought most of modern Senegal and much of
643 Soudan (Mali) under French rule. He installed an efficient
military administration, and even published an official
[804] newspaper the *Moniteur du Sénégal*. Altogether Faidherbe
was a remarkable man. He was a firm believer in the equality of races, and did much to increase the educational
[877] facilities of the colony. He established a school for the sons
[797] of chiefs, and lay schools for Muslims, who objected to
attending the mission schools. Whilst Faidherbe wanted to

648 that belongs to us, our occupation should be limited to those parts necessary for assuring the suppression of brigandage, the freedom of trade and the tranquillity of an industrious population.

The land cultivated by them will provide produce which will become the object of lucrative trade for the European, the only kind of work he can undertake in this climate.

648 By 1865 the colony of Senegal comprised 150,000 inhabit-
641 ants of whom only some 15,000, living in the original
1161 French settlements of St. Louis and Gorée-Dakar, were
1162 French citizens. Indeed this number was not to increase
563 noticeably until the end of the century, since the privileges
granted to those Africans under French rule in 1848 were
never extended to the interior. For whilst Faidherbe
pursued a policy of assimilation in the main centres like St.
Louis, Gorée and Dakar, he initiated the basis of a system of
administration for what was to become the rest of modern
Senegal and French black Africa as a whole that was dis-
tinctly non-assimilationist. The laws for the *sujets* or those
who did not enjoy the rights of French citizens were partic-
1167 ularly harsh. They were not allowed to leave the colony,
466 they had no right of meeting or association, and they
653 were subjected to the corvée or forced labour on the main-
631 tenance of roads. To obtain this forced labour Faidherbe
relied on the chiefs, and indeed one of the main criticisms
of him as an exponent of assimilationism is that he leaned
so heavily on both the chiefs and Islam. The treaty made
by Jauréguiberry (acting-Governor whilst Faidherbe was
on leave in 1865) with Abdoul Boubaker of Toro was far
removed from the principles of assimilation: 'Art. 2—The
Toro will continue to administer itself according to its own
laws, traditions and customs.'

The overthrow of the Second Empire and the establish-
ment of the Third Republic in 1870 was to see lukewarm
reaffirmation of principles of the revolution and a conse-
quent return to assimilationist principles at least in the
646 political field. In 1871 Senegal regained her deputy. More

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

III. FRENCH REACTION AGAINST ASSIMILATION

000 France had made a great mistake in granting suffrage to the Natives. She did not withdraw her present, but took good care not to repeat it elsewhere.

Pierre Mille: *The Black Vote in Senegal.*

648 Until 1913 all the Senegalese deputies in the French Chamber of Deputies were citizens of metropolitan
646 origin. And in the General Council and the municipal councils Europeans, even when they were not in a majority,
[633] more often than not succeeded in controlling proceedings.
[563] With this European domination of the representative institutions, it may come as a surprise that France not only failed to extend the experiment to other parts of French Africa, but indeed did her best to suppress those rights already granted in Senegal. First of all many of the Gover-
643 nors resented the control the General Council had over the
646 territorial budget, albeit limited. Secondly they found that
[652] the General Council tried to run a peace-time administration for that part of Senegal under direct rule, whilst the Governors were more concerned with the pacification of the much larger hinterland, for in those days Senegal included much of what is now Mali. As one historian of Senegal, André Villard, has put it: 'The Colony thought it had the right to lead the quiet life of a French *arrondissement* at the very time when expansion towards the east necessitated exceptional political and military efforts.' An authoritarian Governor like Brière de l'Isle found it particularly galling to be saddled with a democratically
646 elected legislative council. Furthermore the General-
563 Councillors, who were mainly European or half-caste up
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5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

till the end of the nineteenth century, neglected the Pro- 646
tectorate and seemed to think that the only parts of the 563
country that mattered were the four communes. Naturally 633
their official business with the Protectorate was limited, but
they did control the three main ports of the country through [439]
which the products of the interior passed to France. The 646
councillors, too, restricted education largely to the com- 871
munes, where on the whole it reached a satisfactory level. [369]
They even sent students on scholarships to France, but
unfortunately too few of these returned to Senegal to use
their newly acquired talents. It was not until the establish-
ment of the Government-General of French West Africa
in 1905 that educational facilities were extended to the [648]
Protectorate in any great measure.

The increase in education amongst citizens of African 641
origin meant that by the turn of the nineteenth century they were less willing to accept European domination in the communes and the General Council. The assertion of their rights is one of the main factors behind the attempts of the administration to deprive the indigenous Senegalese of their position as *citoyens*. Actually the Administration was batting on a good wicket. Technically a French citizen was one who accepted French rights and duties without qualification.
In the case of the Africans in Senegal they had been allowed [671]
to retain their own *statut personnel*, that is private law, with reference to civil disputes, matrimony, divorce, inheritance and land. But this seemed to conflict openly with the definition of a French citizen. It seemed wrong that a man should exercise the rights of a French citizen and not accept the consequent obligations. Many Frenchmen felt it quite illogical that an African with four wives could yet be a citizen. And indeed in later years the main obstacle to granting citizenship to other colonial peoples was to be the question of retention of the *statut personnel*. Thus many of the attempts by the French to deprive the Senegalese citizens of their rights were the result of quite genuine
objections to the illogicality of their position. Faidherbe, [643]

taxes, but thereafter relations between chiefs and Government 646
on the one hand and citizens on the other were rarely [633]
cordial. [631]

The powers of the Council were very restricted, having
legislative rights over minor matters like the classification
of roads and the management of public properties. Even
these limited powers were subject to the veto of the [648]
Governor-General of French West Africa. Its main deliberative
competence was over the budget, which though drawn [652]
up by the Governor could be criticised by the councillors.
This power was watered down by the classification of a [643]
large section of the budget as obligatory expenditure.
Nevertheless the council was an exceptional institution
in West Africa. As R. L. Buell in his *The Native Problem in
Africa* wrote:

> That the eight Europeans who participated in the Council should 563
> have exactly the same status as the thirty-two blacks is a situation 646
> which would strike the Anglo-Saxon as anomalous to say the least. The visitor to the Council will frequently witness a black president calling a European member to order for rowdiness. It does not appear, however, that the council is divided upon racial lines, i.e. of white versus black, except on the issue of higher pay for European officials—a policy which was, in fact, attacked as vigorously by the Europeans as by the native members. The real alignment so far has been the citizen members—both black and European—against the government supported by the chiefs. Black members as we have seen, have unmercifully criticised officials in Senegal. No British colony would tolerate the attacks which the natives make upon European officials in Senegal.

Buell pin-pointed a growing division in the territory— 641
that between the *originaires* and the *sujets* of the Protectorate.
The *originaires*, especially since the election of one of their
own number as deputy, became increasingly jealous of their
privileges. Meanwhile the rest of the territory was administered
according to the same principles of administration as
were applied throughout the rest of West Africa. Though [631]
traditional chiefs were stripped of their traditional powers

VII. THE FRENCH IN SENEGAL

OOO **The less intelligent the white man, the more stupid the black man seems to him.**

André Gide

563 369 The first thing that strikes the casual visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans and the apparent absence of any colour problem. Senegal in fact has an exceptionally good record of race relations, especially when one considers that the proportion of Europeans to Africans is much higher than in many countries with acute racial problems. The French in Senegal today probably [162] number some 40,000 of which nearly 30,000 live in Dakar alone. In comparison with other territories of French speaking Africa, Senegal has always had a large European minority, and this has increased rapidly since the war. Thus in Senegal the policy of assimilation was not applied in the abstract by the metropolitan Government to a people who, with the exception of administrative officials, had practically no daily contact with Frenchmen. In the major towns the Senegalese have been used to the presence of a substantial French community for well over seventy years. But, as we shall see, it was one thing for the metropolitan Government to initiate a policy of assimilation and quite another to expect its citizens to apply it on a personal level in their relations with the people who were being assimilated.

Though the French community in Senegal is relatively [162] large and in Dakar constitutes at least a tenth of the population, it must not be confused in character with the settler communities of Kenya and Rhodesia.

563 The great majority of Frenchmen have no intention of remaining in Senegal after their retirement. On independence few Frenchman opted for Senegalese nationality

though few picked up their bags and left 'in disgust at the 563 new order of things'. Of course in certain uninformed quarters there was the inevitable short-lived panic about what independence would mean for the French community, and even today, despite reassurances from the Government, certain sectors remain oversensitive to each move or speech made by a Minister. For many Frenchmen their stay in Senegal is not longer than five years, and as a result there is a higher proportion of bachelors than one would normally expect in a community that had intentions of making the country its permanent home. This proportion [648] is largely accounted for by the presence of a French army base.

On the other hand the Dakar European population has 563 none of the temporary character of the English communities 369 in West Africa. Far from living in reservations outside the city, as is still the case with the European population of Lagos, they have moved into the centre of the town and made it a small corner of Europe, and the more the French population has increased the more it has tended to create a metropolitan life for itself in Africa. The range of European-style shops, the number of restaurants, night-clubs, and women's hairdressers shows that although the Dakar Frenchman may have no intention of settling in the city for good, he is determined to live his life in the maximum comfort during his stay. There is relatively little of the attitude of living for the next leave.

Another distinguishing feature of the European community in Senegal is that not only is it not a true settler community but also its economic interests, whilst vast, have not involved any important alienation of land and until very recently have not brought it into conflict with African economic interests. Dakar can in no way be considered a small Algiers. The majority of Europeans, whose [463] per capita income is about £600 a year, are employed by the Administration or commercial and industrial undertakings in executive posts or in technical and clerical positions

563 for which no trained African staff is available. There is a
369 wide range of professional occupations, but private enter-
[463] prise by individuals is largely restricted to higher-class
shopkeeping and the running of bars and restaurants.
Most of the export and import trade is still in the hands of
[439] the large commercial houses controlled from France as
distinct from individual Frenchmen in Dakar.

Relations between the African and European communities have been remarkably good. There have been no really significant racial conflicts in Dakar since the war. But relations are *negatively* good. That is to say that there is almost no contact between the two groups outside work. The French in Dakar, despite the official assimilationist policy of the mother country, have shown little inclination to extend it on a personal plane during their sojourn in Dakar. On the other hand when they were officially representatives of the colonial Power they rarely attempted to enforce discrimination against Africans. Apart from the time of the unfortunate Vichy episode there has never been any open discrimination in Dakar. Africans always had legal access to all places the French had, though inevitably there were a number of private associations such as the *Amicales des Provinces Françaises* which excluded Africans by definition though never by statute. A visitor might be tempted to think that the absence of Africans from the French-style cafés in the main streets of Dakar indicated some subtle form of discrimination, but in fact any African entering would be served, and the sparseness of African clientele is determined by economic and social reasons. Drinks are enormously expensive in such bistros, and few
[162] Muslims, who form the majority of the population in Dakar,
[779] care to be seen drinking in public. Nevertheless it is true
that proprietors of certain bars do their best to maintain a
white clientele.

There is a certain residential separation, once more largely determined by economics. The expensive European

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

flats and villas are usually beyond the range of the African purse though the difference is being eliminated by the accession of Senegalese, immediately prior to and in particular since independence, to high administrative posts and today there is no real residential separation. Many Europeans live in housing estates built primarily for Africans and not a few live in the Medina or main African quarter. Some trade unions are divided on racial lines between Africans and Europeans, largely because the European workers are skilled technicians and there are even to this day few Africans trained in most of the industrial work done by Europeans. 563 [369] [467] [463]

Nevertheless there are certain cases of bitterness between Africans and Europeans over the question of equal pay for equal work. Though the basic principle is that both groups should be paid the same rate for the same kind of work, the European in many cases gets an expatriation addition of up to two-fifths of his basic salary. This is not true of all classes of work. For instance shop girls in Printania, a local version of Woolworth's, earn the same pay whether white or black though of course the European staff are recruited locally from wives and daughters of Frenchmen working in Dakar. It is surely a healthy sign that Europeans and Africans can work together on equal terms and that Europeans can occupy what in Europe would be considered very humble positions. 563 465

One does not detect amongst the French in Senegal any very strong feeling for or against the African. Where any form of racism does manifest itself it is mainly at the level of the artisan worker or the *petit blanc*, a term generally used to describe the poorer white community of small shopkeepers, clerks, mechanics and skilled workers. When the Senegalese are confronted by outbursts of racism from members of this group they are usually inclined to return the abuse in kind, for the Senegalese are naturally an immensely proud people and have very little feeling of racial inferiority. Close contact with a French community 563 [571]

563 that ranges from the Olympian civil servant to a taxi driver and a clerk without work, has left them under no illusion about the equal fallibility of the European. This is in direct contrast to Nigeria where until very recently all Europeans held executive posts, lived in large houses in separate reservations, had cars, servants and high incomes, all of which gave the impression to the vast majority of Nigerians who had not travelled overseas that the English were a race which commanded and did not occupy itself with subaltern work. Thus to this day, even in Lagos, the European is still a 'remarkable' being. In
[369] Dakar the Frenchman passes unremarked, and the *Dakarois* is as used to seeing him on foot or on a velo-cycle as in a car, with the result that the Senegalese on the whole do not have any complex about the European as a person although he does about the technical superiority of the European and about France's insistence on the superiority of its culture.

P. Mercier, the French sociologist, in an investigation into
[369] the habits of the European community in Dakar, found that very few Europeans had African friends outside work, and that contact between white and black was largely limited to the following spheres: among colleagues, employees, and domestic servants, in cultural and sporting activities, and in schools. Few marriages take place between African and European in Dakar and when they do they are usually between African male and European female, and are contracted in Paris. There are two obvious explanations for this. For many it is impossible to find a wife of the same intellectual level in a society where Islam has retarded female education. For many others the need for a companion leads to love affairs and eventual marriage with women whom they would not consider marrying at home. The reason that few French women marry Africans in Senegal, as distinct from in France, is that they become more aware of the type of society into which they are
[596] marrying. It is very difficult for the European woman,

with her restricted notions about the family, to integrate 563 [596] successfully into the extended family, especially in a territory like Senegal where family relations are of such importance that it is practically forbidden to refer to the economic burden they cause. The European wife often insists on her husband breaking with the extended family and restricting the family to the usual European size. Instances of marriage between European male and African females are rare because of the small number of well educated African females.

This all builds up to a picture of a French community with little interest in assimilating the Senegalese to their own standards. But a number of points must be stressed. On the whole the French have always accepted the Senegalese as equals. There is a strict code of mutual courtesy [576] between Senegalese and all but the most uncouth Frenchmen. As Claude Duchemin of the *Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire* has written: 'A genuine "niceness" was apparent in their daily contacts, simply and with no ostentation, as if it were quite natural. It seemed that each wanted to prove to the other his wish to play the game loyally, without complexes.' Also there has been remarkably little use of [198] 'pidgin' in Senegal, a debased form of French which by implication infers an inferior recipient.

But most important of all is the fact that a small minority of Frenchmen, fortunately usually in positions of authority have followed personally an assimilationist policy. This has been most marked in the political sphere. Though the great majority of Frenchmen who were interviewed by Mercier had nothing to do with local politics and even talked in terms of maintaining 'white solidarity' a few were militant politicians alongside men like Senghor and Lamine Guèye. Men like Maître Paul Bonifay, until recently deputy Mayor of Dakar, who was Secretary of the *S.F.I.O.* in Dakar for many years, or André Peytavin, who worked closely with Senghor in the early days of the *B.D.S.* and was chosen as Minister of Finance in the Government [645]

563 [645] formed as a result of the *loi cadre* reforms, are typical of the Frenchmen who have identified themselves with the country of their sojourn. Indeed such was the devotion of Peytavin to his party's cause that he was retained as Minister of Finance even after independence and opted for Senegalese nationality, a step that Bonifay found himself unable to take. These were men of high education—Bonifay, a well known lawyer, and Peytavin a veterinary surgeon. There were many others like them, not only applying such principles in the political field, but in the administration and commerce, who helped to dispel from the African what would otherwise have been a dominant impression of an isolationist and sometimes racist French community.

[369] [571] It would be foolish to paint too idealised a picture of race relations in Dakar. Many Europeans, particularly the *petit blanc*, openly admit to holding the African in contempt. But these are usually Europeans of little economic or political consequence and since independence their opinions have obviously carried negligible weight with the Senegalese.

Furthermore most Europeans in Dakar and the other
main towns of Senegal, whatever their prejudices, send
their children to local schools, where perforce they mix
on terms of equality with Africans. The same is true of
[873] Dakar University which has a large number of French
students, the majority of whom are girls whose parents
are working in Dakar. Their brothers try if possible to go
to French universities. Though friendships tend to be
[572] within the same racial group, there is a considerable number
of inter-racial friendships.

563 369 463 472 The main point of conflict would appear to the casual visitor to be the economic domination of private enterprise and the more important subaltern jobs by Europeans. But before analysing any tensions that have arisen from this, it is essential to point to some special features of Senegalese society. In Senegal, by contrast with Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast, there is no entrepreneurial class of

Africans. Indeed only very small scale trading is in the 563
hands of Africans, otherwise large scale commercial 369
enterprises are run by Europeans, and most of their managerial 463
staff being European. Between these large scale [478]
organisations, the whole range of middleman trade is
dominated by Lebanese and the so-called *petit blancs*. [571]
Small shopkeeping is predominantly in the hands of the
Mauritanians, though larger shops particularly in Dakar, are run by Lebanese and Europeans. At first sight this would seem to be an unhealthy situation, and it would be foolish to ignore the inherent dangers in it. But the most ardent critics of this state of affairs are as often as not visiting Africans, not the Senegalese themselves. When a Nigerian shops in Printania or goes to the local bank in Dakar, he is shocked by the number of Frenchwomen employed in jobs he is accustomed to seeing held by Africans in Lagos. But in considering the rather special case of Dakar one must take into account a number of factors that are often overlooked by would-be critics.

Senegal is a territory of only 3,100,000 people and in the [161]
normal run of education in French-speaking African states, even taking into account Senegal's special position among them, the percentage of the population available to fill managerial and sub-managerial posts or indeed any 'European-style' job in all sectors of the economy, can hardly match up to the requirements of the most highly
industrialised city in West Africa. In addition Dakar has a [508]
large international airport and a port that was the third [504]
largest in the French Union. It is also the centre of govern- [496]
ment for Senegal and the terminus of a railway. It is not
surprising therefore that Senegal finds it more difficult 463
to find the appropriate number of Africans to fill its senior 563
posts in commerce and industry than Lagos which has a Nigerian population of over 36 million to draw on. Furthermore Lagos is in the centre of an area where missionaries have been active for over a hundred years and consequently

463 has enjoyed a much higher rate of education than was possi-
[563] ble in an Islamic community like Senegal, even taking into
account French assimilation policy.

There is a pronounced bias in Senegal against entering
into commerce, whether at the African level or at the
European level. This bias has been observed by many
Europeans. It may be thought of as a mere attempt to
explain away the lack of success or rather a lack of desire
and intention to Africanise commerce, but against this
view, M. Assane Seck, one of the leaders of the Opposition
[665] *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and a lecturer at the university, who might
normally be only too pleased to pin the slow rate of African-
isation of commerce on the Government, has said that one
of the chief obstacles to the Africanisation of economy at
[571] its higher levels is the preference of the Senegalese élite,
and even the lesser educated classes, for work in the Admini-
[647] tration. Under the French the Administration seems to
have enjoyed a very high status especially as rates of pay
[465] have always been considerably higher than in commerce
and industry. Commerce, even when it pays better, has
among the Senegalese something of the smear it had in
ninteenth-century England.

471 Another barrier to the Africanisation of shopkeeping and
[472] small scale private enterprise is the difficulty the Senegalese
have in amassing capital. The obligations towards members
[596] of the extended family are such that a man with money has
calls made on it from even his most distant relatives. This
social parasitism is much stronger in Senegal than in most
West African countries. One of the few important Senegalese
business men operating in Dakar today has admitted that
he had to reduce his family obligations drastically, not only
because he was married to a European, but because unless
he did so, he would never be able to keep enough capital
in his business. Diop Abdoulaye, in his study of the Tou-
[736] couleur, has protested against the use of the term family
parasitism for something which 'makes it possible to help
those in need, the unemployed, for example, who can then

live whilst waiting to find work; it permits those who are 471
ill, those incapable of work, and those without resources [736]
to be taken care of and not die of hunger.'

Probably the most important barrier to the accumulation of capital has been Senegal's dependence on a one-crop [438] economy of ground-nuts. The method of cultivation of ground-nuts and their comparatively low price per ton have worked against the creation of large scale plantations, for instance of cocoa and coffee, which have supplied individual entrepreneurs in the Western Region of Nigeria, in Ghana and in the Ivory Coast with their capital.

These are all factors to set against a situation which 463
otherwise might be explosive. Africanisation has always 563
been a problem in the Senegal and it has increased as the number of professionally trained Africans has increased. But historically, and even today, it has been most acute in the Administration, employment in which is the goal of most young Senegalese. Thus very often commerce is left with the second best. Even so French commercial houses have done far less comparatively to train up an efficient African subaltern class, let alone a managerial élite, than say a company like the United Africa Company in Nigeria. And whilst Senegal was under French control the Administration did very little indeed to encourage Africanisation of commerce.

The present day Senegalese Government, however, recognises the danger of the present position and its efforts to rectify the situation should not be interpreted as a new form of racism but as an honest attempt to maintain the present excellent racial situation. Though the Government has placed many limitations on the autonomy of the trade [467] unions it could not for long suppress criticism of the present structure of Dakar, particularly as Senegal, like all African countries, is subject to propaganda from every quarter. The truth is that there are far too many Europeans doing jobs that Africans could do. In small tea rooms it is not rare to be served by a French girl, for this tea shop is in

463 fact a family concern where it is considered more economical
● 563 to employ the daughter of the family in menial work than a Senegalese. To counter this the Senegalese Government has studiously avoided any open declaration on the undesirability of this situation, but by a series of discriminatory
[651] taxes hopes to make the position of the marginal *petit blanc* untenable. In this way it is hoped that European employment will be reduced by half within the next four years. Thus whilst the European population of Senegal was given
[162] as 46,500 in 1956, about 40,000 in 1960, the Government hopes to have it reduced to about 30,000 by 1965.

[655] One of the ways in which the Government is attempting to overcome the twin problem of European domination of
[471] commerce and the lack of private indigenous capital, is the establishment of state trading companies and cooperatives to compete in the marketing of ground-nuts and other basic Senegalese products. Also in order to reduce Senegal's dependence on expatriate technicians and minor
[874] functionaries it is expanding technical education and spending considerable sums on the training of Africans overseas. In the initial stages this will only remove those Europeans who were doing jobs that can easily be taken over by Senegalese once they have received basic training. There is no reason to suppose that the European Community will diminish by much more than the numbers cited above envisaged by the planners, since the anticipated expansion of the Senegalese economy under the four-year plan should be able to absorb the marginal cases who might otherwise have been forced to return to France. Nor indeed is it the intention of the Senegalese to get rid of the Europeans for the sake of getting rid of them, since the Government still maintains that the two groups can co-exist to their mutual benefit but that it must prevent the seeds of racial tension from germinating.

563 There is of course amongst the young and particularly
[208] among students some difference of opinion over this matter. Not all of them hold such liberal views, particularly

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

those who have been influenced by the barrage of anti-colonial and especially anti-French propaganda that has been current in Africa during the last two years. Many young men declare that the best thing they can do is to get rid of the French since the economy is being strangled or alternatively dominated by their former colonial masters. But this does not reflect a deep-seated dislike for France as such, indeed the opposite is nearer the case. The young man who is demanding the expulsion of the French in a heated moment today, may well be packing his bag to go and find work in France tomorrow. Once again, this division is removed when one suggests that the young Senegalese may be against the French as such in Dakar, but this does not imply that he is against either individual Frenchmen—he may well count a number amongst his personal friends—or against France and what France stands for from the point of view of culture and civilisation. Like all those who have led the anti-assimilationist campaign since the war, he is also aware of the dominating role French culture still plays in his daily life. And the wish to remove the French from Dakar may be considered an attempt to compensate for a psychological domination he resents rather than as a reaction against the French community for anything they may have done. 563 [208] 648 563

The real danger will come if the younger generation becomes economically frustrated by the French community, a situation which could lead to real racial tension. And it is this again that the Senegalese Government in its present planning intends to avert. The Senegalese leaders at present in power believe that it is their role to show how various racial groups can live together in harmony. Here it is essential to remember that Senegal has three other substantial racial minorities, the Cape Verdians, Lebanese, and Mauretanians of Arab stock, but they are not important for the purposes of this study which is primarily concerned with the effects of assimilation on the indigenous Senegalese. 563 [167]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

VIII. THE SENEGALESE

> 563 The case of the one and only Senegalese is interesting. There you have a man no longer designated by his tribe, but by his colony. We are not told what tribe in Senegal he belongs to, Serer, Wolof or Lebu. That he comes from the Colony of Senegal is enough to give him some sort of status, and for native policy to know whom it is dealing with. He is not a *déraciné* from a small isolated Africa; in Bobo *cercle* he is son of the mother colony of all the colonies of the Federation. He is settled in Bobo as he might elsewhere, as a man of the new African world that has got beyond race, where natives of all races give life to the colonial structure and break it open from within.
>
> ROBERT DELAVIGNETTE: *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*

[369] [292] If the first thing that strikes the visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans, the second is the homogeneous character of Senegalese society itself. It is not possible, as it is in Lagos or Leopoldville, to tell from a glance at a man or a woman's clothes from which ethnic group he or she comes. Senegal not only has an excellent record of race relations between Europeans and Africans but between the various indigenous ethnic groups. This happy position is typified by the President of the Republic, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who comes neither from the majority tribe nor the dominant religion of the country, but is a Serer and Catholic. Furthermore he is married to a French woman.

563 162 Senegal has six major ethnic groups accounting for all but 130,000 of its population of 3,100,000. The last census figures gave the Wolof as the largest ethnic group with 35 per cent, followed by the Fula with 17 per cent, the Serer, 16 per cent, Toucouleur, 9 per cent, Diola, 9 per cent, and the Mandingo 7 per cent.

[p 76]

The French sociologist Mercier has already remarked the S 563 fundamental homogeneity of Senegal's main ethnic groups, [184] which 'Whatever their cultural differences and whatever their traditional hostility to one another (which has by no means completely disappeared) all had the same type of social and political organisation.'

Of the major groups the Wolof and the Lebou are for all W [101] intents and purposes indistinguishable, the Lebou being the Wolof-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Verde peninsula. The Serer are also very closely related to the Wolof, being considered as tribal cousins. The Toucouleur, Serer and Fula are traditionally connected, it being held that the Toucouleur are the result of an ancient mixing between the Serers, with whom they have a strong joke-relationship, and the Fulas whose language is very close to their own. Thus nearly three-quarters of the population have closer historical and ethnic connexions than exist in any other area of West Africa save Hausaland in Northern Nigeria. 8 With the exception of the Serers, of whom a substantial [771] minority is Christian, these people are almost exclusively Muslim. They also tend today to use Wolof as a lingua S franca. Even the Diola, from the Casamance, which is [197] in many ways a minority area of Senegal, especially because it is cut off from the north by the Gambia, have strong traditional connexions with the Serer and assert in effect that they are descended from the same ancestor. This leaves only the Mandingo people out of the pattern and as we shall see they do tend to be a minority group in Senegal.

There is thus at the basis of Senegalese society an in- S digenous homegeneity that is nothing to do with the 184 French policy of assimilation, and which has been greatly 563 encouraged by a common adherence to Islam, where S Marabouts or religious leaders of one tribe have considerable [792] influence over Muslims of other ethnic origins.

The French administration, however, through its policy of S direct rule did in fact make one major contribution towards [631]

184 this homogeneity by reducing the traditional authority of
563 the chiefs who more than anyone else are responsible for the
[631] preservation of ethnic differences, in being the repositories
of tribal customs.

For Senegal as a whole, this homogeneity does not go beyond similarities in socio-political structure, a common adherence to Islam, uniformity in styles of dress, a tradition of common relationship and a growing use of Wolof as a lingua franca. Only in the larger towns has there been
563 any general break-down of traditional tribal barriers and
[369] only in the town does one find a high incidence of inter-ethnic habitation and, more important still, inter-ethnic marriage. And since it was mainly in the towns that the French applied their policy of assimilation it is reasonable to assume that there is probably some correlation between the two. In the first place the French in Senegal have always tended to think of the local inhabitants as Senegalese rather than Wolof or Serer, which runs contrary to the common European attitude to ethnic divisions, particularly in British territories where the tendency was always to emphasise the tribal origin of an African rather than the colony in which he lived. Indeed the British administrators, as Lord Lugard himself observed, were always great partisans of particular ethnic groups. Such an attitude, however, has not always been absent in Senegal. For instance Mercier has remarked that certain European foremen in factories tended to choose workers of the same ethnic group in order to avoid possible friction, but he adds that this was not always justified.

563 In the *Quatre Communes*, which for a long time *were* Senegal
619 as far as the French were concerned, the inhabitants came
to accept from early on the idea of being Senegalese as well
[369] as Wolof and Serers. Or they might have thought of themselves parochially as St. Louisiens or Dakarois. With their elected deputy, their *Conseil-Général*, and their municipal councils, the Senegalese crossed early on the barrier between tribalism and nationalism, a result for which other African

leaders had to work so ardently and patiently many decades 563
later. Where it has often seemed to be the policy of European 619
powers to divide and rule, here the French positively
encouraged the creation of a Senegalese identity. Faidherbe 701
created the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, whereas Lugard called
his force the Hausa Constabulary. For many years, Senegal 619
has had a romantic and sentimental place in the eyes of the 563
French, and the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, who in fact enjoyed
the services of recruits from all over West Africa, are known
by most Frenchmen for their services to France in both
world wars. This concept of national as distinct from tribal
identity in the *Quatre Communes* also influenced the educated
élite from the Protectorate who were determined to participate
in the privileges of the *originaires*.

A policy of assimilation that has the aim of eradicating 563
the African past and the creation of 'black Frenchmen', 619
when applied thoroughly, did in fact help to eliminate
tribal differences and create a new common culture. In
particular, education, which grouped children of different 871
ethnic groups side by side, made no concession to local 619
circumstances. They were taught about 'our ancestors the 563
Gauls' and in the best schools standards were the same as
those in France. Instruction was in French from the
very first years, and the school uniform was in European
style. They were thus given a common meeting ground
from the earliest age, with almost no concessions made
to their own ethnic differences. Large numbers of Senegalese
have been to France for their education ever since
the days of Faidherbe, and in France they found themselves
automatically dubbed as Senegalese, for few Frenchmen had
time for the niceties of tribal distinctions.

It is not surprising, then, that particularly among young 563
men many friendships were made outside the tribe. Indeed
today in Dakar it would be rare to find a young man with
primary education who could not count many friends from
outside his own ethnic group. Marriage presented different
problems. For if the young man had overcome sensitivities [582]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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563 about tribe, the women, who in a Muslim society rarely
[582] gained the opportunity of education, tended naturally to
be more conservative in such matters. Nevertheless many
originaires have married outside their ethnic group and can
claim to be Senegalese and Senegalese only, for how else,
they ask, can they describe themselves when one grandparent
is Wolof, another Toucouleur and yet another Serer?
This is by no means common in Senegal, but its highest
incidence is amongst the most assimilated groups in Senegal.

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563 One of the most difficult barriers to break down in African
tribal society is that of the taboo on marriage outside the
582 tribe or clan. Onuora Nzekwu in his *Wand of Noble Wood*
[619] gives a very illuminating study of this problem. In Senegal
[369] however, there is an exceptionally high rate of inter-ethnic
marriage for Africa. Mercier, in his study of Dakar, observed
that the rate of inter-ethnic marriage was below the
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[582] Senegalese average amongst the Diola, Serer, and Wolof
where endogamy is clearest, whilst the Bambaras and
groups of the south, and particularly the Lebou who are
inter-marrying increasingly with the Wolof, were above the
average. Out of 606 monogamous families investigated,
71 per cent had married a woman of the same tribe, but
the figure of 29 per cent for mixed marriages must be
S
[595] considered extremely high for Africa. Out of 228 polygamous
families interviewed 43 per cent were all of the same
ethnic group but 57 per cent had at least one wife of different
ethnic origin. The highest incidence of inter-ethnic
marriages in Dakar occurs amongst clerks, administrators,
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[369] employees of commercial houses and the professional classes,
i.e. those who have been most affected by French assimilation
and for whom ethnic considerations are considerably
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less important than for the peasant, who is so much closer
[619] to the traditional concepts of the tribe. There is then in
Dakar, and one could apply this to other main towns, a
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significant increase in inter-ethnic marriages, though as
[369] far as Senegal as a whole is concerned ethnic considerations
[582] in marriage are still very important. But the multiplication

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of inter-ethnic marriages in the towns is indicative of a 369
major social change and a reflection of the effects of an 563
assimilationist policy on the Senegalese. [582]

Though many communities in Dakar are based on ethnic and family ties, particularly amongst the immigrant Toucouleurs from the Vallée du Fleuve, Dakar is on the S
whole a heterogeneous city. [589]
Mercier has observed that inter-ethnic habitation is particularly frequent among young bachelors, who often club together to hire a room. [591]
This is still relatively rare in Africa except amongst educated élites. S
But in Senegal many young men resent being asked the question whether they are Wolof or Serer, answering [619]
only to the name Senegalese. As far as friendship outside the ethnic group and in particular living with someone from another tribe is concerned, S
one great advantage is the existence of a common cuisine for Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur and Lebou. [262]
W
There is even a national dish known as *riz sénégalais*, known further down the coast as Jollof rice. [262]
This means that not only can friends share the same plate, but a man is not frustrated in his desire to marry outside his ethnic group by fear of a foreign cuisine. S

Another important factor in the breakdown of tribal 369
barriers has been the urbanisation of Senegal. [619]
Over 25 per cent of the population live in towns, the bulk in Dakar, [162]
Rufisque and St. Louis and Kaolack. This represents a higher rate of urbanisation than in any other West African territory except the Western Region of Nigeria, where, it must be pointed out, urbanisation was intense long before the arrival of the Europeans and therefore does not owe its origin to colonisation as it does in Senegal. It is difficult in the present stage of research to measure the results of the S
inter-mixing of races in urban agglomerations. [563]
But in an environment whose *raison d'être* is completely different from that of the tribal village, the individual is subjected to so many pressures that his ethnic individuality has to be extremely strong for him not to assimilate both ideas and customs from his neighbours and above all from the

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French. The Moors are an obvious exception to this, as P. Dubié has pointed out. Though they work in all the major towns of Senegal they have retained complete identity of tribal customs, even maintaining abroad the traditional hostilities between their own tribal subdivisions. The tribal structure of Dakar, which is the most heavily
W [369] industrialised single city in West Africa, gives an idea of the common melting pot that the new cities and towns in
S [162] Senegal represent: Wolof constitute 25 per cent; Lebou, the original inhabitants, 15 per cent; mixed Wolof-Lebou, 11 per cent; Serer, 3 per cent; Bambara, 9 per cent; Toucouleur, 10 per cent; Fula, 5 per cent; Moors, 4 per cent; Diola, 5 per cent; Soussou, 2 per cent; Cape Verdians 2 per cent. The result is that the inhabitants
S [197] of Dakar are forced to learn some form of *lingua franca*, in this case Wolof or French, if they are to live in the city.

In the modern economy of the city, where one seeks work where work is and where housing is short and expensive, it is difficult for any of these groups to keep up any pretence at tribal solidarity. However, as Schapera has shown, it is possible for the African migrant working in industry 'to maintain two quite distinct spheres of human relations. The African who leaves his tribe to go and work in the town will take part in the social organisations, e.g. trade unions, he finds there, but these will affect him only as a factory worker, and will have no place in the subsistence economy which is governed by traditional tribal and social relationships. The two spheres are distinct spatially as wellas socially, and despite the exchange of ideas between them they remain none the less parallel.'

In Dakar this is particularly true of the immigrant Toucouleur from the Vallée du Fleuve, as A. Diop shows in his excellent study of Toucouleur immigration to Dakar.
S [164] But it should be noted here that the Toucouleur are not permanent emigrants from their areas, and have only come to Dakar temporarily to supplement the low incomes of the Vallée du Fleuve. Permanent settlers without the ultimate

goal of return to their tribal home, even Toucouleur, 369 find it more difficult to resist the pressures of their environment, 563 and Dakar has a large number of permanent settlers, who are first and foremost *Dakarois*.

Many of these have found a common brotherhood above 467 tribe in their trade unions. These, despite various setbacks 563 and restrictions, have been well organised in Senegal. Indeed the 1944 decree restoring liberty of association did much to ensure this, by insisting that trade union officials should have good educational qualifications and that accounts should be scrutinised by the administration. Most of the unions belonged to one of the large French confederations from whom they received considerable help and advice. Since Senegal has until quite recently had over 40 per cent of the organised workers of French West Africa, trade unionism embraced a large number of people of different ethnic groups brought together to seek ends that went far beyond the limited horizons of tribal ambition.

The influence of the towns extends beyond their limits. 369 Both in the cities, and increasingly in the villages, young [595] men who have come in contact with the new life of Dakar or of the other major towns tend to contract monogamous marriages in the European style. Amongst the Diola, as L. V. Thomas has observed, young men are now building [591] their own houses outside the parental extended home. But probably most important of all in the breakdown of tribal barriers is the increase of economic individualism, the desire to have possessions, and particularly good clothes, all of [422] which run contrary to the traditional social system which leads to the maximum dispersion of a man's gains amongst his relatives.

Only the very strongest survive the effect of the city, 369 in particular a city like Dakar, the most sophisticated, the 563 most European, the city most diametrically opposed to the tribal life of the bush. Indeed among Dakar's inhabitants only the Moors and Toucouleur really withstand the

S 369 563 immense impact of the town. They* live in small villages made up of relations and fellow villagers. They even club together, subscribing to a common fund to receive their fellows from the Fleuve, and as far as work is concerned they S [463] virtually monopolise certain jobs such as bootboys, waiters, and newspaper sellers. This maintenance of tribal cohesion is a difficult task in this city of French creation, where a new community of Dakarois is rapidly coming into existence.

S 665 563 [619] [182] An important factor in the breakdown of tribal ties has been the creation of political parties and the creation of a new political élite that thinks in national terms. Experience in Africa has shown, however, that this can work two ways, for many political parties are in effect organisations intended to defend ethnic interests. Senegalese politics have on the whole been remarkably free from tribalism, though Senghor did in fact achieve much of his success in the early days of the *B.D.S.* though the emphasis he laid on ethnic considerations in the organisations of his party, and certainly there have existed specifically regional and ethnic parties like *Le Mouvement Démocratique Casamançais* and the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.* But, as Kenneth Robinson pointed out in his study of Senegalese politics in *Five Elections in Africa*, these ethnic and regional aspects were compensated for by the federal aspect of the major party, *Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.* In 1954, in fact, all ethnic and regional sub-sections of the *B.D.S.* were abolished and individual membership was insisted on. But though this led to the breaking-away of certain elements in the Casamance, it would be fair to say that the party has been much less dominated by those regional differences that normally influence political parties in West Africa. Nevertheless, as Robinson found in the 1957 S [666] election, there were a number of constituencies where ethnic rivalries were more important than political issues. W [666] [665] At Linguère, a single member constituency, the population was divided between Fula and Wolof in the proportion of three to two. When the sitting member, a Fula, was

* [i.e., The Moors and Toucouleurs in Dakar--Analyst]

5; Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962

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renominated, the Wolofs created a *Bloc Démocratique du Djollof* which polled 6,000 votes to the 8,000 of the Fula candidate.

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A further commentary on the lack of tribalism in Senegal is the ethnic structure of the Government and the national assembly. The Government is composed of the President of the Republic, who is a Serer, a President of the Council of Ministers who is Toucouleur with strong Wolof ancestry, and fourteen Ministers of whom nine are Wolof, two are half-caste, one a Frenchman who has opted for Senegalese nationality, one a Diola and one a Lebou.

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The ethnic repartition of the Senegalese National Assembly is equally revealing*:

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Tribe	*Percentage of population*	*Number of Deputies*	*Percentage of Deputies*
Wolof	35·0	33	41
Serer	16·0	5	6
Lebou	0·2	10	13
Toucouleur	9·0	10	13
Fula	17·0	5	6
Diola	9·0	5	6
Mandingo/Bambara	7·0	3	4
European	0·1	3	4
Metis	0·1	5	6
Rest	4·7	1	1

The above figures, with the reservations footnoted, show that the National Assembly with one or two exceptions

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* These figures were supplied to me by William J. Foltz and are based on his own research and ethnic data from the *S.E.R.E.S.A. Rapport General* 1ère partie, Ch. 1., p. 38. The population figures are based on old administrative censuses, which may be somewhat conservative. The figures for the Lebou seem surprisingly low. Furthermore, placing deputies under a particular ethnic grouping is often an arbitrary process, since it is in the educated classes that the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriage occurs. Furthermore the large number of Wolofs can partly be explained by the fact that anyone of mixed ethnic origin, in which one parent is Wolof, tends to call himself Wolof.

563 is excellently balanced from a tribal point of view. The
646 large number of Lebou deputies is accounted for by the
fact that the Lebou were the original inhabitants of Dakar,
and therefore had greater facilities for education than other
groups. The relatively small number of Serer deputies can
be explained by the fact that the distinction between Wolof
and Serer is not very pronounced. Again, the small number
of Fula deputies in proportion to their size as an ethnic
group is partly the result of the fact that they are a nomadic
people, and partly because they are very close to the Toucouleur
who have a relatively high representation. The
only grossly under-represented group are the Mande, for
though the Mandingo-Bambara peoples make up 7 per cent
of the population and have 4 per cent of the deputies, only
one of the three deputies in this group is actually Mande,
who make up the greater part of this 7 per cent. Both in
Senegal and neighbouring Gambia the Mandingo seem to
have fared badly as a group in politics. Though only
[162] 5 per cent of Senegal is Christian, five members of the
Government and nearly a fifth of the National Assembly
[771] are Christian. Nor does one have to be a member of the
majority tribe in a constituency to be elected by it*.

563 [771] A source of possible conflict in Senegal is the existence of a large Muslim majority and a small Christian minority representing only 5 per cent of the population. The French as the colonial power, despite their policy of assimilation, were unable to establish a strong Catholic Church in Senegal since Islam had been with the Toucouleur since the eleventh century and had already embraced most of the country by the time Faidherbe extended his protectorate. Islam in Senegal is peculiarly tolerant, not only in its concessions to traditional beliefs among more recently converted groups, but also towards Christians. In few other predominantly Muslim countries would it be possible not only to have a Catholic President but to have such a

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* I am indebted to Mr. W. J. Foltz for supplying me with most of the data on which this paragraph is based.

large proportion of Christians in the National Assembly. 563
At the time of the break up of the Mali Federation there was some attempt to disparage Senghor because of his religion, but it never gained ground. And whilst there is still in certain quarters some criticism of the presence of a Catholic President, it is not widespread. The fact that neighbouring Gambia's Chief Minister Njie is also a Catholic in a predominantly Muslim country suggests that a tolerance that is so rare amongst Muslim communities may be local to this part of the coast rather than peculiar to Senegal. Senghor himself has been particularly assiduous in his courting of the great Muslim leaders of the country. However French assimilation policy was certainly a contributory factor. Long contact with France and particularly the large number of Senegalese who have studied in France have meant that the modern élite is accustomed to the idea of Catholicism and is able to co-exist with it.

So far the picture we have drawn of modern Senegal is rather an idealised one: a large European minority is tolerated by the African majority and there is remarkably little theoretical or actual animosity towards it; it has a particularly homogeneous population in which traditional ethnic barriers are breaking down, particularly in the major towns which have been most heavily assimilated by France; there is little political friction of ethnic origin and religion does not play an important rôle in the determination of the country's affairs. Indeed the planning of Senegal's economic development was confided to a Catholic priest not by Senghor, as one might have imagined, but by the Premier, Mamadou Dia, a particularly devout Muslim. In some ways Senegal from a racial and ethnic point of view represents the ideal West African state. But it has its minority problems.

In a sense the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal can be called a minority area, but in many ways it is an economic rather than racial problem. Though the Toucouleur tend to look down on, say, the Wolof, because they do not consider [433] [735]

563 them strict enough Muslims, the main distinguishing
[433] feature of their homeland, the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal,
[735] is its poverty compared with that of other parts of Senegal.
Diop Abdoulaye in his study of Toucouleur immigration
into Dakar estimates that the average *per capita* income of a
Toucouleur of that region is little more than 4,000 *C.F.A.*
[434] per annum, i.e. about £6 a year. It is this rather than any
real tribal differences that makes the Vallée a special
problem, and this as much as any ethnic factor accounted
[665] for the existence of the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.*

563 The only real minority area in the Senegal is the Casamance,
whose special position is further emphasised by its
619 separation from the main block of Senegal by the Gambia.
In the past it has been thought of as geographically,
economically, socially and even religiously separate from
the rest of Senegal. A forest zone closer to its neighbours
Portuguese Guinea and the Republic of Guinea, it remained
very underdeveloped by the French, though
the present Government is taking this fact into account
with a special development programme for the area.
This separateness was emphasised by the very name Casamance.
The people describe themselves to this day as
Casamançais rather than Senegalese, though this could well
be accepted on the same terms as a Briton describing
himself as Scots or Welsh. It is fortunate that the tendency
is to talk in terms of regional rather than tribal origin.
However one of the important factors in the Casamance
has been tribal. The Diolas were until very recently an
animist people with an entirely different social organisation
from that of the main groups of Senegal, though as
we have already pointed out they had traditional ties with
the Serer which went as far as the injunction that a Diola
should never spill the blood of a Serer. But today the Diola
are being drawn into the main socio-religious pattern of
Senegal. In the most recent estimate of the religious
[162] adherence of the population of Casamance, estimated at
[771] 327,500, 284,000 were Muslims, only 28,000 Christians and

the rest animists. Of course this includes the exclusively 563 619
Muslim Mandingo inhabitants of the Casamance who [162]
have been largely responsible for this proselytisation. The [771]
Diola too is inclined more and more to imitate his Mandingo
and Wolof neighbours. L. V. Thomas, who has written a monumental study on the Diola, fears: 'Soon the Diola country may be, at least in its landscape, like Senegal if no power intervenes to limit the extension of the bushfire; it will certainly become, in its people, just another African country, where only a few anthropological remains fixed by heredity will enable us to distinguish the Diola from the Wolof or the Mandingo.'

The Casamance may well be coming closer to the rest of 563
the Senegal, but it still remains a seat of opposition to the 665
Government of Senghor and Dia, and votes heavily for the 666
opposition *P.R.A.-Sénégal*. However neither of the leaders of this party, Ly Abdoulaye or Assane Seck, is *Casamançais*, and there is strong support in many towns for the *U.P.S.*, which indicates that Diola-Casamance politics are not necessarily either regional or tribal, though these are important factors.

The main social problem of the Senegal, and one which 565
both assimilation and religion seem to have been unable to break down, is that of caste or a class structure very similar to caste. All the main Senegalese tribes—the Wolof,
Lebou, Toucouleur, Serer—are divided into a series of [582]
endogamous castes. These castes differ slightly from tribe to tribe, but roughly they are divided thus:

Nobles and Freeborn
Artisans (jewellers, smiths, weavers, leatherworkers) [463]
Griots or minstrels
Liberated slaves
Slaves

(Of course domestic slaves no longer exist as such in [567]
Senegal, but families know who their slaves were.)

It is certainly easier in Senegal for a Toucouleur noble
to marry a Wolof noble than to marry a woman of inferior [582]

565 [563] Influenced heavily by the Revolutionary doctrine of liberty, equality and fraternity, and having broken down barriers to this at the inter-ethnic level, the Government finds it most difficult to break it down at the level of the caste. Significantly, it was the Minister of the Interior himself who laid down government attitudes to caste at the troubles at Diack and one must hope that such trouble will soon disappear.

000 spent most of his time on the rehabilitation of African history.

631 Of course there would be considerable justification for such criticisms if Senghor and his Government were not in fact getting down to the fundamental reorganisation of Senegal. Already since the days of the French, the whole country has undergone a complete administrative transformation. Before independence the country was divided into *cercles* and *subdivisions*, under French and occasionally African administrators, and *cantons*, run by traditional chiefs as agents of the administration. This structure has been completely changed to give the administration and therefore the Government closer contact with the people. Previously the traditional chief, albeit an agent of the administration, was interposed between the administrator and his people. Now that the *chef de canton* has been eliminated and the *canton* has been redesignated as an *arrondissement*, presided over by an administrative official, working under the *commandant de cercle*, the Government has rid the country of what the Minister of Interior, Valdiodio N'Diaye, has described as an anachronistic institution. The *cercles* [635] are grouped into seven regions, each with its Governor and regional assembly, which deliberates on the regional budget. These seven regions have been laid out so as to correspond with the major economic zones of the country, making concessions only to ethnic factors and problems of communications. The whole field administration outside headquarters has been completely Africanised since July [563] 1960, though there are many Europeans serving as 'technical advisers' in the Government in Dakar.

668 But most important of all is the proposed four-year development plan for the Senegal which envisages a major revolution in the education, health and economy of the country. This plan was drawn up after nearly eighteen months of intensive research in Senegal by the Révérend Père Lebret, and his team of European and African researchers. The whole plan was directed by Mamadou Dia,

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

571 178 preserve much of their prestige;[1] they are sometimes in diametrical opposition to the modernist elites and sometimes try to come to terms with them; occasionally, as the result of historical conditions, the two elites are closely interlocked.[2]

4. Types and degree of tension between the African modernist elites and the European groups. The latter occupy the position of ruling class in the whole community represented by each territorial unit. The conflict is fundamental, yet a balance, however temporary and precarious, between the two groups may sometimes be discerned, though it varies enormously in degree from one region to another and at different times.[3]

The situation in Senegal, compared with that in other parts of French West Africa, exhibits certain special features. Senegal was the first of these territories to be colonized.[4] At the beginning of the new phase which opened after the war, it had the largest number of educated and partly Westernized persons, and it has for several decades had a political life modelled on the West, though of a summary and limited character.[5] At this level of political life, the course of events during the past 10 years affords us a first glimpse of regional divergencies. [668] It is a significant fact that Senegal was not the first French West African territory in which a movement making political demands of some magnitude arose. The acute crises of the immediate post-war period developed elsewhere—in the Ivory Coast—with the founding and expansion of the [665] Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the first political party in French Africa (Black) with nationalistic tendencies. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain never succeeded in establishing itself firmly in Senegal, either before or after its change of policy in the 1950's.[6] There is no space here to describe in detail the historical and social background of such events, though I shall have to refer to it several times later in this paper. Some of the basic traits will suffice for mention: aspects of the traditional structures, of contemporary economic development, of the schools' endeavour to promote assimilation.

[563] The principal racial groups inhabiting Senegal,[7] whatever their cultural differences, and whatever their traditional hostility to one another (which has still by no means completely disappeared) all had the same type of social and political organization. They were strictly graded societies divided into endogamous castes, each with its special economic, political, ritual and other functions. In the present context, inter-caste antagonisms and incompatibilities are as a rule more important than racial antagonisms, since several racial groups may have equivalent social gradings or one may have borrowed and adapted another's gradings./This is a fundamental feature; it indicates the framework within which we can explain the problem of relations between [554] the traditional and the modernist elites. For instance, prestige due to education may be superimposed on prestige based on tradition, in particular prestige due to caste; or else the two may be completely separate.[8] Even today a high

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[1] Either officially or more or less 'clandestinely'.

[2] E.g. in South Dahomey.

[3] In the Ivory Coast, for example, a period of calm and co-operation followed when the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain dropped certain extreme claims.

[175] [4] Trade counters have existed for more than three centuries and the more specifically colonial period began more than a hundred years ago.

[5] It had four municipalities with full privileges which sent a deputy to the French Parliament.

[6] It broke off its alliance with the French Communist party.

[7] The Ouolof, the Toucouleur and the Serere.

[177] [8] The resistance of the traditional ruling strata to foreign influence explains why, in certain cases, the lower castes were the first to go to school.

standing in the modern context does not often completely redeem a traditional 571 inferiority. The latter obviously does not prevent accession to such rank, 178 but it does prevent a man from reaping the full benefit of the prestige which [554] it confers. We shall have to revert to the ambiguity which thus characterizes individual situations, because it is an important aspect of the problem of the modernist elites. The old political organizations have either been destroyed or considerably weakened, though the prestige of the aristocratic families who hold the chefferies or are closely connected with them has not completely disappeared. But an important change has occurred: the power and influence [631] of the traditional political chiefs has to a large extent been transferred to the khalifas of the great Islamic sects;[1] the latter represent today the principal [793] force capable of resisting the modernist elite, and the one with which the latter and the political movements identified with it must to some extent come to terms.[2]

The changes due to the new economic conditions resulting from the colonial period can be discerned at several levels. The rural economy has been radically [433] transformed—progressive abandonment of subsistence farming in favour of a single cash crop throughout a large part of the territory.[3] In contrast with regions where a plantation economy has developed, the average farmer's income has remained extremely low. Consequently, what has elsewhere been termed a 'rural bourgeoisie' has not emerged, and the most favoured economic categories coincide, by and large, with the upper strata of the traditional or semi-traditional type (heads of sects),[4] or with those artificially created on the same model by the colonial administration. Again, the group to which the name 'commercial bourgeoisie' has been given is still too small to have much influence;[5] almost all African traders are small shopkeepers and make no appreciable impact on the affairs of the community as a whole. The most [369] significant changes are found at another level: urbanization and industrialization. Senegal is the most highly urbanized territory of French West Africa; [762] about a quarter of the population live in the big towns and the administrative and trading centres. A very large wage-earning class with a steadily growing nucleus of stable labour has developed.[6] A workers' elite has appeared, and intensive trade union activity in the big towns has brought this class into ~~467~~ [467] touch with the educated elite (the administrative bourgeoisie, etc.).

This educated elite deserves special attention; in Senegal more than elsewhere, it represents the dominant element among the modernist elites. The educational [871] policy was definitely conceived and organized at the beginning of the colonial period in the context of a policy and a ideology of assimilation. The educational curriculum introduced in the French establishments in Senegal at the beginning of the nineteenth century was essentially foreign to the tradition and culture of the autochthonous societies. Thus, in a recent paper, the author made much 571 of the point that 'it was not a factor making for integration of the individual 178 in his group, but rather—at any rate in the first historical phase—one making for a break. The adaptation of the curriculum and even of teaching methods 871

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[1] Their functions are hereditary.

[2] Cf. below, remarks on the political parties of the traditional type.

[3] In this case, groundnuts.

[4] The economic role of the Mouride brotherhood is particularly important: colonization of new lands, experiments in mechanization, etc. [793]

[5] The middle-man trade is practically monopolized by the Lebanese colony; in the town of Dakar alone there are more than 5,000 Lebanese. [369]

[6] The region of Dakar alone has more than 30,000 wage earners in the private sector. [762]

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6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

178 571 The reason is not to be sought solely in the increase in numbers of this intellectual elite though that was quite substantial. Trained in Europe and remaining in touch with the world outside, it was the first section of the population to become consciously aware of the 'colonial situation',[1] and it immediately made an attempt to build up ideological systems which soon acquired crucial influence. Next, the changed pattern in the relations between Europeans and Africans speeded up the development of situations in which conflicts became inevitable, and encouraged the maintenance of close contact between the new [578] and the colonial elites. I shall revert to this point later. True, tension existed, especially between generations, the older strata of the colonial elite having sometimes to defend the positions they had won.[2] But the younger people tended to identify themselves with the new elite, to accept its guidance and to share, more or less confusedly, in the same awakening to the colonial situation. Thus, the intellectual elite, in the broadest sense of the term, embarked in a new direction, and the political consequences of this change are now beginning to be seen. The problem of relations with the workers' elite which has emerged in the past few years is more complex; I shall come back to it in connexion with trade union activity.

In the typical pre-war situation, the African elite had little chance of competing with the European managing class, which was much less numerous that it is now.[3] It was trained to be what might be called an auxiliary elite. The new elite, on the contrary—notwithstanding the administrative and economic expansion of the past 10 years—will inevitably find itself in competition with Europeans in the managing and supervisory grades in an ever growing number of specific cases. Though still few in numbers, it has difficulty in finding a place in the territory's administrative and technological machine. It is a paradox that in a country immensely in need of responsible personnel, both managers and technicians, demand seems somewhat to exceed supply. [464] In French West Africa, and particularly in Senegal, the government officially recognizes the existence of an 'employment problem for holders of diplomas'. One of the causes of this situation is no doubt the total absence of planning in the training of elites.[4] But the real explanation must be found in political circumstances and race relations.[5] The effort to 'Africanize' the upper grades encounters firm resistance, and so the rise of the elites is apparently seriously checked by the growing number of situations in which Africans and Europeans compete and which the two groups explain in diametrically opposite ways.[6] It is a significant fact that several Senegalese who have completed their studies in France have remained there, because they would be unable to find jobs for which they could apply at home. The problem is obviously even more [167] acute in the private sector than in the administration.[7] Also, the European population has considerably increased in the past 10 years:[8] it has more than [563] doubled in Senegal, tripled at Dakar—where it now represents about 10 per cent of the population.

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[113] [1] Cf. the studies of G. Balandier, and in particular: *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Present sociology of Negro Africa), Paris, 1955.

[2] Especially in the administration.

[113] [3] Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar: Orientations d'une Enquête' (The European group at Dakar: Suggested line for a survey), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XIX, 1955.

[4] An effort is now being made in this direction.

[5] Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar . . .', op. cit.

[6] Patterns of thought based on the pre-war situation play a fundamental role here.

[7] Where the trend, as yet timid, towards 'Africanization' of the upper grades can be discerned.

[8] A general phenomenon in French West Africa which involves important changes in relations between Africans and Europeans.

cent of the population. Thus, the number of Europeans in intermediate or 178
subordinate posts has substantially increased and the range of competitive 571
situations, instead of growing less is being regularly extended. This affects
not only the new elite, but a large segment of the old 'administrative bourgeoisie', [563]
and even, to some extent, the workers and lower supervisory grades
in industry. And so, while—in theory—opportunities for reaching the highest
ranks and simultaneously entering the European group (a consequence
foreseen by assimilationist ideology) have increased with the development of
education, in reality a radical change in the whole social structure has multiplied [578]
the causes of conflict. New factors have cropped up abruptly: further assimilation
is gainsaid, Europeans and Africans become more and more sensitive to
the realities of race, etc. Obviously, the political consequences of such conflicts
are considerable.

I have mentioned cases in which a rift occurred between the elites and the
masses, in the early years, at any rate, of the 'colonial elite'. This fact needs
some further explanation, while the question of the relations between the
'educated' and the 'traditional' categories calls for re-examination on a wider
basis. The stereotyped patterns maintained by the European administration
underline the points of divergence. The administration has besides had a
tendency—and not only in Senegal—to underestimate the influence of modernist
elites and to depreciate their impact upon the population as a whole.
True, important tensions can be observed, and some antagonism developed
between the citizens (those of the 'four communes'), from whom the major
part of the 'colonial élite' came, and the subjects in the other parts of the [578]
territory; but such tensions virtually disappeared with the legal changes
introduced immediately after the war, a fact which is proof enough how
superficial the points of divergence were. The 'educated' classes, moreover,
sought to reap all possible profit from the power they acquired in their administrative
functions, or in their role of intermediary between producers and
the big commercial companies; and that attitude naturally set up a great
many local conflicts. Sometimes they sought compensation for their inferior
standing in the traditional framework by asserting themselves in the exercise
of their new functions. As we have already shown, however, the population [554]
as a whole recognized the prestige of the new intellectual elite. True, their
prestige did not necessarily displace the traditional prestige, but the two can
coexist, a circumstance which stands out most clearly in rural districts. So,
even if the 'educated' African has difficulty in fitting into the traditional
system or even the family group, even if he is often a maladjusted element,
he is rarely the fish out of water whom so many colonial observers considered
him. All the elements of the population are still continually in touch.[1] There
are two basic reasons for this. First, the range of family relationships is still [602]
a very wide one and they themselves are still effective; they maintain their
hold on the 'educated' African even when he has left his birthplace. Secondly,
religion—chiefly Islam in Senegal—and above all, membership of a sect, 795
which is practically hereditary, continue to be important. The fact that tension 799
between elites and masses led to nothing but quite limited and temporary
breaks explains why the recent and entirely conscious effort to retie loose bonds [578]
was carried through with comparative ease. It was the new elite that, with
political aims in view, inspired this effort. Usually too far removed from the

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[1] The vitality of racial or regional associations is significant in this respect.

Dakar
Wolof MS30

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out of the bus and it was only with difficulty that Arnold and I managed to extricate ourselves. We took a taxi, at almost greater cost than the journey from Kaolak to Dakar, to a dingy little hotel, in the old quarter of the city. To reach it we passed through the centre of Dakar. Trees lined the streets and the architecture of both offices and houses was admirably suited to its tropical setting. It was at once evident that Dakar was a city and not just a town that had, like Lagos, rambled and sprawled and got too big. With its statuesque young skyscrapers and its wide streets, Dakar seemed a model city for the new West Africa. It was neither distinctly African nor European, but had its affinity with the modern cities of South America.

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Arnold, accustomed to the higgledy-piggledy, chaotic sprawl of Lagos, and the quiet Victorian dignity of Freetown, could not quite take this in. He seemed almost to resent it as an imposition on Africa, as something that was not African. True, I found that against this background the African appeared, at first, to be an intruder. Nothing seemed more incongruous than a vast Jollof belle, dressed in her traditional robes of lace and muslin, sweeping past the more outrageous examples of *cinema moderna* architecture, or standing pensively beneath a marble plaque depicting a naked African surrounded by the fruits of progress. More incongruous still was the sight of them being spooned in and out of fast American cars or staring into patisserie windows—just imagine one of those muslin cocoons tackling a chocolate éclair. Yet the Africans seemed to have accepted their surroundings with such aplomb that very soon I was to feel that it was the Europeans who were out of place. There seemed nothing unnatural in half a dozen Africans making up their bed for the night on the pavement outside a twelve-story bank, or the young men in tight jeans standing on the street corners eyeing passing girls, just like Saturday night back at the Buildings.

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We stayed one night in the Hotel des Fleurs, the cheapest I could find in Dakar. It was owned by a Lebanese, and for Dakar, a city which is almost prohibitive in price for an Englishman, it was remarkably cheap. A haircut in Dakar is 12s., and it has one of the highest cost of living indices in the world.

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That night when I entered a bar called appropriately 'Café de Paris', I was unable to believe that we were still in Africa. It had

Dakar

369 275 all the accoutrements of a Montmartre bistro, together with a large, bad painting of the Sacré Coeur above the bar. Drinks were served by a tall barmaid, with long flaxen hair and make-up applied so that she looked like a German-doll: The clientele was mainly composed of soldiers from the barracks by the sea-front, but at our table sat two elegant Jollof girls, both very drunk. [548] They made it fairly clear they were prostitutes and it was not long before a policeman came to arrest the more intoxicated of the two. She spat, screamed furiously and struggled to break away. Just as she was about to enter the car, she demanded: 'Let me finish my drink.' She was allowed to return to her table, where she drank her beer slowly, eyeing us all as if we were vermin. Then just as slowly, with the comic dignity that comes so naturally to a drunk, she swept to her feet, stood with her henna'd hands on her hips, spat with incredible accuracy at the feet of a nearby soldier and shouted in a voice ringing with anger, and looking at us with contempt: 'Salauds.'

Then an African sergeant came in, asked for a drink, which [563] the flaxen doll served him. She served African and European alike. I found this hard to believe after the Gambia, where no white woman could serve drinks behind a bar to Europeans, let alone to Africans.

369 563 Next morning, I was even more surprised when Arnold took me into a large department store and pointed to the counter-girls. Seventy-five per cent of them were white. Outside a French-woman was selling vegetables at a small stall. Of course, in this respect Dakar is exceptional for West Africa. It is the only city [162] with a large population of Colons. Over 25,000 Europeans live there. They came from every walk of life and have more affinity with the Colons of Algeria than anything else one can cite on the Coast. You can walk into the most ramshackle bar and yet be served by a Parisienne. You will find poor whites living in the Médina, as the African quarter is known. Each year, 'Les Girls' from a Paris night club do a season at the *Bodega*. The N'Gor Hotel and the 'Croix du Sud' are as fine as you will find in France. Dakar's Colons have re-created Paris in Africa. Most of them have never ventured out of the city, and if they had to go into 'the bush' they would probably prepare for it as though they were Mungo Park setting out to discover the Niger.

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Arnold was critical of these Colons, for in British West Africa there is no such class. Indeed he seemed almost to resent their presence, though he has no dislike of Europeans. His opinion is shared by a number of Africans who come into competition with whites for jobs.

'In Lagos the counter girls are African. Why shouldn't they be here?' Arnold argued.

On the other hand in Lagos service and shopping facilities are infinitely inferior to those of Dakar. Another thing that struck Arnold was the absence of Africans from the main cafés and hotels. Surely this indicated a subtle colour bar, he argued. However, I had the answer to this from an African whom I invited to have a drink in a café with me. He declined, because as a Muslim it would not do for him to be seen in a café by any of his friends or relations. If they did see him there would be terrible trouble.

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The Jollofs, Dakar's main tribe, are proud of their race and not over-keen on mixing with whites. Nevertheless relations between African and European in Dakar are extremely cordial. France is still aware of the debt that she owes the Senegalese troops for their part in the last war. There is, moreover, none of the patronizing attitude in the French approach to the African. If anything, as many French complain, the Jollof is the one who does the patronizing.

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We went from the Hotel de Fleurs to some rooms in IFAN, the Institut Français D'Afrique Noire, which were lent us by its Director, Professor Theodore Monod, whom I had met on my last visit to Dakar. Professor Monod is one of the most impressive men I have ever met. He received us both in his large, book-lined office without looking up from his work. We both fumbled and fidgeted nervously studying the pictures on the wall, many of which were religious paintings or texts from the Bible. When I was beginning to feel acutely embarrassed, he looked up from his work revealing a gaunt, hollow face with deep-set piercing eyes, half obscured behind the glass of his horn-rimmed spectacles. I informed him that we had met some two years before, and that I should be grateful for his help on my journey. He looked at me vaguely, smiled, and then suddenly seemed to come into contact with the world we inhabited, and promised to arrange for letters

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7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal, MS37
Goree

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expensive cameras and an intriguing assortment of seaside equipment. The boat ploughed through the brisk waters of the bay before it pulled alongside the jetty, at Gorée, where the passengers climbed out with great difficulty because of the swell in the ice-blue waters, so transparent that I could see myriad fish lurking on the sandy bottom. I was cluttered up with cameras, so a tall, light-skinned African helped me on to the jetty. His fine, almost European features revealed that he was a Fulani, a curious tribe of cattle nomads to be found throughout West Africa. Some of the tribe have settled in the towns, as a superior aristocracy. The young man, a guide book in his hand, introduced himself as Seyni Djibey, and asked me whether this was the first time I had been to Gorée. [563]

'No, I've been here before. Two years ago,' I replied.

'But you're not French,' he remarked with some astonishment. He looked at Arnold. 'I could tell because of him. The clothes he is wearing are not what the French Africans would wear,' he added.

'Where do you come from?' I asked.

'From Niamey, that's in Niger, you know!' he replied.

'Yes, I'm going there,' and before he could ask me why, I asked him a similar question.

'But what are you doing here in Senegal?'

'I just came to look. I had leave from my job, so I decided to spend some money I had saved up, travelling around West Africa. I've already been to Bamako. Next week I'm going to Conakry and Abidjan. I wanted to come here and see what Gorée is like.'

He walked towards the house of a friend to whom I had been given an introduction. The beach was littered with naked bodies, white and black, roasting in the sun that glared through a thin veil of cloud. Overlooking the right-hand wall of the beach was the picturesque Hostelerie du Chevalier de Boufflers, from which stretched in a generous semi-circle an intricacy of old houses, each one a perfect example of nineteenth-century French colonial architecture, with crumbling plaster façades, slatted shutters, large sash windows and delicately patterned verandas. Old wrought iron lamps clung to the walls of each house, giving a strangely Victorian atmosphere to the narrow street. [366]

Seyni, looking up from his guide book, pointed to an old fort.

369 Metropolis. Until recently the African élite has always come from
[571] St. Louis. It is a sort of spiritual centre of Black Africa. It had the
[873] first school—Lycée Faidherbe. And in 1866 it was given the first
Hotel de Ville of the French Union. It is the cradle of the French
Union. It would be a tragedy if it died.'

369 To such men as these it seems scandalous that St. Louis with
175 its great history and traditions should give way to a parvenue like
Dakar. Of all West African cities St. Louis is the one with the most
illustrious and fascinating history. It was called St. Louis after
the great French King, Louis XIII, in the middle of the seventeenth
century. However, in the following century it began to expand
into a town whose inhabitants were a distinct race, comparable
[563] to the Creoles of Sierra Leone. White and black intermarried to
form a group known as the St. Louisians. During the eighteenth
[591] and nineteenth centuries these were the great families of the
[554] Senegal, though today they are losing importance. Names like
Carpot, Descamet, Deves, Guillabert and Crespin are still remembered with respect in St. Louis.

[162] By the end of the eighteenth century the town had more than
7,000 inhabitants and in 1778 a mayor, who had to be chosen
[633] from the local population, was charged with the maintenance of
good relations between the people and the Governor. In 1833
[641] all inhabitants of St. Louis were given the status of French
citizens.

Perhaps the most important date for St. Louis and for West
Africa was 1854, when General Faidherbe was appointed
Governor. Today his mark is still firmly on St. Louis. The
[361] ordered layout of the city and its streets were his work. The large
bridge connecting the island on which St. Louis stands to the
[491] mainland is named after him. The city's most important and
famous school is the Lycée Faidherbe. And even now one can listen to old folk sitting on the benches of the park, in which his statue stands, telling tales of the great General, who had fought against the famous Toucouleur chief, El Hadj Omar and brought Senegal, Soudan and Mauretania into the French orbit. Perhaps some of these old people are his own descendants, for he is reputed to have been a prolific father.

[162] By 1878 St. Louis had grown to a city of 16,000 inhabitants,
and despite the rapid expansion of Dakar and Rufisque farther
down the coast, there was little to worry about the
future.

S 295 733 After the great Magal de Touba[1] our town inherited bands of homeless among whom were notorious criminals.

S 369 614 Alcoholism was not the only form of moral decadence in a city like Dakar. Actually crimes of violence, robbing and murder were almost unknown. There were rarely any reference to them in the papers, and a police officer assured me that this was true. However, one read frequently of crimes of passion, such as a man stabbing his friend to death in the course of a quarrel.

S 369 548 There was, I was told, an enormous amount of prostitution in Dakar. I was shown one of the city's more notorious brothels in Rebeusse suburb, a rambling shack that had been raided more than once by police. S [563] On the whole prostitution is not organized because of legal difficulties. A number of prostitutes were white women, who receive patronage mainly from Lebanese and Syrians. I was told of one who went around the Médina in a small car, serving the local population.

W S 369 838 548 On the other hand homosexuality had a much freer rein, being prevalent amongst Africans, Mauretanians and Europeans alike. In Place Prôtet, the main square of Dakar, young African boys, more often than not Jollofs, could be seen waiting to be picked up. Under the Code Napoleon it is, of course, legal, and in theory presents no problem, though many people are worried by its spread in the city.

Of course, to many of these boys with no work, it is one way of making money. But amongst the Jollofs it seems to be more deeply rooted. Contact with Frenchmen in St. Louis, who often preferred black boys to black mistresses and contact with the Mauretanians may provide an explanation.

Today one can even see Jollof men dressed in women's clothes. I once met one in a small bar outside Dakar. He was obviously pathetically feminine. The Jollof must be used to this since they even have a word for them—Gor-Digen. The elders and faithful Muslims condemn men for this, but it is typical of African tolerance that they are left very much alone by the rest of the people.

W 589 One reason for the growing tendency of Jollof men to remain bachelors to an age much older than is usual in Africa, if not for their homosexuality, is the character of the Jollof women.

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[1] Celebration of Birth of Prophet.

The New Political Life

369 More importantly, the urban centers 668 deserve attention because of the role they have played in the development of a radically new type of political life, one [177] whose forms have been largely borrowed from outside Africa. The first attempts at political organization and activity were born in the cities. More recently some political movements have appeared in a rural context, as a reflection of rural conditions, but they have drawn much of their pattern from the cities, or from among elements subject to urban influences.

The modern African city presents a set of conditions favorable to the development of especially intense political reac- 369 tions. The position of the colonizing power is most sharply apparent in the city, and the instruments of its power are concentrated there. The rootless condition of the African population seems at its extreme; the masses that gather in the city are unsettled, poorly established in their occupations, and suffer from [571] every form of insecurity. The new elites created and shaped by urban life feel restricted and disappointed in their desires for social advancement and for a share in authority and in modern symbols of prestige.[5] Finally, the city brings together a white society and a Negro ● [563] society, though often clearly separated by topography. In these circumstances racial tensions can develop to their maximum. Moreover, they assume varied aspects, *e.g.*, competitive situations in various spheres, official or unofficial discrimination.[6] Intense reactions to such conditions may take no organized form and may not manifest themselves except after some delay, however. Here the

[P. 5A]

"*The Four Communes of Senegal*"

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The four coastal cities have had the longest experience with political rights. All are fairly old; Dakar was founded most recently, in 1857. St. Louis of Senegal, founded in the time of the slave-trade, is the oldest, and a typical example of the "old colonial city." In 1659 a warehouse of the Company of the Senegal was built on the site, the first French settlement in the region. It was a commercial post oriented toward the river, and a small military outpost; it became the jumping-off place for the conquest of the African territories. The general traits of the old African city may still be found in St. Louis' central section, despite recent changes. In such a center the African population was relatively stable.[18] A few European families established residence, and a rather important [563] mixed-blood population developed. By the mid-19th century an urban community with a homogeneous way of life had emerged.

The Isle of Gorée, which became the second commune in Senegal, was occupied in 1677; it was oriented toward the Petite-Cote and the factories of Rufisque, Joal, and Portudal. Of these, only Rufisque developed; it became the third commune. St. Louis and Gorée underwent many vicissitudes before 1815, when they were restored to France. They then returned to "legal" commerce, which was centered in the valley of the Senegal. St. Louis retained its dominance. By the end of the 18th century it had had nearly [162] [563] 7,000 inhabitants, about half of whom were free and almost a tenth European. In the 1870's its population was about 15,000, while Gorée had but 3,000; Rufisque was growing as was Dakar. Finally, the interior back of the Petite-Cote was opening up, and Thiès was founded. In the following period St.

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369 Louis stagnated[14] and Gorée declined,
633 losing people at the expense of Dakar and
175 Rufisque; Rufisque grew rapidly, as the
[162] port for the ground-nut. Dakar entered
a period of prosperity at the turn of the
[439] century.[15] During the late 19th century
the composition of the population already was beginning to change fairly rapidly, especially in the expanding centers, but the old core of urban population continued to hold a dominant place, not only in urban life but also in the colony of Senegal as a whole, whose constitution had come into effect. The people of St. Louis most notably served as essential instruments of the colonization effort.

This dominance was expressed very clearly in the political realm. The coastal cities, in contrast to the interior cities and rural areas, had been introduced to the structure and organization through which modern political life is conducted long before the reforms of 1946. Political activity of the modern type was first limited to the European settlers but was
● [563] soon extended to the mixed-blood element,
and then to the Negro population. Beginning in the late 18th century, St. Louis had a mayor, always a mixed-blood, who served as intermediary between the governor and the populace. In 1789 the
[668] colony participated in metropolitan polit-
ical activities, sending to the States-General a petition of grievances that demanded commercial freedom — *i.e.*, abolition of the Company monopoly — and the end of slavery. A satisfactory agreement was reached among employees of the Company, European businessmen, and mixed-blood businessmen, but it was never brought to fruition; a period of disorder set in and persisted until the rebirth of the colony in 1815.

[641] In 1833 French citizenship was con-
ferred upon all free inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée by royal decree. Citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of

369 in some years. Since the beginning of the
633 20th century, however, urban citizens
175 have taken an increasingly lively interest
[666] in political matters.[18]

In this restricted political system the
relative importance of the roles played by
●563 different ethnic groupings and different
668 cities varied continuously. Ethnic dominance,
first held by the old European
families, passed gradually to mixed-blood
society, which came into being in the
18th century and rapidly acquired wealth,
education, and influence. By the mid-19th
century mixed-bloods made up the
majority of the westernized population.
But the entry of the emancipated slaves,
[166] the first sizable migration toward the
cities, quickly reduced the mixed-bloods
to a minority. In 1900 they numbered
[162] less than 5,000 in the four communes together,
though for several decades their
economic and political influence remained
quite disproportionate to their numbers.
668 Among the cities, St. Louis was
[369] predominant until WW I. At the beginning
of the century it practically controlled
the deputation to the French
legislature and the Council-general —
and hence the economic life of the territory.
Then Gorée-Dakar came to the
fore;[19] in 1914 a citizen of Gorée, Blaise
Diagne, was elected deputy, followed by
Galandou Diouf and Lebou. These men
[645] were the first elected Senegalese to win
broad support at Paris; Diagne himself
was appointed a Secretary of State [a
subministerial post, equivalent to a U.S.
Under-Secretary]. In Senegal, the authority
[642] of elected officials — deputies and
Councillors-general — increased, and
clashes with the civil administration were
frequent.[20]

[P.8B]

665 369 elements that have been urbanized the longest, the percentage of party memberships has been as high among women as among men. This was a peculiar aspect of the Dakar situation, not found, for instance, at Thiès (where the percentage of memberships among women, depending upon the ethnic group, was from one-half to one-tenth that among men). At Dakar the women's branches on occasion could mobilize large crowds, adorned in party colors. Study of about 30 of these individual cases suggested that the conscious essence of political attachment consisted almost entirely of the relation with the leader.

665 578 The formalization noted above can be studied from various points of view. The fundamental bipartition of political life in a way was responsible for the indirect expression of intragroup and intergroup divisions and rivalries whose nature was other than political. This explains why the line of separation between the two political blocs did not have the same significance to all sectors of the population. In specific situations it assumed many meanings. For example, one could find: (1) hostility between the Lebou-Wolof grouping and the rest of the population (which resembled, without exactly corresponding to, the fundamental division [563] noted above); (2) hostility, more or less muted, between Wolof and Lebou; and (3) hostilities within each of the two groups, in proportion to diversities of origin, status, etc.

This accounts for the relative flexibility prevailing in the composition of the clienteles that made up the parties.[39] Since the clienteles represented varied levels, however, they introduced new divisions, or revived and solidified old hostilities.

665 (1) A fundamental problem arises from the interactions between the modern political system and what remains of the traditional or semi-traditional sys-

467 focussing on some of their asserted policies,
668 revealed that the union struggle was
regarded as directed essentially against
the government. This must be interpreted
not only with regard to the general
traits of the colonial system but also in
relation to the commanding role that the
government played in labor. It was first
of all the principal employer: in a city
[369] such as Dakar, a little more than a third
of the wage-earners were dependent upon
it. It was responsible for setting the
[465] minimum wage, and it has happened that
owing to budgetary considerations and
general policy it established a lower figure
than non-governmental employers might
have adopted. Finally, during the period
in question, a central problem was that
[466] of enforcing the Code of Overseas Labor,
enacted by Parliament in 1952. The civil
administration was responsible for its enforcement,
and the strikes of 1953 were
[468] designed to bring pressure on the administration
so as to obtain a "fair enforcement"
of its provisions. In the interviews
mentioned above, conflicts with
employers were scarcely mentioned as
such. Employers were identified with
the civil administration; the terms "civil
administration" and "colonialism" seemed
almost interchangeable. The adversary of
the unions being essentially the civil administration
— and a "colonial civil administration"
— their action inevitably
assumed political significance, broadly
defined.[49]

467 (2) In the field of union activities
the hostility between the European component
668 and the African component of the
•563 urban population showed itself most
vividly. This stemmed not merely from
the fact that the civil administration
and the employers represented the power
of the "whites." It was also noteworthy
that European workers, employees, and
[468] officials almost invariably formed separate
unions, with goals sharply opposed to

[P. 17 B]

467 those of the African unions.[50] The acute
468 crises produced by certain important
strikes gave forceful expression to this
668 rift. The African unions, despite their
563 ideological differences, despite the personal rivalries that brought their leaders into opposition, often engaged in combined and coordinated activities. By contrast, the strikes of the African workers and those of the European workers scarcely ever coincided, though the latter might break out as a response to the
[A65] former in an effort to maintain the hierarchy of salary scales. As demonstrations of African unity against the civil administration and* against European
[578] controls in general, strikes were the only occasion in which the underlying tension characterizing the city appeared distinctly and in a generalized fashion. It was because they expressed this tension that their impact and the emotional response to them were so important.

467 (3) This was also the principal cause
468 of their ultimate success. During such
conflicts, demands were expressed that
668 were far more extreme than those made by the parties. Thus, in the strikes of 1953, the union press and the union leaders evoked the possibility that African "loyalism" would be suspended and that the bonds between France and the Overseas Territories would be changed; the question of independence was openly and threateningly discussed. Union activities assumed a certain nationalistic coloring that the parties at that time disregarded. Behind every limited demand regarding salaries or the regulation of working conditions lay the fundamental anti-colonial demand; it was this demand that gave weight to the mass demonstrations and
467 that carried the day.[51] It must be further
noted that during this period major ex-
668 ternal ideological elements entered the contest, especially through the unions. An important number of their activists had studied techniques of organization,

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467 668 both in France and in other countries. Participation in international congresses put them in contact with the ideological currents of the world. A study of the union press was very revealing in this regard.

[665] To the masses, unions proposed goals that were, in the period under consideration, far different from those of the political parties. Unions were in many ways more systematic and more vigorous. They were much less apt to make ● [563] differentiations along ethnic, religious, or other lines. The unity of action that they practiced banned their assimilating such hostilities and conflicts, whose meaning was foreign to them. These hostilities yielded before the fundamental hostility brought out by union action. The near-unanimity with which the directives of the union have been followed is very [571] significant. For the elites, on the other hand, unions offered, in an era in which the forms and matrices of customary political expression appeared too narrow, a wider and more adequate field of action. Unionism supplied the most accessible agencies for sharing in power of the modern sort. The intellectual elites furnished [571] the substance of the union framework and played a dominant role on their executive committees.[52] Located at the very center of situations of tension and conflict, they found in union activities the most effective way of asserting modern views and of surmounting the limits barring their advancement in the political and occupational fields.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1956

668 369 Such were the chief aspects, in a period of transition, of the political life of the large Senegalese urban centers. In the subsequent four years, great changes have occurred. Senegalese political individuality — considerably modified by that of the "old cities" — has remained clear, but it has in great part shifted to

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[50] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Aspects des problemes de stratification sociale," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XVIII, 1954.

[51] A scrutiny of union publications in 1953 made this evident.

[52] In a very broad sense; their composition was very heterogeneous and drawn from various strata.

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other fields.

668 In the "old cities," changes have taken
369 place that were already evident when the
investigations noted above were being
conducted. The importance of these facts
must be emphasized:

(1) The separation between the cities
and the countryside, and more particularly between the old cities and the rest
of the territory, is becoming less sharp.
This fact has already been pointed out
in connection with recent demographic
developments and the growth of the
B.D.S. There are other indications. The
571 intellectual elites have more diversified
origins; though the oldest nuclei of urban
668 population remain important in their
369 composition, they are steadily decreasing
in size. The bonds among the different sections of the territory are tightening. On the other hand, the old elites are becoming active outside city boundaries, and give a place in their considerations to the problems of rural modernization and evolution. Certain projects established by the youth associations and the unions have contributed to this orientation.

(2) These facts are connected with a shift in generations that has extensive effects. The attitude of youthful elites has been different; they feel themselves competent to assume broader responsibilities.[58] At the same time they are diverging more or less impetuously from the paths of "assimilation," and are striving to rediscover and revive specifically African values. An effort to prove themselves individually by integrating themselves into the existing system is being succeeded by an effort to prove themselves as representatives and guides for a host that must be freed from this system. This is a trend toward nationalism, in the widest sense of the term.

668 (3) In the coastal cities, the grow-
369 ing strength of racial tensions since the
563 last war cannot fail to encourage such a

[P. 19 A]

668 change. The vast increase in the num-
369 ber of Europeans, their greater occupa-
[563] tional diversification, the much stronger
reaction to the facts of discrimination, and multiplication of competitive situations — occupational or otherwise — are the most obvious phases of this major phenomenon.[54]

As these factors have come into full operation, a new phase of political life has opened. These are its principal traits:

668 (1) From 1956 on, in unions and in
politics, secessions from the original
665 French bodies — confederations or par-
[467] ties — have multiplied. Previous remarks
indicated the development of this process among unions. After some delay it affected the S.F.I.O. itself, which was transformed, not without difficulties, into the African Socialist Movement. The assimilationist tradition declined, or at least was no longer proclaimed openly. After the parties became autonomous, the distinction between direct and indirect forms of political expression began to disappear. Extremist demands of a nationalistic character found expression within the parties, and worked effectively there after 1957 (at the time when the new "organic law" authorized the first Senegalese government).

(2) To a certain degree, the very old Senegalese political tradition once more became a driving force. At the same time the marginal elements, whose exist-
[571] ence was particularly marked among in-
tellectuals, entered into real politics, chiefly within the framework of the B.D.S. They comprised the left wing of the new Senegalese Populist Bloc (B.P.S.), which stemmed from the B.D.S., and shared in the creation of the African Convention, which is striving to extend outside Senegal the strictly autonomous orientations of the B.D.S. They tried to organize the B.D.S. as a

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[53] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).
[54] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Le groupement européen de Dakar," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.*, XIX, 1955.

[P.19C]

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125 such as caste and the degree of kinship of each actual union [8].

[143] In this region the person questioned, mostly in public, did
[565] not make any difficulty about declaring to which caste he belonged. Moreover, this is known by all the inhabitants of the
[124] village and has such social importance that if one asks a child in the street, "Who are you?" he replies, "I am of such and such a caste." As for the degree of kinship of the spouses, a previous study among the sedentary Peul of the Fouta Djallon [9] has shown that it was possible to obtain this without a cumbersome demographic investigation; the individuals are well acquainted with the fact in regions where consanguineous unions are the custom.

The investigator asks whether or not the woman is married to a near relative, and, in the case of an affirmative answer, if the spouses have the same grandfather or grandmother (fourth degree) or in what other way they are related. A total number of 6,208 married women were questioned in this manner, and in order to correct possible errors of observation in such a sample, a control was established in a subsample of 382 sedentary couples by noting the names of the parents, grandparents, and eventually great-grandparents. At this stage there is uncertainty, but this can be removed only by laboriously working out genealogies. That is why the proportion of marriages to the sixth degree, which we indicate below and which are beyond the kinship ties known with sufficient accuracy, are perhaps more important in reality.

•563 The ethnic groups. The region studied contains 341,000 inhabitants divided into five principal ethnic groups: Moors, Toucouleur [Tukulor], Peul, Saracolé [Sarakole], and Wolof (Table I). The ethnic groups are distinguished by such characteristics as the way of life, social structure, group consciousness,
[186] the name given them by other groups, and language, except for
[199] the Peul and the Toucouleur, who speak the same language, Poular. Aside from the Moors, the population is grouped in five
[361] port cities and 800 villages and communities.

[162] The Toucouleur form the largest aggregate (187,000 persons) and occupy the center of the region on the two rivers. The

/667 cont./
563 term Toucouleur often erroneously designates all the inhabitants
of the Fouta Toro; we shall use it here in the way the Toucouleur
speak of themselves, namely, Halpoularen (speaking the language
[197] of the Peul), distinct from the Wolof, who have their own
language, and from the Saracolé, who speak a Mandé dialect.

/668/ Downstream the boundary between the Wolof and the
Toucouleur is not clearly defined and several Wolof villages have
been established in the very heart of Toucouleur country and
[186] have preserved their ethnic individuality. They are regarded as
foreigners. It is the same upriver on the part of the Saracolé.

The Peul live in the midst of the three groups mentioned
[175] above, and the Peul ethnic group in the valley of the Senegal is
itself composed of several waves /nappes/ which have successively
spread throughout the region. The oldest are also the most
sedentary and the most Islamized (Foulbé walo) and have a way
of life very much like that of the Toucouleur, with whom they
sometimes intermarry. The others, who have come more recently
[221] (Foulbé Diéri), are seminomads and only in winter cultivate
[162] the sands of the hills which border the valley (Diéri). There
is a total of 47,000 Peul in this region, but we do not know the
[613] actual number of each wave, itself divided into relatively
[175] endogamous lineages /lignages/ or pseudo-lineages. The latter,
designated by the administration as communities, served as
census units for the Peul, while for the others this unit was the
village. The location of these communities often changes because
of the seminomadic character of the Peul way of life,
which is devoted principally to livestock-raising.

[162] Among the 56,000 Moors, although some of them (6,000)
are settled in the river ports, the majority merely meet on the
Mauritainian shore and only part of the year; they camp there
[221] during the dry season in order to cultivate the alluvial soil (walo),
and they return after the harvest to camps sometimes located
several dozen kilometers from there. These farmers for the
most part are Haratin of the black race, that is to say, ancient
serfs of the Moors, from whom they continue to lease land.

125 Since they occupy a very marginal position in relation to
the totality of the inhabitants of the valley, they will not be
studied here. /Table I appears here./

/668 cont./

162 Table I. Division of the population of the Senegalese Fouta according to ethnic groups.

Ethnic Group	Actual Number	Percentage
Toucouleur	187,000	54.8
Wolof	36,000	10.6
Saracolé	13,000	3.8
Peul	47,000	13.8
Moor	56,000	16.4
Miscellaneous	2,000	0.6
Total	341,000	100.0

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● 563 The ethnic groups are relatively endogamous, because marriages between persons of different ethnic groups are very rare, except perhaps, as we have seen, between Toucouleur and Peul (Foulbé walo). The Toucouleur /669/ are the only group entirely
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[166] within the Fouta, aside from some fractions that emigrated in the course of religious crusades into Macina, Boundou, and elsewhere.

Each of the other ethnic groups is merely an extension into the valley of a group whose bulk occupies the neighboring regions, the Wolof in the northern part of Senegal, the Saracolé in western Sudan, the Peul near the Ferlo and the Assaba. But each of these ethnic groups is itself divided into several populations: the castes.

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[582] Castes and social conditions. The castes, in reality, present a matrimonial barrier more difficult to overcome than that of ethnic affiliation. The term "caste" is used here in the general sense of social class, exclusive in nature, and not in the sense
[564] that is given it in the valley where the term is reserved for artisan castes.

[567]
[422] Social conditions first of all distinguish the captives from the free men. The captives are regarded as the personal property

/166 cont./

166 369 Coming to Pikine means coming to the city, and that is an indication of urban maturity which shows that Pikine is tending toward a relative sociological autonomy with respect to Dakar (1). /167/ /Table 4 appears here./

> 1. Autonomy does not mean independence, and it is quite certain that Pikine is a result of Dakar and that without Dakar there would be no Pikine. We wish to say simply this: migration to Pikine effectively brings about insertion into an urban environment through its distance from the Dakar agglomeration, and permits a migrant to participate in the economic and social advantages of the city.

166 /168/ As for the high percentages of non-expelled among the Peul, Moors, and the other ethnic groups, it is difficult to give a reason for them. All that one can suggest [563] as far as the Moors are concerned is that they are chiefly merchants and that they establish their shops where the population is to be found. It is therefore normal that their presence in Pikine is the result, not of compulsion born of expulsion, but of choice for commercial motives.

Except for several hundred children less than five years old, no resident was born in Pikine. Two things are interesting to know:

1) Where do they come from, what is the respective proportion of their region of origin?

2) When did they arrive in Dakar?

Here is first, for the male heads of families, a detailed table, in absolute figures, for the places of birth divided according to age classes, and then the table in percentages from the principal regions, regrouped this time into only five categories in order to make the principal tendencies more apparent. /Table 5 appears here./

/181 cont./

191 academic training.

871 2) The great difference between the districts and the other quarters: the percentage of literates in the districts is almost four times the corresponding percentage in the quarters.

191 3) The very special situation of the Moors: they seem
871 distinctly refractory with regard to modern education and do not
563 show any more evidence of an aptitude or a very urgent desire for the study of French. This trait is characteristic of the originality of the Moorish community. It is not merely a sign, however, but is also a factor, and, as such, it contributes strongly to the withdrawal of this community and to its cultural isolation in the midst of the nascent urban civilization. The Moor has managed to integrate himself in the city -- it would be more accurate to say thrust himself into the city -- without changing his habits of life very much and by keeping intact the compact homogeneity of the group.

191 It is likewise necessary to note another tendency, although less obvious than the preceding ones: the Wolof and Sérère family heads who do not speak French are superior in number to those who speak it; this proportion is, on the contrary, reversed in the other ethnic groups. One must probably seek the cause of this variation in the fact that Pikine is a city close to the Wolof regions and that Wolof is the lingua franca there. The Toucouleur, Bambara, Soussou /Susu/, or Mossi come from much farther away, they have often "labored" in several places before ending up in Dakar, and this experience has not failed to give them some rudiments of French acquired in the course of their previous migrations.

191 871 The evaluation of the preceding results, no longer according to ethnic group but according to age class, gives other indications which at the same time indirectly confirm the above remark. /Table 15 appears here./

/182/ The percentage of literates in proportion to the whole of an age class decreases in proportion to the increase in age. There are proportionately six times more young

/13 cont. /

this differentiation of functions has only taken shape in the last three decades (op. cit., p. 609)." This differentiation has been greatly accentuated in recent years. 369x [361]

2. The time and variable possibilities that the colonial towns have had to crystalize new social behavior and forms permit one to place them on a scale between two extreme types. There are old towns, this with respect to the measure of time that one must adopt in order to place the colonialtowns, the majority of which date from only a few decades ago and very few of which have reached a century of existence; there are absolutely new towns.

a) The old town has already had time to structure itself. The original ethnic differences are being obliterated; one could say that there is being created from multiple contributions a new ethos peculiar to the city. 369x 563

The European and African elements have contacts of variable amplitude and partially mingle in the habitat. Some Europeans found families. A sizable mixed society is formed. A proportion of higher schooling and in certain cases landed wealth have favored the creation of a leading African stratum. Some political traditions have been created there. The African population has become stabilized; the "family home" is in town and no longer in the bush. This extreme case is rare; one finds an example of it in the central part of Saint-Louis of the Senegal, the island. Still a new town, with an unstable population, little urbanized up to now, it is juxtaposed there, and the contribution of new layers of European population has changed certain data of the problem.

b) The recent town on the other hand, has very few stabilized Europeans. The mass of Africans is not [166]

/13 cont. /

stabilized either. Most of them were not born in town. There is no mixed society of any importance. The structures adapted to the new environment in which the rural people, recently settled, or seasonal people, who stream toward the town and salaried work, find themselves placed are hardly delineated yet. A relative "social amorphism" prevails. The European town and the African town, on the other hand are more clearly separated. This is the case, in part, for a town such as Brazzaville (2).

/14/ 3. Among the colonial towns, some have received an African population that is ethnically homogeneous or characterized by a well-marked dominant ethnic group; others have been populated by waves of immigrants of very diverse origin. The role that the traditional structures and values retain is therefore of unequal importance. Thus the clear contrast between the two "Black Brazzavilles" pointed out by G. Balandier (1). Thus the contrast between the two western and eastern annexes of Saint-Louis, Guet-Ndar and Sor, neither of which, however, can be regarded as completely urbanized.

4. The numerical importance of the European population, in absolute value and in relative value, is quite variable. Its growth is accompanied by modifications of structure

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2. Cf. G. Balandier, "Approche sociologique des 'Brazzavilles noires'; Etude préliminaire /Sociological Approach to the 'Black Brazzavilles': Preliminary Study/," Africa, XXII, 1, January 1952, pp. 23-34.

1. Ibid.

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Wolof MS30
Lebu

/14 cont./

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(occupational structure, class structure, etc.). It seems that there are certain numerical thresholds beyond which important qualitative changes make themselves felt, for example, in the area of race relations. We shall return to this.

B. -- Dakar is one of the most complex cases. It has some aspects of an old colonial town, and in fact it is one of the oldest in West Africa (2). But this one has been covered in a way by a town of the second type (3). The mixture of the social characteristics of the one town and of the other permits one to understand certain features of evolution of Dakar. On the other hand, the dominant original ethnic group, the Lebou group, has progressively lost its importance. Finally, a last phase of the development of the town makes it seem like a center of European population, still unstable.

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1. Considering only the African population, one ascertains that the elements that are old and stabilized -- unequally and under diverse conditions -- (Goréean "old families," Lebou community) have been submerged by a heterogeneous mass. It is nevertheless necessary to specify:

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a) The Lebou, despite the contributions received from the nearby suburb which is their traditional habitat zone (4), undoubtedly represent hardly more than 10% of

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2. Counting only the colonial towns; the pre-European towns, with specific characteristics, are excluded here.

3. Cf. above, I, A, 1, b.

4. Cf. G. Balandier and P. Mercier, "Particularisme et évolution: les pêcheurs

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/14 cont./

Lebou /Particularism and evolution: the Lebou Fishermen/," Etudes Sénégalaises, No. 3, 1952. Result of investigations made in 1946.

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the population. (5). Their /15/ customary organization,

5. The estimates, furnished by the way with every reservation by the Dakar Délégation, give 15% Lebou, but for the whole of the commune (suburban villages included); in the town itself the proportion is not as high. We consider only this one, without forgetting, however, that many Lebou living in the villages, and even Rufisque, work in Dakar. In the investigation by questionnaires conducted in Dakar, which gives, if not a true ethnic representation, at least some valuable indications, we encountered a little less than 10% Lebou.

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moreover, continues to exist (1), but becomes more and

1. On this subject, cf. C. Michel, "L'organisation coutumière (sociale et politique) de la collectivité Leboue de Dakar /The customary organization (social and political) of the Lebou community of Dakar/," Bull. du Comité d'Études Historiques et Scientifiques de l'A.O.F., XXII,

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Wolof MS90
Lebu

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more formal, and its efficacy is reduced besides by the new political cleavages (2). Their role as holders of the landed property has progressively shrunk and remains important only in the suburbs (3). Finally, the Lebou particularism (4) is tending to be obliterated, and the boundaries between Lebou and Wolof become more blurred (5).

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/15 cont./ 3, 1934; G.-J. Duchemin, "La République Lebou et le peuplement actuel /The Lebou republic and the present pupulation/," in "La presqu île du Cap-Vert /The Cape Verde peninsula/," _Etudes Sénégalaises,_ No. 1, 1949.

2. This goes as far as a splitting up of the traditional functions and those of the heads of quarters between the supporters of the two large present-day parties (SFIO and BDS).

3. On this subject cf. the indications furnished by J. Dresch, _op. cit._, pp. 219-220.

4. Cf. G. Balandier and P. Mercier, _op. cit._, _passim._

5. In the figures furnished by the Dakar Délégation, one sees accounting for 11% a category

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Lebu

/15 cont. /

called Wolof-Lebou, for which one cannot know to what extent it is the result of mixtures between the two groups and to what extent it is the effect of a "Wolofization" of the Lebou.

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b) As far as the Lebou and the Wolof are concerned, and to a lesser extent certain other groups, contacts with the regions and kinship groups of origin remain important. Let us add that for a population in large majority Moslem, the religious centers attracting pilgrims are in the interior of Senegal. A large proportion of the population is therefore not at all completely uprooted, and the phenomena of "destructurization" which generally accompany the rural exoduses are less marked than in most of the recent towns. Therefore the fact that only 22% of the persons questioned during our investigation were born in Dakar is less significant than it seems at first glance (6).

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6. Compare with the figures given by G. Balandier for Poto-Poto: 90 to 98% for persons born outside of the town (*op. cit.*, p. 25). On the other hand it must not be forgotten that even in the "old towns" in France the proportion of persons born in the town where they live may be very low, for example, 25% at Auxerre (cf. C. Bettelheim and S. Frère, *Une ville française moyenne, Auxerre en 1950, Etude de structure sociale et urbaine* /An average French town, Auxerre in 1950; Study of social and urban structure/, Paris, 1950).

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Lebu

/15 cont./

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c) It must be noted also that not all of the immigrant population is of rural origin. Many persons questioned by us, especially among the functionaries, were originally from "old towns" /16/ (Saint-Louis, Rufisque, etc.). It is then a matter of elements already strongly urbanized, for which, in any case, the question of uprooting would not pose itself in the same manner as for the rural people. The percentage of persons born in the town thus does not express exactly the degree of urbanization of the population.

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2. Under these conditions, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Dakar agglomeration does not signify, as in other centers presenting the same character, that social "amorphism" prevails (1). It only reveals itself at certain levels and in certain sectors of the population (seasonal workers, members of ethnic groups represented by a very low number of persons, etc.). The topographic regrouping of people of the same origin however, is far from being systematic, as we shall see in the study of neighborhood groups. At the very most one can mention some dominant ethnic groups in certain quarters (Sarakolé sector of the quarter of Nyaye-Thioker, for example), and the tendency to the least dispersion which characterizes certain groups (Moors, for example). The purely Lebou quarters have ceased

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1. Likewise, in a town such as Cotonou, the proximity of the big traditional centers of Dahomey counterbalances in part the facts of dissociation which one would suppose more important in view of the considerable ethnic mixtures that are produced there (cf. J. Lombard, "Cotonou, ville africaine /Cotonou, African town/," Etudes Dahoméennes, X, 1954).

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Wolof MS30
Lebu

/16 cont./

to exist by two processes: forced displacement of old quarters at the time of the creation of the Médina, massive settlement of foreign "tenants" in the quarters remaining in place. If the Lebou names of quarters have often been preserved (even after their displacement), if the headships of quarters are still in major part held by Lebou, these soon perhaps will be only historical vestiges. Moreover, the ethnic composition of the quarters and of the "compounds" is constantly being transformed. The numerical importance of the diverse groups cannot be established in any precise fashion because of the lack of detailed censuses. We shall mention as an indication:

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a) The official figures, furnished by the way with every reservation, and valid for the whole of the commune of Dakar (the suburban villages included): Lebou, 15%; Wolof, 25%; "Wolof-Lebou," 11%; Sérère, /Serer/, 3%; Bambara, 9%; Toucouleur /Tukolor/, 10%; Peul, 5%; Moors, 4%; Diola, 5%; Soussou /Susu/, 2%; Cape Verdeans (Portugese), 2%; etc. (2).

2. Percentages taken from figures shown in the 1953 report. Not mentioned, by the way, are persons originally from Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey. They do not seem to figure in the total, the headings including only: persons originally from other territories of the A.O.F. /French West Africa/, persons from Cape Verde, persons from Togo, persons from the Cameroun, persons originally from AEF /French Equatorial Africa/ and those from Sierra Leone.

/17/ b) The fragmentary data gathered at the time of the investigation by questionnaires conducted by the Section

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/17 cont./ 369*
de Sociologie in the first half of 1953. The 1,231 persons 563 ●
questioned were divided among 43 different ethnic groups. 162
The groups of small numerical importance, however, were [125]
not all represented (1). One found (the few percentages
given are only indicative):

-- persons originally from the Senegal-Sudan zone: [166]
besides the Lebou (9%), the Wolof (43%)(2), the Toucouleur [167]
(11%), the Sérère (5%), the Bambara (6%), the Sarakolé (3%), the Socé, the Mandingue /Mandingo/, the Khassonké /Kassonke/, the Peul, the Diola (3%) (3), the Mandiaque;

1. Some others, represented in all Dakar by only a few individuals, were encountered in the course of subsequent investigations.

2. Included here is a certain number of persons who were manifestly of Lebou origin and who nevertheless called themselves Wolof, proof of the crisis of the old Lebou particularism.

3. The figure furnished by official sources undoubtedly is closer to reality; there is, in fact, among the Diola, a majority of workers, permanent or seasonal, and this is the category that proved to be the most difficult to contact. The proportion of workers in the total number of persons who agreed to answer our questionnaire is much smaller than it should be. [125]

/17 cont./

-- persons originally from French Guinea: Malinké (3%), Peul, Soussou, Kissi; 369x 563● 162

-- persons from the Ivory Coast: Agni, Appollonien, Attié, Baoulé /Baule/, Bété /Betie/, Dida, Krou, Wobé; [167]

-- persons originally from the Togo-Dahomey zone: Aizo, Ewe, Fon, Goun /Gun/, Nago, Popo, Mina;

-- persons originally from the Upper Volta-Niger zone: Mossi, Sonray;

-- miscellaneous: Moors (3%), Cape Verdeans (2%), Yoruba, Boulama, Congolese, etc.

Those for whom we have indicated no percentage are for the most part of little importance numerically in relation to the total population. Their situation, however, is very variable: the consequences of uprooting, the degree of cohesion which preserves small groups very far from their region of origin, the degree of integration in the urban society, vary according to the level at which they are located in the new social stratification which takes shape in the towns.

3. Indeed, another feature of the sociology of colonial towns -- and which is, as we mentioned above, very conspicuous in the "old towns" -- is the progressive differentiation into strata definable by socio-occupational criteria. It assumes, as the investigation on Dakar showed, a /18/ greater and greater importance in the stabilized population; there, the domains where behavior continues to be determined by the ethnic, religious, etc. situation are limited. We posed the problem in this manner in a recent article, to which we allow ourselves to refer (1): "It appears ... that our categories only 369x 565

1. P. Mercier, "Un essai d'enquête par questionnaires dans la ville de Dakar /An attempt at investigation by questionnaires in the town of Dakar/" (Paper given at the conference on the Consequences of Industrialization [113]

/18 cont. /

and Urbanization in Africa,. Abidjan, 1954). 369x 565 [113]

tendentially have the character of social classes. They are distinguished by the living standard and way of life and by a certain number of specific behaviors, but the characteristics of colonial society, on the one hand, and, on the other, the persistence of traditional values do not permit them to assume the character of clear-cut classes." We shall return to this account, where we noted the absence of close correlations [182] between socio-occupational category, ethnic group, and religion, but, on the other hand, the existence of very clear correlations between the socio-occupational categories and facts such as level of French studies, the importance of intermarriages between different ethnic groups, that of the role played by the groupings and associations of a new type (political parties, syndicates, etc.). Also the ethnic affiliation plays a role of variable importance, although it is very rarely obliterated completely.

4. The new structures which characterize the towns 369x 571 give a large place to grouping of a political, syndical, cultural, sportive, etc. order. We shall not discuss this problem here. It must be noted, however, that in Dakar the importance of some of them is considerably reinforced by the function that Dakar performs as the federal capital; it is valid for the syndicates and to a lesser degree for the political parties.

5. Finally, an important fact in every colonial town, 369x 563 162 but particularly in Dakar is the juxtaposition of racially and culturally different groups. For Dakar, the European population undoubtedly represents 10% of the total population (2), and

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2. In the census of the non-autochthonous population of 1951, close to 22,000.

Dakar

/18 cont./ 369x
the Lebano-Syrians at least 2%. Let us consider in this brief 563●
glance only the problem of the relations between Africans and [162]
Europeans.

a) The increase in the number of Europeans -- which [161]
has increased at least sixfold since 1939, while the African population
has undoubtedly not even tripled -- has been accompanied [463]
by qualitative changes: development of the categories of technicians,
workers, artisans, petty employees, petty merchants.
This population, despite the sense of a strong solidarity (which
is admitted in time of crisis) vis-à-vis the African population, [565]
has seen a division /19/into classes inherited from the society
of origin become marked. At the same time, the European
community has withdrawn into itself, developing its own services
(specialized merchants, etc.).

b) The evolution of habitat zones reflects these transformations. 369x
The close checkerwork of the original plan of 563
Pinet-Laprade still encompasses multi-racial quarters (where 361
the Lebano-Syrians have taken a greater and greater place).
But, in the course of the development of the town, the Médina,
almost exclusively African (1), has been added to them in the [362]
north, while purely European residential quarters developed
in the south. The recent zones set up on the other side of the
Médina for the residences of functionaries likewise allow for
little mixing. Finally, with the reconstruction of new buildings,
the European town, starting from the southern zone,
gained on the mixed quarters, and a movement toward a clearer
segregation of the habitat zones is taking shape, segregation
which is in no way official, but which is considered desirable
by the majority of the European population (2) and is based in

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1. Some Europeans live there, however; the general housing crisis largely accounts for this.

2. Differences in way of life,

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differences in the daily rhythm are the arguments put forward by those who do not use purely racist arguments.

fact on the differences in economic status.

c) In principle there is no segregation in social life,
either; certain public places, however (cafés, bars, etc.),
strive directly or indirectly, to secure for themselves a purely
European clientele. On the other hand, many clubs and asso- [575]
ciations of a recreational nature exclude Africans in fact (it is
rarely statutory). The syndicates themselves, although they [467]
are not in principle founded on a racial basis, do not effect
a mixing of Africans and Europeans, as a result of the diver- [468]
gence of interests and claims; the strikes, when they occur,
are in practice purely African. Finally, the political parties [665]
are for the most part almost exclusively African; the European
population as a whole is disinterested in local political activity.

d) Essentially the relations between Africans and Europeans are: relations at the place of work, between colleagues and, much more often, between subordinates and superiors, employees and bosses; relations between masters and domestics at home; common participation in cultural and sportive activities; relations between teachers and pupils or students. Relations of a more personal character(regular relationships, friendships, etc.) are much rarer. Intermarriages -- almost exclusively between African men and European women -- have a particular significance; there are practically none that have been contracted locally.

/20/ e) Here we shall not touch on the area of interracial judgments and attitudes, which must be the subject of more detailed investigations. It will suffice to say that all the observations made permit one to conclude that there is a

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/20 cont./

state of tension between certain sectors of each of the two populations that is much more obvious than it was a few years ago. New facts have intervened in this period (not to speak of the grasp of clearer political perception by certain African elements). The number of European (men and women) workers and subordinate employees has increased, and this coincides with a considerable extension of vocational instruction and general instruction (at all levels) among the Africans, resulting in a much greater frequency of competitive situations in the occupational and economic spheres (1). 369x 563●

1. The study of unemployment in Dakar is very revealing. Besides the causes of unemployment which one could call classic, one more and more notices those that are due to this competitive situation. [464]

Such a glance shows how numerous, important, and entangled are the problems to be studied. A general publication will later give an account of the various investigations in progress. This account will permit one to place the problems that we shall bring up next. It will also permit one to understand the spirit in which our first inquiries were conducted. 369x

II

The information that we are going to give on the African family structure in the Dakar agglomeration is based, on the one hand, on documentation gathered at the time of the investigation by questionnaires, and, on the other hand, on facts confirmed through broader interviews and applying to a much more restricted number of families. These last have permitted us to observe in a more precise fashion the dynamic aspect of the problem. 125 124

Dakar

/28 cont./

employees and 15% of the members of the teaching and intellectual professions, etc.

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[162]

those concerning the extent of the family.

/29/ E. --In the same general sense, the variations in the percentage of interethnic marriages are according to socio-occupational categories. For the whole of our population, we find: among the monogamous (696 families), 71% ménages where the wife is of the same ethnic group as the husband, 29% where she is from a different ethnic group; among the polygamous with two and three wives (228 families), 43% ménages where all the wives are of the same ethnic group as the husband, 57% ménages where at least one wife is from a different ethnic group. The following tables give the distribution by socio-occupational categories: 369^{x} 563 ● 565

(tables on following pages)

17: Mercier--33 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/29 cont./

Socio-occupational Category	Number of monogamous restricted families	Wives of the same ethnic group as their husband		Wives from a group different from that of the husband	
		T	%	T	%
Farmers, fishermen	16	14	87%	2	13%
Laborers, domestics	81	68	84%	13	16%
Workers and artisans	214	152	71%	62	29%
Master workmen	11	5	45%	6	55%
Subordinate functionaries and employees	208	136	65%	72	35%
Superior functionaries and employees	29	19	64%	10	36%
Teaching, intellectual professions, etc.	47	28	59%	19	41%
Merchants, transporters, etc.	47	65	84%	12	16%

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/29 cont./

Dakar

Socio-occupational Category	Number of polygamous restricted families (2 and 3 wives)	All the wives of same ethnic group as the husband		At least one wife from an ethnic group different from that of the husband	
		T	%	T	%
Farmers, fishermen	7	3	43%	4	57%
Laborers, domestics	14	7	50%	7	50%
Workers and artisans	75	36	48%	39	52%
Master workmen	10	3	30%	7	70%
Subordinate functionaries and employees	57	25	44%	32	66%
Superior functionaries and employees	10	2	20%	8	30%
Teaching, intellectual professions, etc.	5	2	40%	3	60%
Merchants, transporters, etc.	45	19	42%	26	58%

369x
563●
565

Dakar

/30/

1. The first table is more significant. In fact, the number of polygamous families is too low in absolute value in certain categories for one not to fear distortion, in the conditions under which the investigation was made. In any case, the fact that the only wife (or the first wife of potential polygamists) is from an ethnic group different from that of their husband is more important than when it is a matter of a second or third wife of a polygamist. 369x 565 563 ●

2. As far as the monogamists are concerned, the categories of farmers, laborers, and merchants are clearly below the average (29%). The workers and artisans reach this average exactly. They likewise form among the polygamists a rather clear grouping, characterized by the preservation of ethnic values. One problem is posed here, however: the master workmen, contrary to what we have previously ascertained, do not fit into this group. We lack factors for an explanation of this seemingly aberrant fact. Subsequent investigations will try to illuminate it.

3. The categories of the subordinate functionaries and employees more clearly approximates here those of the superior functionaries and employees, of the members of the teaching and intellectual professions, etc. In this whole, the ethnic values, and this is confirmed by other investigations, tend to play a less important role; they are far, however, from complete obliteration (1).

1. See below some notes on the composition of groups of friends.

4. It would be necessary, however, to shade this account by studying the prevalent behaviors in the different ethnic groups (2). One finds that the situation varies in terms of: 369x 563

[565]

2. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the ethnic groups, except for the most important numerically, are not

Dakar
Wolof MS30

/30 cont./

369x
563●
[565]

regularly distributed among the socio-occupational categories. We shall refer here to our paper, already cited, which was prepared for the Conference of Abidjan of September 1954.

on the one hand, the numerical importance of the group in the town; on the other hand, the distance from the region of origin; finally, particular factors closing off the group (racial prejudices, religion, etc.). Thus we find, among the groups where the average for interethnic marriages is not attained: the Cape Verdeans, the Moors, the Diola, the Sérère and equally the Wolof, among whom ethnic endogamy is the clearest. Among those where the proportion of interethnic marriages clearly exceeds the average: the Bambara, the groups originally from the territories of the south, and, unexpectedly, the Lebou, which indeed confirms the weakening of the former particularism and the mixing (which is accelerating) with the Wolof element. Let us note /31/ finally that in numerous cases, if the spouses are not of the same ethnic group, they are nevertheless originally from the same region; this is the case for most of those questioned by us who were originally from Dahomey and Togo.

S
369x
592

F. -- We must look briefly into the qualitative aspect of the composition of the family groups going beyond the framework of the restricted family; we have indicated what limits are put on the utilization of the purely quantitative data. This composition is very diverse and very changeable in time.

1. Here are the dominant types which were encountered, in order of decreasing frequency:

S
W
[604]
[597]

a) The nephew-uterine uncle relationship and more rarely the nephew-consanguineous /paternal/ uncle are the basis for the formation of many groupings. In particular among the Wolof and the Lebou, the educational role of the uterine

Dakar

/34 cont./

369x

2. And much less, as we have seen, with regard to the facts of "familial parasitism."

categories that on the whole have the same way of life. The distinction which has imposed itself between two groups of categories corresponds to this last fact. The boundary, however, is unequally clear, depending on the phenomena considered. One finds the problem of cultural persistences cutting across the changes of structure and way of life in the course of consolidation.

3. The at least partial entry into the western "technical milieu" appears to be a factor of transformation much less important than schooling. The majority of the specialized workers are still in the most traditionalist group, with only the master workmen approaching, in certain forms of their average behavior, an intermediate position. The level of schooling itself, however, is still only weakly decisive, except in the category of members of the teaching and intellectual professions, etc. The relation between level of studies and the way of life, even though it tends to assert itself, is not direct in every case. [182]

III

The group of relatives no longer coincides with the local unit. Neither the quarter, the sector, the block, nor in certain cases the "compound" are ethnically homogeneous any longer. In this case, what is the social role of the neighborhood? Under what conditions does it create relationships of a new type which are to be integrated into the new urban "pattern"? The groups of friends were formed essentially in the framework of the age class (3) as a consequence of the ethnic group (and often of the group of relatives in the broad sense).

369x
621
571
[563]●

3. See, for example, G. Balandier and P. Mercier, op. cit.

Dakar

/35 cont. /
kinship, kinship by marriage, membership in the same ethnic 369^x
group, the same religious persuasion, the same occupation; 621
certain other facts are ambivalent, for example, membership 571
in the same association. In the study that we have made of a certain number of blocks of Médina, we have tried to isolate the neighborhood factor at different levels of participation in common activities. We essentially retained: reciprocal visits, conversation groups, mutual aid (loans, etc.), relationships between women, the play groups of children. The relationships of simple politeness are not retained. We considered successively the relationships inside the compound -- when it is not inhabited by a single family -- and the relationships within the block. In the last case, a somewhat arbitrary limit is posed: the street is not a border, but a zone of assembly. It has not yet been possible to study completely the social role of the latter.

In the block that we shall take as an example, 12 out of 14 compounds were studied; the inhabitants of the other two compounds were on a trip or refused to lend themselves to the investigation. The block as a whole is very heterogeneous [563]
ethnically, but, however, with a clear dominance of Wolof-Lebou (2).

> 2. Six family heads who were manifestly Lebou persisted in calling themselves Wolof. Cf. above.

It contains 39 family groups (representing 199 persons) and 11
isolated bachelors, tenants of some of the preceding families. [427]
Five of these bachelors only live /36/ in Dakar seasonally, but in principle always in the same place. The distribution of the
family heads by ethnic groups is as follows: 28 Wolof, 4 Lebou, [563]
5 Toucouleur, 1 Sarakolé, 1 Socé. Among the isolated bachelors, one has: 5 Wolof, 2 Toucouleur, 2 Socé, 1 Bambara, 1 Soussou.

1. The study of the relationships within the compounds shows a certain variety of situations.' These compounds are

'[see chart, pp. 56-57.- Analyst]

Dakar

/36 cont./

divided into several types by their composition: 369x

-- Compounds composed of a single family group: extended kinship group based on the nephew-uterine uncle relationship (B), restricted family (E); 621 571

-- Compounds composed of restricted family groups, but having between them ties of distant collateral kinship (J);

-- Compounds composed of restricted or extended family groups tied only by the ethnic relationship (A and N);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families from different ethnic groups (F, G);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families and isolated persons, all of the same ethnic group (L);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families and isolated persons, and ethnically varied (C, D, K, M).

The compounds of the first two types will not detain us; family solidarity plays a major role there. In the others, the situation is extremely variable. Frequent relationships exist everywhere on the level of the children (play groups), less frequently on the level of women, still less frequently on the level of men. Let us consider essentially the relationships which are not sustained by the ethnic community.

a) The bachelors, except when they are of the same ethnic group as some of the families of the compound (1 case, in compound D), participate little in the life of the compound; most eat outside and only spend the night at home. Mutual aid does little for them; most said that they had recourse, in case of sickness, to the aid of friends -- almost always of the same ethnic group -- on the outside. In one single case (compound K), the bachelors -- of the same ethnic group, moreover -- form a group eating together, going out together, etc.; the cooking is done for them by an old woman -- also of the same ethnic group -- a widow who lives with her children. [589]

b) Within the compound the ethnic disparity among the families does not exclude some minimal forms of mutual aid (loans of utensils, small purchases, care of children, etc.) [563]●

/36 cont./
There is one single case of a ménage having practically no relations with the rest of the compound, that of a Sarakolé family (compound F). 369* 621 571 563

/37/ c) The extreme cases of mutual aid, on the contrary, are only noticed among families that are related or at least of the same ethnic group. Thus, in the compounds I, N, D, one finds an unemployed man, married and father of a family, temporarily taken care of by his cousins (compound I) or by his neighbors who are related to him only in the broadest possible sense of the term (compounds D and N).

d) The play community of the children is encountered everywhere within the compounds, the ethnic differences not at all intervening. This and other elements, such as the life in the courtyards, the daily encounters at the water places, cause the women ultimately to have many more personal contacts than the men. The only case of a woman living relatively isolated is that of the Sarakolé woman already mentioned. [857]

2. The picture is a little different when one passes to the larger framework of the block. It is moreover divided longitudinally, the relations clearly being more frequent among the compounds which face on the same street. It is necessary, however, to add the shadings.

a) The play groups of the children are still larger, and neither the ethnic group nor other differential elements seem to play a role in their formation, but only proximity and individual affinities. [857]

b) As far as the women are concerned, the contacts that we noted above, conversations at the water place, etc., concern practically the whole block. On the other hand, visits and possible mutual aid occur almost exclusively among relatives, relatives by marriage, and women of the same ethnic group.

c) We have examined, for the men, the composition of groups of friends. In most cases, the majority of friends were dispersed throughout the town, these friends being either of the same ethnic group, of the same work group, or members of the same association -- these factors can all be combined, or [572]

/37 cont./
combined two by two. Out of 32 male heads of families, 369x
eight had no friends in the neighborhood (block and its imme- 621
diate surroundings -- the relatives obviously being excluded). 571
Among the 24 others, one counted 15 whose friends in the 563
neighborhood were at the same time all members of the same 572
ethnic group; for five others, they were either of the same
ethnic group or members of the same syndicate;[1] for two others,
they were either of the same ethnic group or members of the
same religious association. Only the two heads of Lebou families, the ones settled in the block the longest and enjoying a certain prestige, had many friends in the neighborhood; the majority of the latter did not belong to the Lebou group and were not members of a like structured group. The factor of neighborhood, properly speaking, seemed, for our people as a whole, to account for only the most superficial type of relations. The common religious persuasion does not /38/ play an essential role; its limits rarely coincide with the limits of groups of friends. The religious associations, however, are practically the only ones which rest, in a certain number of cases, on a local basis. The importance of occupational ties (in the broad sense, including syndical activity) and, above all, that of ethnic ties are of primary importance.

B. -- In this domain, however, differences in behavior 369x
between the socio-occupational categories are seen to appear, 621
and it is important to note them in order to complete the pre- 571
ceding data. One sees some distinctions delineated which, 563
as a whole, go in the same direction as those encountered in 572
the second part of this work. In our population investigated 565
by questionnaires, one finds: 13% of those queried who have less than 10% of their connections belonging to the same ethnic group as themselves; 29% who have less than 30%; 57% who have less than 50%; 11% who have 100%. The following table indicates the distribution by socio-occupational categories:

[1] [i.e., trade union.-Analyst]

/38 cont. /

Socio-occupational Category	Percentage of connections belonging to the same ethnic group			
	Less than 10%	Less than 30%	Less than 50%	100%
Farmers, fishermen	11%	26%	50%	7%
Laborers, domestics	7%	19%	41%	21%
Workers and artisans	13%	33%	64%	10%
Subordinate employees and functionaries	14%	33%	60%	11%
Superior employees and functionaries	17%	34%	61%	7%
Teaching, intellectual professions, etc.	26%	40%	72%	6%
Merchants, transporters, etc.,	6%	17%	41%	17%

369x
621
571
563
572
565

We thus find a first group where the role played by ethnic membership in the formation of the group of friends is more important than it is on the average: the laborers and domestics, the merchants and transporters. The opposite situation is found among the superior functionaries and employees and even more accentuated, among the members of the teaching and intellectual professions. The farmers are to be added to this group, however; most of them are Lebou, and these figures account well on the one hand for the loss of their particularism before the Wolof thrust, and on the other hand for the more /39/important role played among them by the factors of neighborhood. An average group is constituted by: the subordinate functionaries and employees, and, much more clearly than in the other domains considered, the workers and artisans.

Some remarks are necessary. The factor of ethnic regrouping retains its importance in all the categories, although unequally.

Dakar

/39 cont./

unequally. The scrutiny of the data concerning the neighborhood factor furnished by this same investigation is not finished; the first results seem to confirm those obtained in our monographic investigations: it in itself only plays a reduced role, only reinforcing the ties of some other origin. On the contrary, memberships in the same occupational milieu, in the same association, syndical, cultural, sportive, etc. (1), are important factors in the formation of groups of friends. Finally, let us add that the average behaviors of ethnic groups are extremely variable. Their distribution, however, does not coincide exactly with the one that we have indicated in the domain of interethnic marriages. Only groups among whom the importance of the ethnic factor is clearly greater than the average, the Moors, the Peul, the Toucouleur, the Sarakolé; on the other hand it is slightly less among the Wolof and the Bambara, average among the Sérère, the Diola, the Soussou, the Cape Verdeans. The partial divergences between these two orders of data (2) pose in themselves a problem which will be the subject of subsequent investigations.

369x
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[572]

We have studied essentially the permanent population of the town, moreover unequally stabilized. It remains to complete these data by the examination of the problems posed by the seasonal population, and, more generally, by the population without fixed residence. It is in this minority that one can really speak of facts of detribalization, in the sense of pure deterioration of the former social frameworks. On the contrary, we [182]

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1. The study of the role of associations is reserved for another work.

2. Cf. II, E, 4.

182
369x
[621]
[571]
[563]

/39 cont./
have seen that in the permanent population the kinship structures and ethnic membership (3) played a considerable role. Certainly, a new equilibrium has not been achieved everywhere, and we have noted that the kinship structures were not always adapted to the conditions of urban life. But one is far from dealing with an amorphous mass. Where one can speak /40/ of detribalization, among the elites of a new type, it is not in a purely negative sense. The crisis phase of traditional institutions has not completely passed. But the phase of reconstruction of institutions has begun; some average behavior which implies a certain equilibrium in new frameworks can already be disclosed. /Figs. 1-4 appear here./

3. It would also be necessary to examine the role played by the associations formed on an ethnic or regional basis.

102
361
× 369
● 563


Legend
Mixed quarters
European quarters
African quarters
Lebanese sectors
Pointe de Fann
Ile de la Madeleine
Scale:

Fig. 3. Divisions of the Dakar habitat.
/left side of map/

102
361
● 563
x 369


Hann
Pointe de Bel Air
Pointe de Fann
Ile de la Madeleine
Cap Manuel

Fig. 3. Divisions of the Dakar habitat.
/right side of map/

17: Mercier--56 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37 .

Dakar

x 369
571
● 563
621



Male heads of families	△	Wolof	W
Female heads of families	○	Lebou	L
Bachelors	□	Toucouleur	T
Related groups	◌	Sarakolé	Sa

- - - - - Example of a group with relationships.

⟷ Example of relationships between persons of two neighboring compounds.

☼ Families having relationships in the whole neighborhoo

◌ Families not having, beyond the compound, any relationships in the block.

○ Persons without relationships in the neighborhood.

Fig. 4.
/left side of sketch/

17: Mercier--57 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37

Dakar

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
PA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
J
K
L
W
L
T
Sa
So
B
S
Related by marriage
Wolof W
Lebou L
Toucouleur T
Sarakolé Sa
Socé So
Soussou S
Bambara B
/see left side of Fig. 4/

Fig. 4.
/right side of Fig. 4/

/174/

175 The major part of the commerce was then concentrated
369 north of the railway; nevertheless, as early as 1895 some
[366] shops were established to the south, near the residence.

In 1890 Thiès had a permanent population of 1,200
[162] inhabitants. Some native quarters were established in the
175 vicinity of the commercial escale. The little village of
369 Thiès-None was shifted from the other side of the railway.
361 A native quarter was attached to the western part of the commercial zone; it was moved toward the south after the plague of 1911 and took the name of Randoulème (a word meaning in Wolof: remove yourself). Takhikao (storied house in Wolof), established originally near the first storied house belonging to Maurel and Prom, was ultimately pushed back along the route to Saint-Louis (Fig. 2).

175 Little by little, while the military function fell asleep,
369 the development of commerce brought stable economic
[366] activity to the city. Until 1914 the city grew very little,
and its population amounted to only 2,400 inhabitants at that
[162] date; from 1885 to 1914 the city gained only 1,400 souls in all.

The military function of the city recovered part of its former importance during the war of 1914. The base of Thiès
[712] became a center of military training for new recruits. The quarter of Diakhao adjoining the camp was enlarged by the arrival of the families of the military. On the other hand, commerce was threatened during this period. The French
175 personnel, which since the beginning of the century had been
369 permanently established, was summoned to the colors. In
441 order to avoid shutting up shop, the Levantines were called
563 upon. The latter had made their appearance in Senegal as early as 1895 and up to that time had played only a very secondary role in the market of the city: selling candles, matches, beads... The war of 1914 facilitated their entry into the lucrative activity of trade.

/74 cont./

369 3. The establishment of industries (1923-1945).

498
[175] The event which gave a decisive impulsion to the commercial escale and which brought Thiès to the rank of a city was without question the establishment of the railroad repair shops in 1923. As early as 1907 the first work had been undertaken to connect Thiès to Bamako directly by rail; difficulties of all kinds and then the war impeded it. In 1923 only the junction of the two sections had been made at Kidira on the Falémé. There was some concern to have the repair shops of the Thiès-Niger established in the center nearest the coast. Thiès, head of the line, was chosen as
[162] the center. In a few years the city grew by 10,000 souls, going from 3,000 inhabitants in 1921 to 13,000 in 1929.

369
441 The opening of the railroad yards not only brought about the arrival of many workers and their families, but at the same /75/ /Fig. 2 appears here/ time gave a strong impulsion to commerce. The regular injection of credits by this new industry brought about a renewal of commercial activity which showed in the expansion of the firms already established and the creation of new stores. The Africans, who up
[472]
[563] to that time worked solely for the profit of firms under European management and who had been kept out of the retail business, opened small shops for their own profit (4).

[177] 4. It is the military, it seems, who brought back from France this idea of establishing for themselves small grocery stores copied from those encountered in the villages of the mother country.

The latter, appealing to an essentially native clientele, multiplied as soon as the economic scope of the city increased. At the same time the number of artisans increased.

[563] After the war, the Levantines, who had been the only ones able to carry on commerce in complete tranquility for four years, set up businesses for themselves. Their experience

/75 cont./

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
N
Vers Mt Rolland
Ngent
Mission
Escale
Piste de Dakar
Diakhao
Gare
Vers Dakar
Camp militaire
Résidence
Piste de St Louis
Takhikao
Vers St Louis
Village Bambara
Vers Diourbel
Piste de Mbour
Piste de Khombole

Fig. 2. Thiès in 1910.

369 441 563 acquired during the period of hostilities, their knowledge of the language, and their great aptitude for adapting themselves to the customs of the country and for living under very curtailed conditions /76/ made these newcomers serious competitors whom French commerce tried, but in vain, to eliminate. All the concessions of the northern escale were now occupied (5); the newcomers -- chiefly Syrians -- set up their factorerie (6) in the

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5. There was no question of extending the first lots farther to the north; the concession ceded to the Mission prevented such an extension.

[443] 6. Factorerie: shop where everything is sold and where at the same time

/76 cont./

369 local products (groundnuts,
441 millet ...) are bought or
● 563 bartered for.

443 still almost empty quarter of the residence.

Already the economic equilibrium of the city was no
369 longer essentially based on the commerce of trade, subject to
433 price fluctuations, but also on the budding industry which as-
458 sured it a certain stability. It is true that the latter, barely acquired, was put to a harsh test during the world crisis from 1930 to 1934. In the course of this difficult period the price of the groundnut slumped. The old commercial firms which depended solely on the trading were no longer able to meet their payments and liquidate their stock: Société Française du Sénégal, the firms Lacombe, Latrille... The sounder establishments were themselves obliged to close their city branches temporarily, for example, Peyrissac, Maurel Frères. Nevertheless one did not see here a complete slump in commerce with spectacular failures such as occurred in Dakar, but rather commercial liquidations, sales of stocks that were repurchased by Levantines and wholesale companies.

[471] The effects of the crisis, which ended in 1934, re-
[563] sulted in a redistribution of commercial ownership, a readaptation of commerce to the new requirements, along with the definitive establishment of the Levantines.

369 At this date the fusion of the two railroad companies,
498 the Dakar--Saint-Louis and Thiès-Niger, stimulated an ex-
433 pansion of the industrial quarter by regrouping at Thiès the workshops originally installed at Dakar for the Dakar--Saint-Louis railway.

369 On the eve of the Second World War the city reached
[162] the figure of 22,000 inhabitants, 1,200 of them Europeans.
[511] The almost complete disappearance of epidemics, the better food supply, the construction of comfortable houses (Ballabey
[361] district created as early as 1925 for the railway workers, villas for officers) permit metropolitan families to settle in a permanent fashion. In a parallel manner, the native

/78 cont./

2. The Quarters

1. The quarters of European type.

361 If we eliminate the two military bases that offer very
563 special characteristics peculiar to their internal organization,
Thiès contains three quarters of Western conception: the
Cité Ballabey /Ballabey District/, the Vieille Escale /Old
Escale/, the Résidence. While the first shelters a population
almost wholly European, in the other two the Whites are in
the minority (one White to four Blacks).

No systematic segregation really exists in the city.
The Cité Ballabey itself is a district for operatives belonging
to the managerial staffs; it is in no way closed to Africans
who have reached the rank required by their establishment.
Although located near the workshops, it is a quiet zone. Its
park is magnificent. The villas there are arranged regularly
351 according to a checkerboard plan in the purest colonial style.
[342] Each square of the checkerboard is occupied by a villa divided
into two twin and symmetrical apartments; courtyards and
gardens extend out on all sides of the dwelling; some mango
trees with dense foliage shelter the rabbit hutches, the hen
house, and the garage from the heat of the sun. It is easy
341 to date the construction of each of them by its architectural
342 style: the pink brick corresponds to the years 1925-1930;
the reinforced concrete, painted light beige, dates from
after the war... The quarters of the D. M. A. and of the air
base, with some variations, show almost no originality of
their own and are comparable to the Cité Ballabey.

The Old Escale presents the appearance of a quarter
[363] in a Mediterranean city: narrow streets bordered by storied
buildings built out of the white limestone from Bargny; a
small, light balcony with a metal balustrade projects over
the sidewalk and runs from one end of the building to the
other; a very slightly sloping red tile roof under a blue sky
accentuates this impression of the Mediterranean world.
351 Each concession, square in plan, forms a regular block of

/79 cont./

361 mahoganies planted at the end of the last century. The very close presence of the station, and the continual coming and going of locomotives, with strident cries that rend the air, destroys the harmony of these quiet spots of small provincial cities, while attempts are made to recreate them.

361 346 Even more peaceful air is breathed in the Catholic Mission, located to the north of the old "escale." The buildings were constructed at the end of the last century in red laterite, storied buildings /80/ with monastery arcades. They are situated in the middle of a huge garden, always green, extended by a park of magnificent trees. The whole reminds one to some extent of the peaceful site of some metropolitan abbey.

361 •563 443 The two business quarters (Old Escale and Residence) present the peculiarity of becoming, according to the time of day, the domain of the European in the evening (at the hour for the apéritif) and on Sundays, and that of the African during the day (while the market is open). A place of contact between the Black and the White, this market occupies a very important place in the life of the African city and merits pausing there a bit.

443 [438] It is on the day of the opening of the groundnut trade (at the beginning of December, for example) that it is proper to visit it. On coming from the station one plunges suddenly into the animation, the dust, the heat, the "sticky" odors of the market. The place is swarming with people where
443 494 the most diverse means of locomotion are squeezed and mingled together: a small cinder-gray donkey, heavily laden, deciding to block the passage of an automobile, despite the beating by its master; a small, light cart with two rubber wheels serving as a taxi and in quest of a possible passenger; a housewife from the neighboring village, her
[482] last-born hanging on her back, and who keeps on her head, in marvelous balance, a calabash full of market produce; a cyclist, poorly balanced on his machine, now and again running into a pedestrian or a vehicle; a truck with impressive loads, which slowly pushes from the road the human

/80 cont./
443 flood rapidly closing in again behind it. All these noisy peo-
[493] ple carry with them a flavor of the neighboring bush, warm
and dusty.

The market of dried fish readily reveals itself by the
[563] strong odor that it gives off; farther on is the stall of the
butcher for Europeans; very close to it the merchant of the
tripe trade who grills some skewers of small pieces on a
charcoal fire. Elsewhere the sellers of colas, of condiments
and cloth from Guinea, the cobblers offering their products
among the very mixed odors in a halo of dust raised by the
crowd. It is a delight for the eyes to see, in the bright sun-
light under a very clear and pure blue sky, the shimmer of
full garments of vivid hues moving with deliberation and
majesty.

443 The animation reaches its greatest intensity between
nine and ten o'clock in the morning; the pedestrian is king,
512 he blocks all traffic. Then, little by little, sellers and
buyers disperse, and everyone falls into a blessed torpor at
the noon hour. The afternoon is quiet, and at five o'clock
each merchant has left his premises. This animation, which
has only a temporary character in the commercial quarters of
/Plates XI and XII appear here/ /81/ European type, is
permanent in certain native quarters, but with a maximum
amplitude in the evening after work.

2. The native quarters.

361 The native quarters also have their peculiar characteristics, a function of their antiquity, of their proximity or their distance from a center of activity, and, naturally, of the social category of their inhabitants.

Takhikao and Gent were among the first quarters
created. Except for the nearness of the road from Thiès
to Tivaouane, which attracts the merchants' small shops of
planks or straw, they have kept their rural character; dwell-
[351] ings arranged in a loose order, surrounded by an orchard
protected by a tapade /walling/ of branches or stalks of
millet.

[Text continues on p. 18]

/81 cont./
361 millet. The old people assemble in the evening under the
[517] large silk-cotton tree that shades the old crumbling mosque of
Takhikao. The women chatter while awaiting their turn to
[312] draw water at the common well, while the children play in
[342] the sand. Gent stands out because of a series of small, low
houses with a rectangular base and a roof of corrugated metal,
all identical and set along the trail that leads to the marigot
[351] /watercourse/ of the mission. A garden and a courtyard, always
littered with laundry, characterize each concession. It
[563] is the quarter of Portuguese half-breeds called "portugalais"
(Plates XI B and XII A).

Diakhao-Nord /North Diakhao/, quiet, airy, arranged
[363] according to a strict plan of lots, contrasts with Diakhao-Sud
with narrow, winding lanes bordered on all sides by tapades
of millet stalks and noisy in the evening. The proximity of
[275] the two military bases has made it a place where one amuses
himself with all that this includes in the way of drinking
[525] shops and more or less clandestine gambling dens. Brawls between
[579] drunken men are not rare in these places.

Randoulène, Derrière-la-voie-ferrée, and Bambara,
which form a unique quarter, homogeneous in its density and
in the heterogeneity of its dwellings, have become established
in the immediate vicinity of the railroad repair shops. The
[342] huts of planks, mud, or straw stand one against the other along
[363] the winding lanes laid out according to the desire of the
moment and not without some imagination. These lanes are
[373] noisy with people, and even late at night they walk between
the small shopkeepers' stalls lighted with smoking candle ends.
351 The dense crowd flows over the edges of the street and enters
the interior of the courtyards. The latter, covering barely
[463] a few square meters, often serve as a workshop for the
weaver, the blacksmith, or the jeweler, and as a kitchen for
[252] the housewives of the neighboring huts; it is not rare to see
half a dozen millet pounders there, pounding their mortars
in rhythm in groups of two or three. This is also the gathering
[577] place /82/ /Fig. 4 appears here/ of workers, where, after
[524] work, sitting in the sand amidst the dust and the noise, in a

/83 cont./

3. The Activities of the City

1. Commerce.

433 If we except the period of conquest, during which a handful of troops established themselves in the entrenched camp, the primary function of Thiès was commerce.

441 An escale of trade in its beginnings, Thiès has re-
mained that up to our times. Almost 25,000 tons of ground-
433 nuts are commercialized each year in spite of the opening
of important points of trade in the vicinity, Tivaouane,
Khombole, located some 30 kilometers from there. This
commerce demands a certain taste for risk; if in certain
years it offers appreciable profits, it sometimes renders the
balance sheet of the merchants who practice it very precari-
ous. The groundnut trade, as far as purchase from the pro-
● [563] ducer is concerned, is almost entirely in the hands of the
[442] Levantines and a few Moors and Blacks. The important
establishments, N.O.S.O.C.O. (8) and the Soucail firm,
engage only in wholesale trade.

443 The factorerie run by a Levantine (9) next to the courtyard of the secco (10) has kept all its picturesqueness
[438] up to our day. /84/ Everything is sold there, from the piece
of trade cloth in vivid colors to cheap perfume; kerosene by
the liter and millet by the kilo or sack are retailed there.

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8. N.O.S.O.C.O. Nouvelle Société Commerciale.

[162] [563] 9. The Levantines are 48 in number, namely, 23 Syrians and 25 Lebanese (figures of 1952).

[257] 10. Secco: mass of groundnuts stored in the courtyard of the merchant and destined for export.

/84 cont./

442 iron for cement, tires...piled loosely together. The activity
443 of these branches is based on three elements: retail with a sales store open to the average customers, wholesale granted to the important factoreries (Levantines...), and wholesale to the small shopkeepers for retail. Each is furthermore an implement dealer with exclusive right of sale granted to them: frigidaires, motor fuel, automobiles... The figure
[433] for the monthly business of one of them fluctuated between 20 and 25 million in 1953.

443 An intermediate type of commerce was established a short time ago with the arrival of the Moroccans; they
[563] numbered 25 in 1952. /85/ Some among them attempt to
[162] corner both the European and native clientele. They specialize in the sale of fabrics and fancy articles for Africans:
[438] babouches, fezzes, cheap watches. They speak the native
[191] language fluently and sometimes French extremely well.

The Africans, as we have seen, have launched into private business since 1920. Some of them have a factorerie of the Levantine type, but most of them have opened a shop in the outlying quarters. The Moors and the Blacks share this small-scale commerce: in 1952 the former reached the figure of 120; the Blacks were perhaps as numerous. They
[347] are installed in the small shops of boards or mud roofed with straw or with corrugated metal. On the counter, made up of a simple board, stands a Roberval scale, some jars of large multicolored bonbons, a pasteboard box filled with dry biscuits. The bag of charcoal on the floor stands beside a tin of kerosene. Some cola nuts kept fresh in a wrapping of leaves still green, a kilo of sugar broken open, which is sold by the lump, some packages of cigarettes sold by the unit, and small cans of condensed milk give a glimpse of the small volume of their business.

To complete this picture, let us add the innumerable small "doorstep" merchants who on a piece of cloth or in a calabash display a few handfuls of roasted peanuts and cola nuts, a package of cigarettes, or millet fritters. These small stalls are all located in front of the door of the hut;

MS37
Thies
Wolof MS30

S /86 cont./
498 manufacturing cost would be high if they were smelted
S in Senegal, are bought on the outside.

498 Originally the repair work, the machining of loco-
463 motive parts or of rolling stock, necessitated only the
563 presence of good mechanics. But putting into service
more powerful engines that no longer run on charcoal but on fuel oil requires /87/ precise inspection and minute repairs made by experienced specialists. Most of them are still Europeans, but already some Africans have the technical training required for this delicate work.

S The enterprise, however, has only a small percentage
[162] of Whites: out of 2,500 railway workers there were only 140 Europeans in 1953. And most of them worked in the offices (one European to eight natives); in the workshops this proportion reached only one to 40. While most of the metropolitan specialists are taken from the staffs of the S.N.C.F.,
S the African specialists are recruited from among the students
[874] coming from the technical schools of Terrasson-de-Fougères in Bamako or William-Ponty in Dakar and from among the former mechanics of the arsenals of the national marine. They constitute the supervisory staffs in the different shops.

The ordinary workers, founders, hammermen, carpenters .... have generally been trained in the very workshops of the Dakar-Niger where they work for a number of years. Finally, the non-specialized work is done by newcomers from the bush.

S An investigation carried out in 1952 on a quarter of
498 the total number (834) enables one to learn the ethnic
563 composition of all the workshops. One can note a pre-
W eminence of the number of Wolof (301); the Peul and
498 Toucouleur /Tukolor/ number 189; the Bambara come
162 third with 115 individuals. It is necessary to add 39
463 Sarakolé, 40 Khassonké /Kassonke/, and 79 workers belonging to different groups. This list gives an idea of the important mingling of individuals that make up this industrial center. One observes, nevertheless, that the

S /87 cont. /
498 workers from the regions neighboring Thiès are not in the
majority; the Wolof-Sérère group is made up of 380 units,
563 45% of the total. Besides, the Wolof and Sérère /Serer/
W offer relatively few technicians and supervisory operatives;
498 the Wolof make up only 7% in the supervisory category as
162 against 24% in that of manual workers; the Sérère account
463 for only 5% in the first category and 39% in the second. On the other hand, 17% of the Khassonké and Sarakolé belong to the supervisory staffs as against only 22% of the manual workers and employees. These figures underline the difficulty for the enterprise in recruiting specialized workers in the vicinity of Thiès. It must call upon technicians from distant territories, although a high percentage of non-specialized workers and manual laborers are recruited locally.

S Because of the number of its total labor force, the in-
498 dustrial grouping of the Dakar-Niger forms one of the most
433 active elements of the economy of the district. More than 25,000,000 francs C.F.A. are distributed monthly in the form of salaries to all of the personnel.

/88/

S 3. The Public sector.

712 Although the installation and extension of the two
433 military camps have in an indirect way increased the importance of the city, it indeed seems that they have little influence on the economy of the district on account of their internal organization within a closed circuit.

S The establishment of increasingly more numerous and
647 substantial administrative services affects the economic
464 life of the escale in a more tangible fashion. The administration of the circle /cercle, an administrative district/ and the services for agriculture, education, and public works employ several hundred officials, day laborers, and manual workers.

/88 cont./

871 Education has developed in a remarkable fashion; each year more than 2,000 school children attend the public and private schools. The number of young pupils also has increased steadily, but only for the past dozen years. The modern college, because of its inadequate size, refuses numerous requests for admission every year. In spite of the annual opening of new classes, it can be estimated that only one child out of three of school age attends school.

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4. The Social Structure of the City

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1. The Whites.

In 1955 we are far from the heroic epoch when Thiès was considered an unhealthy place and when the mortality was very high. The arrival of the first European families at the beginning of this century could be considered an important event. It marked the possibility of permanently implanting a white colony in the escale.

The climate has been made more bearable by the many improvements in comfort that have created a propitious atmosphere for the establishment of family life. [162] In 1953 there were almost 1,200 women out of 2,700 Whites.

369 563 573 The European population is divided into a certain number of "milieus": army, operatives of the Dakar-Niger, officials, merchants. Contact between any of these assemblages is very loose: with few exceptions the relations between individuals belonging to different groups are not very frequent; there is visiting only among people of the same background. The transfer of personnel, which is repeated every two years, has the result that the time of residence is not ordinarily long enough for a newcomer to break away from his milieu. A certain apathy and a lack of curiosity limit these human contacts with neighboring groupings.

The armed forces, and Dakar-Niger, because of the very conception of their internal organization, live in isolation. Each of them has its co-operative, its club, its

/88 cont./
369 bar, and sometimes its cinema and its swimming pool; /89/
563 they form a small city that is self-sufficient. The officers
of the administration by their very functions seem to have
573 more extensive relations in the different milieus.

Among the merchants and artisans, the problem is different because of the very stability of their work and the length of their stay. In this commercial and artisan milieu one could define three very distinct "groupings": the "old ones" who have lived in Thiès for several decades; the "newcomers" from after the war; the Levantine-Moroccan grouping.

The first are not very numerous; they live in their old factorerie, which, in spite of recently added arrangements, preserves something old-fashioned about it. They are able to
191 talk to the native in his own language. Their life, while it has become more comfortable, is lived modestly; they go out little and entertain only among themselves. Every two
484 or three years they take a few months' rest in France during the season of cultivation in Senegal. As a result, their life is quite withdrawn.

The second group, made up of recent emigrants, is entirely different. It primarily contains bachelors or young married people more or less in love with adventure perhaps, but above all seeking a broader existence. They generally
427 live in one or two rooms rented from a Levantine or Moroccan.
265 Since it is difficult for them to cook at home, the restaurant provides for them. In general they adopt a careless attitude,
484 are restless, and speak loudly; their first savings are intended
493 for the purchase of a motorcycle or a small car which will enable them to escape from the city. Moreover, they are per-
546 sistent spectators at the four local cinemas, which have a new program every day.

The group of Levantines is different from the two preceding ones; their life is spent between their shop and their
484 apartment. Rare changes take them to Dakar on business.
353 Their interior is comfortable, arranged according to Oriental taste; they love vivid colors and pile up cushions. They
484 rarely go back to their country of origin; some of them have

MS37
Thies
Wolof MS30

S /89 cont./
369 not left Africa for 30 or 40 years. Others, more favored by
563 business, take a trip each year to France or western Asia.
573 Generally, the children pursue their studies in their parents'
[484] land of origin and speak French and English fluently. This
new generation of Levantines, to whom one must add a few
[191] Moroccans, is becoming integrated little by little in the
[529] metropolitan milieu through the medium of sports associations and hunting parties. These amicable relations will
[578] perhaps favor to a certain degree a closer relationship between
[477] these groups which are so often antagonistic on the commercial level.

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2. The Africans.

S According to the census statistics gathered in 1953, the
369 ethnic composition of the city was the following: out of an
563 African population of 36,050 inhabitants, the Wolof appeared
162 as the most numerous and, with 23,624 individuals, made
W up 65.5% of the population; the Toucouleur, numbering
[162] 3,356, represent 9.3% of the total; the Bambara (Sudanese,
rather) attained third place and accounted for 6.8% of the
[369] population with 2,447 individuals; the Sérère, although
settled in the vicinity of Thiès, included only 1,856 persons,
namely, 5.1% of the total. The Peul and the Moors, respectively 1,074 and 843 individuals, made up 3% and 2.4% of the total. The Sarakolé and the various other groups, represented, respectively, by 650 and 2,190 members, formed 1.8% and 6.1% of the population.

W These details speak eloquently of the ethnic hetero-
[162] geneity of the Thiès population. Still, it should be empha-
[369] sized that the number of true Wolof is certainly less than the
[563] statistical figure given; after a stay of some ten years spent
in Thiès, the Khassonké or the Sarakolé, who will have lost almost all contact with his country of origin, who will have married a woman not of his race, who will have adopted the language, the food, the corresponding Wolof name, will speak of himself as belonging to this group.

/90 cont./

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[161]
As one may well imagine, the most populated zones are the ones located near the railroad workshops; Derrière-la-voie-ferrée, Randoulène, and Bambara have densities from 102 to 125 inhabitants per hectare (14). These quarters are at the same time the places of the most complete intermingling; almost 40% of the population is made up of elements foreign to the region of Thiès where Wolof and Sérère live.

We quote these figures, of course, in order to pose the problem of contacts between the various ethnic groups and of the relations between individuals.

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Nevertheless, we should set apart the Moor group, whose conduct clearly differs from that of its colored neighbors. The Moors do not have any relations with the Blacks, except for purely commercial reasons. They meet only among themselves, travel only accompanied by one of their fellows. Their sobriety, their sense of thrift (often carried to excess), and their frigid calm estrange them from the often expansive temperament of the Blacks. Perhaps a certain feeling of superiority toward the population which they dominated before our arrival is the origin of this profound gap between people of identical material circumstances.

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[182]
/91/ The Black masses seem at first estimate to form a homogeneous whole. Nevertheless, among the elements which compose it there exist traditional distinctions of customary, ethnic, and religious origin, and social distinctions linked to recent structures: a new hierarchy in the

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14. In French Equatorial Africa, in the quarters of Brazzaville (Poto-Poto and Bacongo), it reaches 100 inhabitants per hectare. Information taken from Documents and Statistics, Ministry of the F.O.M., No. XI, March 1954, p. 25.

/91 cont./
369 industrial enterprises and in the public function. Even in a
563 professional category a certain hierarchy of a traditional
[182] order survives and is always respected. In the workshops of
[565] the Dakar-Niger, for example, the higher supervisory staffs
are made up of workers belonging to superior castes: free
[466] men, descendants of chiefs' families... Operatives coming
from families of griots or former captives, in spite of their
skill at the work and their training, would have only very
weak authority over their subordinates.

[578] The animosities between individuals belonging to
formerly hostile groups or to opposed religious sects may
sometimes reappear in the course of contacts between individuals or groups of individuals. Along the same line
[466] of thought, a certain favoritism may creep into the relations
between foreman and subordinates belonging to the same
ethnic category or the same religion.

369 Within each ethnic minority scattered through the
563 city spontaneous associations spring up, led by the oldest
573 among them. These friendly groups meet periodically. They
are at the bottom of the mutual aid to the newcomer, to the
workman who lives temporarily without funds in the *escale*.
Each of these gatherings is at the same time the occasion for
"folkloristic" celebrations, reminding the members of the
group of their customs and their country of origin.

369 The traditions which have been able to survive by
177 being adapted to the new conditions of the society lose
563 their importance to a certain extent in contact with new
ideas and Western influence. We have already remarked
that the notion of ethnic group is rapidly obliterated when the
individual is transplanted for a long time in a city very far
from his natal village. The family ties, and above all the
[593] authority of the head of the family over each of its members,
become extremely loose in the city. We see a breaking up
of the subordination that subjected each of the members of a
family to the paternal authority. The child is no longer
compelled to adopt the trade of his father; he may choose
the work that he thinks will suit him. The young girl is
[584] rapidly becoming emancipated, and rare are the Thiès

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families in which the father imposes on the child the spouse of his choice. The spread of the teaching of the Moslem and Christian religions count for much in this loosening of the too confining ties of family tradition. This breaking up of ancient, too narrow social structures is not a strictly /92/ urban phenomenon; it also occurs in the countryside, but with less force and with a certain delay.

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The presence of the industrial bloc of the Dakar-Niger, on the other hand, has had as an effect the formation of a working class, which is a specifically urban phenomenon. Although the ancient system of castes does exist in human contacts, that of social class is little by little being substituted for it. In sum, there actually exists a superposition of the two systems, but the pre-eminence of the second is already being affirmed. [177] [467] [474] Through daily contacts and the rapid diffusion of social ideas coming from the West, the mass of workers is organized, it is grouped by syndicates, it has set up consumer co-operatives. Because of the great number of the members of this worker group, the workshops of the Dakar-Niger and, through repercussion, the city of Thiès itself have become the most active and the busiest centers of French West Africa. [468] The strike that in 1948 paralyzed railroad traffic on the two lines (Dakar-Bamako and Dakar--Saint-Louis) for several months is certainly proof of the influence of a powerful and organized grouping, and a typical urban phenomenon.

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Thus there exists in Thiès a somewhat special social climate that sometimes makes the relations between Whites and Blacks strained. Chiefly during these periods of social crises. But these tensions are always temporary and automatically disappear as soon as the conflict is settled.

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A much more important problem that seems general in all of the cities of Black Africa is that of the too rapid, if not excessive, swelling of the urban population. [162] We have seen that the population of Thiès has almost doubled from 1945 (24,000 inhabitants) to 1953 (40,000 inhabitants). Dakar, Conakry, and Abidjan have grown in the same proportions.

/15 cont./
442 into the secco, an area with a floor of hard earth or cement,
437 closed off by sheet metal. The agriculturalist, paid forthwith,
[492] immediately spends the sum received, in settling the sums
[488] owed to the trader and in buying from among the manufactured
[452] objects of the same factory the most diverse articles: cloth,
[443] playthings, articles for bicycles, etc. Thus the same trader
[438] realizes two profits in the traditional system.

3) The agents of trade. Until the Second World War,
439 the trade in groundnuts was in the hands of about 3,000 private
441 traders organized in a strict hierarchy. At the top, the trade was
442 controlled by the large import-export houses, especially of
438 Bordeaux origin, Maurel et Prom, Peyrissac, Vézia, etc., to
which was added the C. F. A. O. of Marseilles origin, and the S. C. O. A. Franco-Switzerland. These firms, whose central agencies for Senegal are in Dakar, make arrangements for the "banks" and "agencies" in the principal localities, for "factories" in the escales, and for "operations" in the bush. These commercial houses concentrate the purchases of their various traders and provide them with imported products. They are supported during the campaign by the banks of the mother country or their agencies in Senegal.

441 The independent French merchants, often former employees
442 of the firms, play the role of intermediary /demi-grossiste/ in
the escales. /16/ They buy directly from the producers or from
438 the African sub-trader and bag and forward /the product/ to the
commercial houses in the shipping ports. They have been very harshly affected by the economic crisis of the 1930's and then
● [563] by the war, in particular by the mobilization, which facilitated
the establishment of many Lebano-Syrian traders.

The treaties of 1919 facilitated the arrival in Africa of
[563] these Lebano-Syrians. They devote themselves essentially to
commerce, and they have on the whole succeeded, because, living near the autochthons, they have adopted their way of life and are contented with much less than the independent
442 Europeans. During the trade, they are generally commission
443 agents of the firm that they represent. They receive a commis-
438 sion for each metric ton of groundnuts purchased, and sell in

/22 cont./

258 [433] [439] product, usually crude, each year leaves the Senegalese factories, which thus operate under their productive capacity. About 110,000 metric tons are exported. The traditional technique of manufacture by pressure, with recovery of the oil cake, or "expellers," is being replaced more and more by the procedure with solvents, slightly increasing the rate of extraction of oil, but providing poor oil-cake.

[464] ● [563] This industry of the oil-factory if now localized in five urban centers: Dakar, Lyndiane, Djourbel, Kaolack, and Ziguinchor. It employs more than 3,000 wage earners, nearly 300 of whom are European technicians; on the basis of this it is the primary industry /23/ of Senegal, and the more so since [388] it has had annexed to it the complementary industry of soap-making, which produced more than 15,000 metric tons of soap from the neutralization paste.

258 433 [439] The development of the Sengalese industry of oil-making represents a considerable evolution of the economy of the country, since the groundnut has ceased to be a product of trade in the colonial sense of the term. In fact, the product that traditionally constitutes the great agricultural resource has become the principal raw material of local industry; more than ever, the groundnut keeps Senegal alive.

433 241 3. The essential position of the groundnut in the economy of Senegal. "Whether or not it is desirable, the economy of Senegal can revolve only with the help of the production of groundnuts." This phrase by M. Portères sums up the essential position of the product in the local economy. In 1957, for the [439] whole of former Mali, the total value of the exports rose to 21,085 billions of francs C.F.A., the products of the groundnut accounting for 18,257 billions of this sum, of which more than 15 billions was for Senegal alone. At the same time, of [162] 2,230,000 inhabitants of Senegal, only 58,700 were non-agricultural workers, that is, non-producers of groundnuts. Actually, 433 however, many of them are supported by them indirectly, in trade, transport, or industry. It is not exaggerated to affirm

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369 [361] "Dakar is the only city, in the European (or Western) sense, in all of West Africa," wrote D. Wittlesey in 1941 (1).

[162] [563] [505] Things have changed since then; Conakry, Bamako, Abidjan, and other centers have become true cities. It is incontestable that the 230,000 inhabitants counted in the census in 1955, of whom more than 30,000 were non-Africans, make Dakar the most important city in all of the Black Africa of French expression. In 1957 its port had more traffic than all the other ports of former French West Africa; in 1960, 8,000 vessels, with a capacity of 21,000,000 tons (2), put it among the most frequented ports of Africa. [162] But 50 years ago Dakar did not have 25,000 inhabitants. The rhythm of its growth is thus on a level with that of certain mushrooming cities in the United States of America. Dakar does not owe this extraordinarily rapid development solely to favorable natural conditions, as is often said, but also and especially to a complex interaction of historical, economic, and political factors. It is a crossroads born out of the effective integration of the African world and South America in the European economic system, an integration linked with the search for raw materials and markets, made possible and necessary by the great technical progress realized since the middle of the nineteenth century. City-crossroads, all of its vitality depends on the state of its relations.

[133] 1. Birth of Dakar. The head of the peninsula of Cape Verde, on which Dakar was established, is an assemblage of

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[113] 1. Derwint Wittlesey, "Dakar and other Cap Verde Settlements," The Geographical Review, 1941, p. 609.

2. The official figures are 7,948 vessels and 20,992,111 tons.

/383 cont. /

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1958, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 35: 1910, 24,000; 1921, 32,000; 1931, 54,000; 1945, 132,000; 1955-56, 231,000.

[633] there, nevertheless give an acceptable idea of the direction of the development of the population of Dakar. The first 20 years that followed the construction of the port were characterized by a not very spectacular progression, the population merely having doubled, going from 24,900 in 1910 to 54,000 in 1931. This relative slowness of growth should undoubedly be attributed to some check due to the First World War, but it is basically explained by the then very imcomplete [496] character of the modern paths of penetration, the railroads from Thiès to Kayes and from Louga to Linguère not having been finished until after the war. By contrast, the progression has been particularly rapid in the 20 years that followed, and, in spite of the checks that would seemingly have been put into operation by the Second World War, the population has more than quadrupled between 1931 and 1955, reaching 230,000 inhabitants at the latter date (19).

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19. Recensement démographique de Dakar 1955. Résultats définitifs, 1er fascicule /Demographic census of Dakar for 1955. Final Results, No. 1/. Publication of the Service de la statistique de l'ex-A.O.F., July 1958. The following figures given for the population of Dakar have been taken from this number or have been calculated from the figures that it gives.

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This Dakar population, very diverse in its make-up, is an almost complete sampling of the ethnic groups of Senegal, to which are added elements from the other territories of former French West Africa and also some non-Africans. Thus, jostling

[Text continues on p. 20--Analyst]

/Fig. 3 Caption cont./

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102 a-g. The piers. -- I. Town Hall. -- II. Chambre de
491 Commerce. -- III. Sandaga Market (Ponty-Clemenceau cross-
496 roads). -- IV. Former Palace of Justice. -- V. General
504 Postoffice. -- VI. Treasury. -- VII. Kermel Market. --
712 VIII. Military Circle. -- IX Residence of the President of
743 the Republic. -- X. Military Hospital. -- XI. African
Hospital. -- XII. Palace of Justice. -- XIII. Camp Bornis. --
XIV. Camp Galliéni. . -- XV. Station.

369 /383 cont./ one another in Dakar are Lébou, Ouolof /Wolof/,
563 Toucouleur /Tukolor/, Sérère /Serer/, Sarakolé, Diola, Socé,
162 etc., who are Senegalese, but there are also Mauritanians, Suda-
nese, Voltaics, Guineans, Ivorians /persons from the Ivory Coast/,
Dahomeans, Cape Verdeans, Lebano-Syrians, French, etc. The
Lébou, who are the original population of Dakar, today represent
scarcely one-tenth of the population, exceeded in number by the
Oulof, the Toucouleur (20), and even by the 30,000 non-Africans,
among whom the French constitute a great majority of close
to 23,000 persons in residence. This character of Dakar as a
[166] region of call is illustrated first by the fact that only a little
more than one-third of the population was born there, /384/
and then by the quite obvious inequality between the number
of men and that of women. Before the war, among the Euro-
peans, there were 65% men as against 25% women and 10%
[744] children (21). Today the systematic destruction of the

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[113] 20. A. Diop, "L'immigration toucouleur à Dakar (enquête /investigation/ 1958-1959)," I.F.A.N., Dakar, p. 1. The author, citing an investigation by the M.I.S.O.E.S., gives the figure of 31,000 Toucouleur in 1959.

21. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

162 /384 cont./

369 563 [744] [132] breeding-places of mosquitoes in the numerous swamps of the peninsula having been successfully undertaken by the federal authorities, one can better appreciate the exceptionally pleasant climate of Dakar, subject eight months of the year to the "influences of the Canaries" (cool and brisk current, marine trade-wind from the northeast), and an equilibrium tends to be established between men, women, and children, the first nevertheless still remaining the most numerous; in 1955, 39% men against 31% women and 30% children for the total non-African population; and 35% men, 30% women, and 35% children for the non-African population in residence. Among the Africans, one can verify the same phenomenon: 36% men, 31% women, and 35% children less than 14 years of age for the total population; 34% men, 31% women, and 35% children for the population in residence. Despite this tendency toward equilibrium, the fact remains that for the whole population of Dakar, men over 14 years of age are definitely more numerous than women over 14 years of age and than children; the balance sheet gives 37% for the men as against 30% for the women and 35% for the children.

369 563 166 162 This situation is explained by the fact that immigration to Dakar is first of all of interest to the men, for whom it carries the hope of a better position, but it also represents a daring enterprise on which one does not take women and children until definite opportunities for settling down present themselves. This fact is particularly clear for the non-resident population, among whom the proportion of men is very high. Thus, among the non-resident Africans, there are 57% men as against 27% women and 16% children. The proportion is even higher among non-resident foreigners: 77% men as against 12% women and 11 % children.

[464] But though settling in Dakar is almost always linked to employment for the non-African population, it is not the same for Africans. The destruction of the villagers' traditional institutions, modern transportation, the facilities for hospitality

/384 cont./
369 in the city at the home of a relative, at the home of a friend
563 or the friend or relative of a friend, or at the home of a resi-
166 dent originally from the same village or merely from the same
162 region -- all of this ultimately makes up the factors that are
464 more decisive than the salary. Because of this, while among
the resident non-Africans the number of persons employed
amounts to 43 % of the total and 64% of the economically
active, among the resident Africans, the proportion of workers
is no more than 27% of the total and 42% /385/ of the econom-
ically active. If one adds to that the salaries, on the average
369 much higher among the first than among the second, one finds
571 in Dakar some of the contrasts characteristic of West African
563 cities: on the one hand, among the non-Africans, a high
standard of living which is often shown in the appearance of
their quarters, and, on the other hand, the mass of the African
population whose settling in the city is tied neither to a correl-
ative augmentation of the normal opportunities for lodgings
nor to a higher living standard in relation to the bush, which
gives to the African city, or at least to some of its quarters,
an appearance more wretched than that of the villages of the
interior.

369 This situation, formerly very clear, put Dakar in the
563 normal category of West African cities, where a white city and
a black city stand in contrast (22), a contrast that was the result
[361]

[113] 22. Dresh, J., "Villes d'Afrique occidentale /Cities of West Africa/," Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 1950.

of a de facto segregation imposed, not by law, but by the norms
of urbanism and of hygiene, to which it was impossible for the
bulk of the natives to subject themselves, and also by the high
[465] price of rent -- the non-Africans being nearly always lodged by
their employers. In 1936 Charles Morazé wrote: "Formerly
Europeans and natives lived mixed. Innumerable families lived

/385 cont./

369 563 in small apartments, true caravansaries contained within the European city. This promiscuity was deplorable. Europeans and natives were not in fact subject to the same epidemics; [164] yellow fever, for example, fatal for the white, is benign to the black. The danger of a mixed population was that the epidemics would spread without being stamped out in time. [361] Finally, the system lacked style; therefore as early as 1916 the creation of the native village of Médina was decided upon" (23).

23. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

There it was, in a way, the theory of the urbanism of the West African cities ! Nevertheless the problems of land were so complicated at Dakar (24) between the two world wars

[113] 24. See the work by A. Angrand, Les Lébou de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert (Essai sur leur histoire et leurs coutumes) /The Lébou of the peninsula of Cape Verde (essay on their history and their customs)/. "La Maison du Livre," Dakar.

[167] that, with the Lebano-Syrian immigration and the Crédit [452] Foncier /Mortgage-loan Society/ helping, there was created, in contact with the European city and the Médina, a collection [367] of quarters more mixed in their contents and in their appearance. Up to the end of the Second World War Dakar preserved this appearance of a threefold city. But after the war a series of new factors caused a rapid and brutal evolution in Dakar. The return to normal economic activities after the slack period following the war, the awakening and amplification of political and syndical life, the creation of the Fonds d'Investissement Economique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.), and, finally, the ever greater influx of rural people into Dakar led the federal authorities to take a series of fortunate initiatives. /386//Fig. 4 appears here/

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

Fig. 4. Médina. -- 1. Industrial zone;
2. quarters more or less urbanized;
3. irregular quarters.

369 which progressively transformed the Dakar agglomeration.
563 There was first the creation of the S. T. A. G. D. (Service temporaire de l'aménagement du Grand-Dakar /Temporary
[361] Office for the Arrangement of Greater Dakar/) for a systematic urbanization of the city. Then there was the decision to promote a policy of lodgings for African officials, while a society for a mixed economy, the Société Immobilière du Cap-Vert (S. I. C. A. P.) /Building Society of Cape Verde/
[362] studied and made up forms for cheap dwellings for mere renting or for rent-sale. At the same time there was the law called "Lamine Gueye," which equalized upward several
[465] elements of the African and non-African wages at the time when "l'africanisation des cadres" /Africanization of the
[647] staffs/ was promoted, which led to a mixture of Africans and Europeans in the administrative lodgings and in the new quarters for officials. Finally, first the staff-law and then autonomy

/386 cont./

369 and independence have had the effect of reinforcing this mix-
563 ing the more since it sometimes brings about a pure and simple
substitution of African staffs for European staffs in many of the
lodgings.

Finally, although today the quarters of Dakar are still clearly distinguished by their appearance, the differentiation of their contents is less and less based on origin and tends to be a social rather than racial differentiation. Therefore, instead of the traditional division of the West African cities into "white city and black city," let us distinguish four sections in the Dakar agglomeration: /387/ Dakar-ville, the Médina, Greater Dakar, and the suburbs.

361 1. Dakar-ville. The plateau from the southeast to the
369 head of the peninsula and a part of the plain from Cape Manuel
to the avenue El Hadji Malick Sy constitute what today is
called Dakar-ville. The essential characteristic of this part of
the Dakar agglomeration is that almost all of its buildings are
permanent, except for some islands of huts. This is where
practically all of the administrative offices, the large-scale
[366] commerce, the major part of the Lebano-Syrian commerce,
and the great markets are found. But Dakar-ville shows very
diverse aspects (Pl. XXI B) (Pl. XXIIA).

The Plateau is the best arranged part of Dakar-ville. It
is there that the first nucleus of modern Dakar was located, ex-
tending around the port, from the station to the Protet Plaza
and the Military Circle. Little changed, this nucleus has re-
[363] mained very much as it was at the beginning of the century;
[342] it is intersected by narrow streets, bordered by old houses in
[347] colonial style, with stores on the ground floor and lodgings
with verandas on the upper floor. This nucleus has remained
the business quarter, that of the large-scale commerce domi-
[441] nated by the great companies and the old Bordeaux firms,
C.F.A.O., S.C.O.A., N.O.S.O.C.O., S.O.C.O.P.A.O.,
[366] Chavanel, Maurel et Prom, etc., surrounding the Kernel market,
surmounted by its cupola of 1900 style. Several old administrative

/387 cont./

361 buildings, the General Postoffice, the Treasury, the Town
369 Hall, the former Délégation, the former Palace of Justice,
and the Chambre de Commerce are included there. A "city"
phenomenon tends to be produced in this quarter which, very
lively by day, is almost completely empty at night. Toward
the east this quarter extends along the road to Bel-Air and the
old road to Rufisque by way of the industrial section of Dakar
where the factories have been established largely since the war.
On the northwest, on each side of the avenue W.-Ponty, extends
a mixed quarter, commercial and residential, harboring the
old Lébou families, having benefited from the facilities offered
[427] by the Crédit Foncier, and the Lebano-Syrians and Cape Verdeans
who rent or are quasi-owners as a result of long-term leases.
It is therefore an old quarter that developed especially after
the construction of the commercial port and has preserved its
narrow streets, quite unique today, its low houses dominated
here and there by some recent building. The avenue W.-Ponty,
366 with greatly varied commerce, the avenue Gambetta dominated
369 by the Lebano-Syrian commerce, the avenue Roume bordered
by beautiful buildings and enlivened by luxury commerce, and
finally the avenue Maginot which is shared by great stores of
the West and Lebano-Syrian commerce in fabrics near the market
of Sandaga are the most completely transformed arteries of this
section of the Plateau, where many cafés and restaurants, /388/
cabarets, and cinemas maintain far into the night a nonchalant,
but pleasant animation following the rushing business of the day.

Beyond the Boulevard de la République, which bounds the
369 old quarters on the west and which is distinguished by its many
361 buildings, commerce disappears almost entirely, giving way to a
residential zone of middle-class appearance, with its villas often
more comfortable than stylish. This residential zone, formerly
[563] entirely European, is mixed today, harboring European and
African staffs. Barracks and hospitals separate this quarter from
[712] Cape Manuel, formerly a military zone, but today occupied by
the monumental, Palace of Justice dominating the newly estab-
[344] lished embassies. But all of Dakar-ville is not as well arranged

/388 cont./

369 as the Plateau. The low quarters that border the avenue Malick
361 Sy and which are crossed by the route de l'Abbattoir /Slaughter-
[363] house Road/ quite obviously differ from the rest. In Rebeus and
in Niayes-Thioker, few of the streets are paved, and, during
[364] winter, ponds where household debris rots often surround the low
permanent houses and the neighboring huts.

[162] Dakar-ville has only 46,000 inhabitants, among whom
[563] are almost two-thirds of the 30,000 non-Africans of Dakar.

Gorée, the fallen capital, which has become a military, tourist, and, to a slight extent, residential annex of Dakar, is attached to this section.

[563] 2. The Médina. Containing practically only Africans,
the Médina is much more densely populated than Dakar-ville.
[764] Blocked on the west by the Moslem cemetery and on the north
by the canal of the Gueule-Tapée, the Médina has not ceased
stretching toward the east since its creation during the First
World War. It presents several aspects: the oldest part, east
[363] of the avenue Blaise-Diagne, has all of its streets paved and
planted with trees; it has few huts, and permanent houses are
[364] erected almost everywhere there; many sanitary facilities and
public fountains complement the private establishments and
make this quarter relatively clean and pleasant (Fig. 4 and Pl.
XXII B).[1]

The farther one goes toward the east, however, beyond
the avenue Blaise-Diagne, the newer the quarter is and the more
it gives the appearance of a wretched village. Thus, between
[363] the avenue Blaise-Diagne and the Gendarmerie, although some
[364] principal arteries are paved, most of the streets remain sandy
and obstructed with household rubbish. Moreover, one notes
some permanent houses here and there, to be sure, but huts are
much more numerous. East of the Gendarmerie, Colobane is
even less well arranged, while, beyond the automobile road,
Kip-Coco and Quartier Mous, veritable camp cities for new
arrivals, are called "irregular quarters," that is to say, quarters
temporarily tolerated, although no right of the inhabitants to
settle there can be recognized (Pl. XXIII A).[2] /Pl. XXIII and

[1] [See category 116, p. 16 -- Analyst]

[2] [See Category 116, p. 29 -- Analyst]

/388 cont./
369 Pl. XXIV appear here on unnumbered pages/. /389/ /Fig. 5
361 appears here./

3. Greater Dakar. Of all the sectors of the Dakar agglomeration, Greater Dakar is certainly the one that presents the sharpest contrasts. The quarter of the "Gueule-Tapée" resembles the old Médina, while Fass and "Usine Biscuit" /Biscuit Factory/ remind one of Colobane, but aside from these there stand some modern quarters that are quite varied in appearance, contrasting strongly with the "Médinas," the "Colobanes," and the irregular [873] quarters that surround them. It is in this sector of Greater Dakar that the University is found, raising its majestic buildings on the edge of the sea. It is flanked on the north by the rich quarter of Fann-Résidence where the residences of ministers and members of their cabinets, directors of houses of commerce, and high officials are grouped; to the south military villas and the allotment of Fann Hock separate it from the Gueule-Tapée. Point E, Zone A, Zone B, /390/ the Cité des Douanes /customs/, and that of the Port de Commerce are officials' quarters, while Bopp, formerly a swamp, has in recent years become a pretty little quarter, all the houses of which were built by officials [452] with the aid of the Crédit du Sénégal /Local Association of Senegal/. The S.I.C.A.P. which extend along the route des Puits /Roads of the Wells/ (Karacks, Baobabs, Liberté I, Liberté II, Liberté III, etc.) are pleasant lots intended to facilitate for Africans the acquisition of property (Fig. 5).

Finally, the quarter of Derklé forms, in several groupings of houses, a residence for petty African officials, another one for the African employees of private enterprises, and finally a quarter called the "Castors," the houses of which have been built by their associated and grouped owners with the aid of the public authorities.

[162] Greater Dakar is the most extensive and the heaviest populated sector in the Dakar agglomeration. It includes more than
[565] 73,000 inhabitants, among whom is numbered one-sixth of the non-African population.

[Text continues bottom of p. 31--Analyst]

/1/

125 During the years 1960 and 1961, a demographic investigation by sampling was undertaken over the whole territory, the first one in the history of Senegal. (Administrative counts, city censuses, and an investigation in the central valley of the river /Senegal River/ had been made previously, but never a demographic inquiry covering the whole territory.)

[369] [162] The country has been divided into two large parts: the urban zone, composed of the whole region of Cape Verde and the cities of Thiès, Saint-Louis, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, and Louga; and the rural zone, which includes the rest of the territory. The sampling fraction was 1/50 in the rural zone and 1/20 in the urban zone. Subsequently a sampling to the twentieth was obtained by dividing into two a certain number of maps of the rural zone.

It will be seen merely from the method utilized that it renders illusory the study of small groups /groupes à effectif réduit/. It should be acknowledged from the first that the numbers below 500 (that is, 25 in the sample) are not significant.

II - The Structures:

III - The geographic distribution:

114 162 The operations in the field begun in the month of April 1960 were terminated in the month of August 1961 (April-June '60 for the rural zone, July '60 to August '61 /2/ for the urban zone). It should be acknowledged that on the whole the numbers indicated below correspond to the situation on the date of 1 July 1960. (Table 1 on following page)

This table shows, on the one hand, the low average density and, on the other hand, its great variability.

[563] 161 648 The non-African population is made up essentially of French and Lebano-Syrians. It is heavily concentrated in the urban zone and particularly in Cape Verde; 74% of the non-Africans of Senegal are actually in residence there. Moreover, this concentration has become accentuated in recent years for several reasons: the departure of the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments from Saint-Louis; the closing of a number of agencies in the interior following the
Change in The Commercial Circuits.

Wolof MS30
Serer FA32
Tukolor MS27

/2 cont./

ooochange in the commercial circuits.

S 162 /3/ It should not be without interest to give an idea of the peopling of the various regions by ethnic groups. (Table 2 on following pages)

W [162] It is shown that the Ouoloff /Wolof/ constitute more than a third of the total population. This group is abundantly represented in most of the regions, with the exception of Casamance and Senegal-Oriental. It is known that their arrival has determined the growth of the population of Dakar. It is not impossible that persons belonging to other ethnic groups but speaking Ouoloff have been given as Ouoloff.

SR [162] The Sérère /Serer/ are second in rank from a numerical standpoint. They are relatively grouped in Sine-Saloum and in the region ot Thiès.

T [162] /4/ The Toucouleur /Tukolor/, the majority of whom are in the river region, are scattered throughout the territory; they are, however, less numerous in the region of Diourbel.

W [162] One can also note that the Casamance groups scarcely ever wander away from their region of origin except to come to Dakar, and that the Lébou are largely concentrated in Cape Verde.

S [563] Concerning the non-Africans, whose concentration at Dakar has already been mentioned, one will note the presence of a Lebano-Syrian group in the region of Kaolack and a French group in Saint-Louis and Thiès.

S [369] The population of Senegal is still essentially rural, but the urbanization movement, which is noted in all of the regions by reason of the diversification of economic activity and especially the industrial development, is particularly marked there. This factor will greatly modify the geographical distribution of the population during the coming years.

The following table gives the population of the cities which constitute the urban zone. (Table 3 follows Table 2.)

/5/ In sum, the urban population is close to 705,000 inhabitants and represents 23% of the whole. Dakar alone has 12% of the population of Senegal, which is not abnormal. But

Table 2 Cont.

Ethnic Group	Cape Verde	Casamance	Diourbel	River	Senegal-Orient	Sine-Saloum	Thiès	Senegal
Sarakolé	6	17	1	2	32	5	2	65
Moors	8	1	16	6	0	8	9	48
Lébou	37	-	0	-	0	3	2	42
Other Groups of Black Africa	12	5	0	1	5	3	3	29
Europeans	30	1	0	2	-	1	4	38
Lebano-Syrians	10	-	1	-	-	4	0	15
Eurafricans (Cape-Verdeans)	6	0	0	1	-	0	-	7
Misc.	1	-	0	0	-	0	0	1
Total	444	530	503	345	151	727	410	3,110

/3 cont./

21: Verriere--5 G-5 (1960-1961) 1963 MS37 Senegal MS37
Soninke MSa1
Wolof MS30
5 50 W
162 5 563

/4 cont./

162 Table 3 - Population of the Cities of the Urban Zone (1)

[563]

City	Africans	Non-Africans	Total
Dakar	336,580	38,120	374,700
Kaolack	68,160	1,400	69,560
Thiès	66,940	2,200	69,140
Rufisque-Bargny	48,280	1,380	49,660
Saint-Louis	47,700	1,140	48,840
Ziguinchor	29,520	340	29,840
Diourbel	27,820	740	28,560
Louga	16,120	160	16,280

1. The total population of these cities does not correspond exactly to the population of the urban zone given below, because all of the region of Cape Verde, including the cantons of Sangalkam and Sébikotane, has been included in the urban zone.

[167] /5 cont./ it is necessary to take note of the fact that Dakar has been in existence scarcely more than 75 years. Its rate of growth, remarkably stable since 1890, stays at between 6% and 7% per year. At this rate, Dakar will have 1,275,000 inhabitants in 20 years and will contain a quarter of the inhabitants of Senegal.

The rural population is about 2,390,000 inhabitants distributed in 13,000 communes or villages. The average population of a village is thus less than 200 inhabitants. This fact is not unimportant, because this great dispersion increases the "general expenses" of the nation, if one can use this term. It is obvious that instruction in schools, for example, is more costly when settlements are dispersed, whether the classes have an attendance lower than is normal or whether it is necessary to arrange for collecting the students. There is thus reason for encouraging regroupings as much as possible.

22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

S 797 with which the Society of the Holy Spirit was united in 1848. About the same time a house of the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception (the Blue Sisters) was established at Dakar, which has been the Roman Catholic metropolis of French West Africa ever since.

In 1906, on the separation of Church and State in France, the government subsidies to the Roman Catholic missions were withdrawn. S [162] In 1930 the Roman Catholics in Senegal had 67 European priests, sisters, and lay workers aided by 175 native catechists and teachers. S [368] Professing Roman Catholics numbered 22,300. A magnificent cathedral, the work of many years, was consecrated at Dakar in 1936.

S [162] The only Protestant mission in Senegal is that of the Société des Missions Évangéliques de Paris, which began work in the colony in 1863. Its adherents number about a hundred.

8. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND INLAND TOWNS

Distribution of Population

S *Senegal*

161 Senegal is the third most densely populated colony, with an average of 21·58 persons per square mile and a total population in 1937 of 1,666,374. The distribution, however, varies greatly within the colony itself. The regions of Fouta and Ferlo are almost uninhabitable, while the provinces of Baol, Sine-Saloum, and Thiès have more than 50 persons per square mile. The coastal provinces of Bignona and Ziguinchor, south of the Gambia, are equally closely settled. S [311] [361] The left bank of the Senegal, roughly from Bakel to Podor, supports a fairly dense agricultural population.

Growth has been steady, the figures for 1921, 1926, and 1931 being 1,225,523, 1,318,287, and 1,584,273 respectively. There is no doubt that the colony is capable of supporting many more inhabitants than it does at present.

S 162 563 W [162] [701] *Natives.* More than 580,000 Ouolofs live in Senegal. These are among the most energetic and intelligent peoples of the Federation, and they provide the bulk of the famous Senegalese Tirailleurs. There are about 250,000 each of Sérères, Mandingos, and Fulani, and 150,000 Toucouleur. Broadly speaking, the Ouolofs live north and east of Dakar, the Sérères south-east thereof, the Toucouleur

near the Senegal river, the Fulani in the centre of the colony, and the 162
Mandingos in the east of it. [563]

The District of Dakar

The 66 square miles of the District of Dakar contain 126,929 persons; but the figures for density per square mile mean even less than elsewhere, since most of the inhabitants live in the town itself.

In 1937 there were 118,459 natives and 8,470 Europeans, of whom
6,728 were French. This was about a quarter of the total of Europeans [563]
in the whole Federation.

INLAND TOWNS

BAKEL (14° 52′; 12° 24′ W.) Population, 2,103. Provincial head- 36
quarters. Medical post. Landing-ground. Regional School. [131]
Garage. Daily market. [162]

Bakel is on the left bank of the Senegal (Plate 83) where the
river passes between cliffs some 17 miles below the entrance of
the Falémé. It is a local market for gum, ground-nuts, grain, gold [438]
dust, hides, and ostrich feathers. Most of the inhabitants are Moslems. [162]

By river it is 531 miles from St. Louis and 84 miles from Kayes, [487]
and there is a fortnightly steamer service when the water permits.
By colonial road Bakel is 386 miles from St. Louis, 93 miles from [505]
Matam, and 32 miles from Kidira. A bus service connects all these [491]
places. The river can be crossed by ferry, and from the Mauritanian [494]
bank a poor track leads to Sélibaby (32 miles).

BAMBEY (14° 40′; 16° 25′ W.). Altitude, 59 feet. Population, [131]
4,209. Mixed Commune. Dispensary. Police station. Meteoro- [162]
logical station. Landing-ground. Garage. Agricultural experi- [654]
mental station. Daily market.

Set in the midst of an area of dense population, Bambey is a
prosperous market town. The main product of the locality is [438]
ground-nuts, and large quantities of these are put on the train each
year. They also form the chief speciality of the agricultural experi- [654]
mental station.

Communications. By railway Bambey is 77 miles from Dakar,
33½ miles from Thiès, 17 miles from Diourbel, and 319 miles from
Kidira. It is on the intercolonial road, being 49 miles from Thiès [491]
and 16 miles from Diourbel. A colonial road goes almost due south
to Fatik (27 miles). There is a daily bus service (p. 473) to Fatik, [494]
Foundiougne, and Kaolack.

23: Aujas--10 G-5 (no date) 1929 MS37 Senegal MS37

/Between 100 and 101/

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
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Diourbel
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Gossas
Fatick
SERERES
Guinguineo
Joalo
Foundiougne
Kaolack
Birkel
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Saloum
MANDINGUES
C E R C L E
TOU
O.
ATLANTIQUE
Pᵗᵉ Sangomar
Sokone
RIP
NIOMBATO
Nioro
Koular
Messira
NIOM
Djinnak
Sabap
GAMBIE
Gambie Fl.
BATHURST

Circle of Sine Saloum

/left side of map/

23: Aujas--11 G-5 (no date) 1929 MS37 Senegal MS37

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
OUOLOFS
SINE-SALOUM
PEUHLS
Birkelane
Kaffrine
TOUCOULEURS
Koungheul
NIANIOULI
MANDACK
RIP
Nioro
NIOM
Medina
BIE
ANGLAISE

Circle of Sine Saloum

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